Speaker & Gavel
Volume 42/2005
Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates:
Muted Groups
Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn Prentice
Kritiking as
Argumentative Praxis
Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain
Nothing More than a Little White Lie:
An Examination of Ethics in Extemporaneous
Speaking
Ric L.
Shafer
Winning the Peace:
The “Three Pillars” of George Bush at
Terry Robertson
The Effect
of
Hesham M. Mesbah
Journal of
DELTA SIGMA
Speaker & Gavel
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National Honorary Forensic
Society
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Speaker & Gavel
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Table of
Contents
Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates: 1
Muted Groups
Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn Prentice
Kritiking as
Argumentative Praxis 13
Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain
Nothing More
than a Little White Lie: 28
An Examination of Ethics in Extemporaneous
Speaking
Ric L.
Shafer
Winning the
Peace: 35
The “Three Pillars” of George Bush at
Terry Robertson
The Effect of
on Memory and Metamemory
Hesham M. Mesbah
To Answer,
or Not to Answer— 58
That is the
Question of the Hour:
Speaker & Gavel
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National Honorary Forensic Society
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Daniel Cronn-Mills
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James
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David
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JanieM.
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Karla
Leeper, Baylor U
Allan
Louden,
Mark
Meister, North Dakota State U
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Panetta, U of
Jeff
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Powell, Luther C
David
Williams,
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Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates:
Muted
Groups Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn
Prentice
With the rise of a multitude of
political parties, some campaign debate organizers are beginning to include
third party candidates in their public debates. However, these third party
candidates have been ignored in campaign debate literature. This study analyzed
the transcripts of three campaign debates that included third party candidates,
using muted group theory to understand the impact of third party candidates in
campaign debates. The analysis demonstrates that third party candidates
experience the communication obstacles of muted groups.
Since World War II, party affiliation
among
As pointed out by
Since the exploration of the impact of
third party candidates in debates is a new frontier, I sought the guidance of
an overarching theory to direct my analysis. Third party candidates seem to me a
marginalized group in society, excluded and vilified by major parties and their
cohorts. Thus I considered theories of standpoint and power, but one with an
emphasis on language, since I would be studying third party candidates’ debate
dialogue. The theory that seemed more applicable is muted group theory, which
has heretofore been used principally to examine feminist issues.
Muted group theory was first conceived
by a male anthropologist and later expanded by a feminist communication
scholar. Anthropologist Edwin Ardener first described the concept of muted
groups, specifically focusing on how anthropological research used only male
informants, ignoring and disparaging female informants as inarticulate
(Ardener, 1975a). He suggested that ethnographers were thereby missing the
entire experience of half the population because the informants were muted by
being required to use the language of the dominant half. Because men created
and normed the language, it reflected their experiences, but it also left women
unable to express their experiences except in a crude translation effort to
make the language fit. Cheris Kramarae expanded Ardeners’s ideas to
particularly address feminist issues:
The language of a particular culture does not serve
all its speakers equally, for not all speakers contribute in an equal fashion
to its formulation. Women (and members of other subordinate groups) are not as
free or as able as men to say what they wish, when and where they wish, because
the words and the norms for their use have been formulated by the dominant
group, men. So women cannot as easily or as directly articulate their experiences
as men can. Women’s perceptions differ from those of men because women’s
subordination means they experience life differently. However, the words and
norms for speaking are not generated from or fitted to women’s experiences.
Women are thus “muted.” Their talk is often not considered of much value by
men—who are or appear to be, deaf and blind to much of women’s experiences. Words
constantly ignored may eventually come to be unspoken and perhaps even
unthought. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 1)
Ardener noted that “muted” has two
distinct meanings relevant here: “Mute” means “without speech” and also
“reduced in perceptibility” (Ardener, 1975b). Although Kramarae and others
(Kramarae, 1981; Rubin, 1993; Spender, 1984; Turner, 1992) have used muted
group theory to explore women’s issues in society, the theory is not limited to
gender issues. As Ardener pointed out when he introduced the concept, “The woman
case is only a relatively prominent example of muting; one that has clear
political, biological, and social symbols. The real problem is that all
world-structures are totalitarian in tendency” (Ardener, 1975b, p. 25). Thus
Ardener recognized that other groups, particularly political groups, might also
be seen as muted groups. This paper will use muted group theory to examine how
third party candidates, when allowed to participate in public campaign debates,
seem inarticulate and undependable because they are judged by the standard of
the political rhetoric and worldview of the major parties.
If third party candidates exemplify the
communication problems of a muted group, then Kramarae’s three assumptions
should be true of them, with the language adjusted by substituting “major
parties” for “men” and “third party” for “women.” Thus adjusted, the three
assumptions include:
1.
Third parties
perceive the world differently from major parties because of third parties’ and
major parties’ different experiences and activities rooted in different
political ideologies.
2.
Because of their
political dominance, the major parties’ system of perception is dominant,
impeding the free expression of the third parties’ alternative models of the
world.
3.
In order to
participate in debates third parties must transform their own models in terms
of the received major party system of expression. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 3)
Method
To test
these assumptions as adjusted to apply to third party candidates in debates, I
analyzed three campaign debates that included third party candidates: (1) Anne
Northrup vs. Eleanor Jordan vs. Donna Mancini (Kentucky Third District
Congressional race, 2000); (2) Jean Carnahan vs. Jim Talent vs. Daniel Romano
vs. Tamara Millay (Missouri Senate race, 2002); and (3) Howard Dean vs. Ruth
Dwyer vs. Anthony Pollina (Vermont gubernatorial race, 2002). These debates
were chosen because they each included at least one third party candidate who
was not a nationally known figure that had defected from another party. In addition,
the three represent a cross-section of the different levels where third party
candidates are most likely to be invited to participate in campaign debates. For
my analysis I reviewed both the videotapes and the transcripts of these three
debates. The
Analysis
In this section I examine the three
debates in terms of the three assumptions of the muted group theory, simplified
as Different Worldview, Impeded Free Expression, and Attempt to Transform
Model.
The Kentucky Third District
Congressional race in 2000 included incumbent Anne Northrup (Republican), Donna
Mancini (Libertarian), and Eleanor Jordan (Democrat). The debate included a
two-minute opening statement from each candidate, followed by four questions
from local journalists that were answered in turn by all candidates for 90 seconds.
Then each candidate had 30 seconds to ask one question of another candidate of
her choosing, with a one-minute response, and a one-minute rebuttal. Then the
journalists asked different questions to each individual candidate. And
finally, each candidate made a two-minute closing statement. Excerpts from this
debate clearly show that the third party candidate expresses a different
worldview and this expression is impeded by the worldview of the major party
candidates.
As a Libertarian candidate, Donna
Mancini differed from the others in that she did not view the debate as
increasing her chances to win an election, but as an opportunity to share the
Libertarian message with a larger audience. In both her opening and closing
statements she expressed thanks for being invited, saying it was a “wonderful
opportunity to share my views with the citizens.” She did not explicitly ask
for a vote. Her opening and closing statements express a clearly different
perception of the political world:
The Libertarian offer is to keep your money and run
your own life . . . This is to end the personal income tax and to replace it
with nothing, end the insane war on drugs, and to free you of the social
security pawn scam and let you plan your own secure retirement. [opening
statement]
I think that the important
thing that the American people really have to start to think about is how much
more control do we want to give the federal government over our lives? . . . I
truly believe that our country is going downhill quick. I think that we have to
turn this thing around and put people back in charge of their own lives, give
them their money back, their freedom back, let them make their own choices. . .
. I love
What’s striking about these statements
is that no major party candidate would make such a doomsday proclamation about
the state of the country nor likely characterize an anointed political reality
such as Social Security as a “scam.”
Major party candidates typically impede
the free expression of third party candidates’ worldview by three principal
tactics: Ignoring their claims, appearing confused (verbally or nonverbally) by
the claims, or actively attacking the claims made. In the Kentucky House
debate, the major party candidates chose to simply ignore the claims made by
the third party candidate, a tactic supported by the format of the debate,
which basically allowed only 90-second answers to specific questions. Therefore,
the major party candidates focused on their own records and ideology and
occasional attacks on their major party opponent. Although Mancini was able to
state her views in the debate, the two other candidates addressed her only
once, and did not refer to her positions or refute her claims. When given an
opportunity to question another candidate, the major party candidates simply
traded questions with each other. When Mancini got her opportunity to ask a
question of Jordan, the Democrat, Mancini rambled a little, but when pressed
for time, she asked a very specific question: “What is your answer to the
insane war on drugs, what is your plan to end it?” To this very direct
question,
One of the problems of a debate format
in which the same questions are asked of all candidates is that questions are
specifically worded to reflect the worldviews of the major parties. In the
Kentucky House debate, all candidates were asked whether they favored the Bush
or Gore plan for retirement savings, both of which specifically mentioned a
Social Security Trust fund. The major party candidates expressed support along
the expected party lines, but as a Libertarian, Mancini could not directly
answer the question:
Well, I prefer Harry Brown’s plan, which is
the great Libertarian offer, and that would allow people to take care of their
income tax money, to keep it themselves . . . There is no social security trust
fund . . . it’s a pawn scheme that’s insolvent with younger workers paying for
older workers . . . it’s my responsibility to take care of my own retirement
and we would all be better off if we just put our money in a savings account
than invest it in social security.
Similarly, when asked how to spend the projected
budget surplus, she replied:
How can you say we have a
budget surplus when we are so many trillion dollars in debt? . . . As far as
I’m concerned, when people are in debt, they have no extra money, they need to
use the money they have to pay their bills.
Both of these examples demonstrate that
questions formulated for major party candidates set up the third party
candidates to express seemingly “way out” views in contrast to the saner, more
familiar views of major party candidates. Without adequate discussion and
rebuttal time, third party candidates are thus muted by an inability to clearly
articulate their worldviews.
Similar to Mancini, the Libertarian
candidate discussed above, Millay expressed a different worldview early in the
debate. She said that she did not expect to win, and then addressed why she
would choose to run in an election she had no hope of winning:
This election has seemed so far, flip a coin. Public
dialogue has revealed no substantive difference between my major party opponents.
They both want lower taxes and higher spending and a balanced budget. They both
want more damaging intrusions into health care. They both want to save a failed
and dishonest Social Security System, instead of getting serious about replacing
it while there’s still time. They’re both willing to sacrifice American lives
on the altar of a failed foreign policy and to sacrifice American rights on
failed schemes like the war on drugs and gun control. I’m the only candidate on
this stage that stands for less government and more freedom. I’m the only one
who can swear the oath with a clear conscience, to defend and protect the
Constitution. I believe that Missourians deserve the opportunity to vote for
those things.
Thus, Millay framed her view of the race
as between her and everyone else, that the major party opponents really had the
same political worldview, and that she stood in opposition as the only real
choice, the only person for the government that is enacted by the
Constitution—a worldview that differed dramatically from the major party
candidates.
Similarly, although he did
not state explicitly that he did not expect to win, Green Party Candidate
Romano voiced a different reason for running for office, reflecting a different
alternative worldview:
I am the Missouri Green Party’s candidate, because I
want to open up the political dialogue in this country. I feel that there are a
lot of issues that have been suppressed and are off the radar screen, important
issues. And the reason is because the major political parties in this country
have become dependent on money from corporate sources. So what happens is that
they end up representing the interests of big money, instead of the working people.
I’m talking about issues like the over-consumption of oil in this country,
which has necessitated intervention and invasion of a foreign country to secure
access to fossil fuels.
Like Millay, Romano positioned himself
as standing in opposition to the major party candidates who are essentially
identical in their worldviews. He bothered to run in a sure-to-lose campaign
because he wanted to share his worldview with voters. Romano’s comment about
issues being “off the radar screen” indicated that he recognizes that he
represented a different worldview that had been muted by the major parties.
Even though the third party candidates
were invited to debate, their free expression of their worldviews was impeded
by the dominance of the major parties’ model. In this debate major party
candidates for the most part ignored the claims made by the third party
candidates, although at times pointing out disagreements or obliquely attacking
the third party stance. For example, when Romano expressed his opposition to
drilling in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge and suggested supporting
alternative energy, Talent said, “Digger and I have a mild disagreement on this
one” (notice his casual use of his opponent’s nickname). This rather flippant
reference to the Green Party worldview casts their stances as “other”—and
thereby muted.
In this debate, the third party
candidates attempted to transform their worldviews in terms of the major party
models principally through pointing out agreements with the major party
candidates and refraining from attacking the major party candidates. For example,
when asked about criteria for choosing Supreme Court judges, Millay explicitly
expressed agreement with Jim Talent that competency and honesty were more
important than partisan issues. Later on, Romano pointed out a similarity that
he had with Senator Carnahan in being a newcomer to the politics of elected
positions. In a statement that supported both himself and Carnahan, he says: “But
I think that we can see that fresh voices in the legislature can add a lot to a
legislative process.” Similarly, Millay expressed mild support for Carnahan
with these words: “I’m sure that there is quite a learning curve for any new
legislator. And personally I don’t have any issues with Mrs. Carnahan’s
learning curve.” Other than a very brief joint attack on Attorney General John
Ashcraft—not a contender in the election—the third party candidates simply
attacked the political system in general, never their individual opponents, a
tactic that made them appear reasonable and considerate in a campaign that had
been marked by the major parties trading accusations and attacks.
As is typical for campaign debates, the
journalist’s questions controlled the format, being formulated principally for
the major party candidates, even though the journalists attempted to offer the
third party candidates alternative questions. For example, one of the
questions, “Who is your political role model?” on the surface seemed a sincere
attempt to more fully engage the third party candidates, although it is not
clear how one’s role model predicts one’s ability to serve in office. Nevertheless,
in answering the question, Romano reveals his non-traditional political roots,
roots that many Americans might find disturbing:
Political role model . . . Well, that’s an interesting
. . . One of the many that I can think of would the Zapatistas of Mexico and
Comandante Marcos. Because although they have exercised their right to arm
themselves, they have stayed away, for the most part from using this violence
as a way to protect the peasants’ rights to access the land. And they’re
standing up for the poor people that are getting rolled over in this so-called
globalization.
Although he was able to frame his answer
as related to his ideology, to most of the mainstream American public, holding
up what they perceive to be Mexican rebels as political role models is almost
traitorous! The other three candidates chose more familiar American
politicians. Thus a question that could have been intended to facilitate third
party candidates, actually served to emphasize their marginal, possibly
traitorous positions as muted groups.
The 2000
But this attempt for the muted group
member to transform his worldview in order to participate more fully backfired.
Since
Another issue that illustrates the
dominance of major party rhetoric in muting third party candidates is the
popular perception that third party candidates are spoilers and vote stealers. Preliminary
research has suggested that many of those who vote third party would otherwise
not vote at all (Ardener, 1975a; Luks et al., 2003; Sifry, 2002; Winger, 2002);
nevertheless, one often hears that a vote for a third party candidate is wasted
or is really a vote for the other major party opponent. Major party candidates
promote this worldview because it preserves their power. However, in the
debates analyzed here, third party candidates articulated a different vision of
how third party candidates enhance democracy and how voters must exercise their
responsibility to vote for the best choice. For example, Romano from
The Green Party is not taking away votes from any
other party because no other party owns those votes. The voters own those
votes. And look at our elections. We’re seeing 70 percent of people not voting.
So they’re making a statement there. The statement they’re making is that no
party, none of the major parties, is representing us. (Romano, 2002)
Similarly, Mancini from
I think the average person in this day . . . think
maybe that this is hopeless and that’s why so many people just don’t go to the
polls, and they think they’re going to get opposite sides of the same coin. . .
. (Mancini, 2000)
The third party candidates
offer disillusioned citizens a different vision of democracy, one that asks
them to participate in changing the system. However, this different vision is
muted by the format and rhetoric of campaign debates geared toward major party
candidates.
Discussion
This study represents an exploration of
uncharted territory using a traditionally feminist theory to examine how the
voices of third party candidates although invited to participate, are
nevertheless muted in campaign debates. The dominance of the major party
worldview prevents third party candidates from effectively articulating their
alternative worldviews in a debate. When third party candidates are not
considered serious contenders, major party candidates simply ignore their
positions or act confused by them. The debate format may not allow adequate
time to fully articulate a position or questions may be inappropriate for third
party candidates, leading them to make statements that can be misinterpreted by
the voting public. However, when third party candidates come close to being
taken seriously, their issues may be taken up by the major party, thus blurring
the differences between the ideologies. This blurring is not a bad thing in
itself because such movement shows that third parties do impact the political
system. However, they remain muted groups and many of their issues remain “off the
radar screen,” and they are viewed with suspicion because major parties refuse
to seriously engage them in dialogue.
This analysis demonstrates the dilemma
that confronts members of muted groups when they seek to gain greater
consideration and participation in their societies. An invitation to
participate in campaign debates may be problematic for third party candidates. On
one hand, the debate is a golden opportunity to showcase their beliefs and to
get media coverage for their critical perspectives. On the other hand, the deck
is stacked against them. Because major party candidates are more familiar, the
major party positions are more easily articulated to and grasped by the public
in 90-second sound bites. Encapsulating an entirely different political
worldview in a few short answers is an impossible task for third party
candidates. In addition, questions may be inappropriate, patronizing, or
booby-trapped for third party candidates, and thus answering them may result in
simply confirming their “way-out” image in the public’s eye. In addition, in
order to enter the system they criticize and seek to change, they have to play
the game and develop a discourse strategy that is closer to major party
politics as usual—resulting in a blurring of difference and the possibility of
becoming what they criticize.
Third party candidates must evaluate the
benefits and losses that may come with accepting an invitation to participate
in a campaign debate. Specifically, third party candidates should consider the
following:
·
What are their
goals in participating in a debate? Do they hope to garner more votes or simply
educate the public on their positions?
·
How can they
emphasize their political records and not simply their political ideologies?
·
Can they clearly
articulate their party differences in the short response times allotted?
·
Can they be
ideologically loyal and yet articulate a worldview that will appeal to the
American public?
·
How will they
respond to agreement by major party candidates on their issues?
·
How will they
address the image of third party candidates as election spoilers who somehow
steal the votes that belong to major party candidates?
Thus third party candidates may find
that the invitation to debate should be considered carefully to see if their
participation will advance their political goals.
Further study of third party campaigns
is warranted, but it will be hindered by the fact that debates that include
third party candidates are uncommon, not to mention rarely recorded and
transcribed, and thus are unavailable for examination. Complicating third party
study is that the fact that there are so many different parties with different
ideologies and approaches. Nevertheless, a concerted effort to locate, record
and transcribe these debates on a variety of levels could yield interesting
research findings. These, coupled with research into who votes for third party
candidates and why, might dispel the notion that third party candidates are
spoilers that threaten the stability of the
Works Cited
Ardener,
E. (1975a). Belief and the problem of women. In
Ardener,
E. (1975b). The ‘problem’ revisited. In
Kramarae,
C. (1981). Women and men speaking.
Lacy,
D., & Monson, Q. (2002). The origins and impact of votes for third-party
candidates: A case study of the 1998
Luks,
S., Miller, J. M., & Jacobs, L. R. (2003). Who wins? Campaigns and the
third party vote. Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 33, 9-30.
Miller,
W. E., & Shanks, J. M. (1996). The
new American voter.
Rubin,
D. (1993). Gender influences: Reading
student texts.
Sachs,
D. C. (2003). D.C.’s political report: Minor parties link. Retrieved December
15, 2003 from http://dcpoliticalreport.com/PartyLink.htm
Sifry,
M. L. (2002). Spoiling for a fight:
Third-party politics in
Southwell,
P. L. (2003). The politics of alienation: Nonvoting and support for third-party
candidates among 18-30-year olds. The
Social Science Journal, 40, 99-107.
Spender,
D. (1984). Defining reality: A powerful tool. In C. Kramarae & M. Schulz
& W. M. O’Barr (Eds.), Language and
Power (pp. 194-205).
Turner,
L. H. (1992). An analysis of words coined by women and men: Reflections on the
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Winger, R.
(2002). More choice please! Why
Carolyn Prentice (Ph.D.,
University of Missouri-Columbia) is an assistant professor of Communication
Studies at the
Kritiking
as Argumentative Praxis
Joseph P.
Zompetti and Brian Lain
Introduction
Controversies in the
realm of academic debate are often assessed with the standards used for other
social science confrontations. The notion of paradigms, introduced by Thomas
Kuhn (1970) to describe scientific revolutions, provides a starting point for
analyzing the current conflict over kritiking.1 Despite this, previous
discussions concerning the so-called “kritik” have focused mainly on whether it
should be considered a legitimate argument form in contemporary policy debate
(Berube, 1996; Katsulas, 1996/1997; Morris, 1996/1997). In this way, these
discussions have become embroiled in a back-and-forth squabbling.
Overcoming the tendency to steadfastly proclaim the legitimacy/illegitimacy of
kritiks as an argument form is necessary if we are to extend argument theory in
relation to the kritik.
In an effort to explore
and extend argument theory, we offer three main positions in this essay. First,
we argue that there is an emerging paradigm,2 which we call the
“questioning-assumptions paradigm” that is evolving out of a conflict with the
current policy-making paradigm. After describing the current controversy
between these paradigms in debate, the major arguments lodged against kritiking
(as a way of viewing argument rather than as an argument form) will be
explained as a way of analyzing the paradigmatic differences, especially with
the concept of fiat. Second, we suggest that there is room for dialogue among
these two paradigms that lies within the concept of fiat. Policy-making is concerned
with what the judge does when adjudicating a “policy.” The
questioning-assumptions paradigm is concerned with how a judge endorses a
“process,” which we call “fiat kritiking.” We argue that a bridge of compromise
can be forged between these two concepts of fiat. Finally, we offer this
conception of kritiking as a means of argumentative praxis, whereby argument
theory is coupled with a unique experience of debate “action.” In this way, we
suggest that kritiking is an exciting area for both argument theory and
contemporary debate practice that, at the very least, deserves an investigation
which transcends the already stale “legitimate/illegitimate” dispute that has
characterized previous kritik discussions.
Thomas Kuhn (1970), in
his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, introduces the idea of systems of thought operating in
paradigms. Along these lines, we may view a paradigm as a worldview or
conceptual model “shared by members of a scholarly community that defines how
inquiry within the community should be conducted” (Smith, 1988, p. 299). More
specifically, Kuhn explicates the idea of a paradigm in two ways:
On the one hand, it stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members
of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that
constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the
remaining puzzles of normal science. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175)
Paradigms, therefore,
are characterized by their different ways of seeing and “knowing” the world.
This feature removes the “truth” variable of one paradigm from another; in
other words, paradigms simply see the world differently. Kuhn explains that it
is inaccurate to describe different paradigms as unscientific just because
several of their tenets are called into question by the preceding paradigm,
since “What differentiated these various schools was not one or another failure
of method — they were all ‘scientific’ — but what we shall come to call their
incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it”
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 4).
Paradigms are often
applied to systems of debate theory (Pfau, Thomas & Ulrich, 1987).
Paradigms are used to examine how the entire worldview of debate participants
and judges is affected in different ways. Usually, two or more paradigms are
compared to illustrate the conflicts between the differing worldviews. In fact,
as one paradigm emerges, it is often thought that the existing, predominant
paradigm becomes replaced. Within the debate context, Pfau and his colleagues
(1987) have expressed that “[d]ebate is generated by shifts in paradigms.
During this period of transition between the era dominated by the ‘normal’
paradigm, and the new era when the alternative paradigm replaces it, many
controversies and debates are conducted over the whole nature of the field and
the specific methods used to study and advance the field” (pp. 6-7).
The policy-making
paradigm has been described as the prevailing paradigm in contemporary debate
history. Generally, this paradigm prescribes the roles of debaters and judges
by using a making-of-policy model, such as the U.S. Congress. Ziegelmueller,
Harris and Bloomingdale (1995) explain:
A . . . model of debate is derived from
an analogy to the policy making process typified by congressional decision
making. The subject matter of the debate is typically concerned with the
development of public policy. Consequently, theorists have suggested modeling
the argument practices found in congressional debates. (pp. 18-19)
Without going into all
of the formal tenets of the policy-making paradigm, we should have a general
feeling of what this view of debating is about. As a deductive model of debate,
it seeks to “force nature [debate] into the conceptual boxes supplied by
professional education” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 5).
Given the predominance
of the policy-making paradigm, alternative or competing paradigms have been
relatively few in number in the past few years. One such recent challenge has
been the hypothesis-testing paradigm which views the debate round as a
laboratory that “tests” different (and not necessarily mutually-exclusive)
methods of change, as if they were “hypothesis” statements (Hollihan, 1983;
Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Zarefsky & Henderson, 1983). Yet, the
prevailing support for the policy-making paradigm has resulted in a general
dismissal of the hypothesis-testing paradigm as a viable or accepted worldview.
In the wake of this type of paradigmatic flux, we believe this is the first
time that the argument style of “kritiking” has been presented as a separate
paradigm. Indeed, we feel that this paradigmatic flux may mean that
policy-making as a paradigm is particularly vulnerable to challenge, or that
“kritiking” as a paradigm may be premature. Nevertheless, the responses from
the margins of the debate community concerning the viability of the kritik as
an appropriate argument form has gained increasing acceptance. Thus, for our
purposes here, we suggest that engaging in kritiking may represent a developing
worldview that might be called the “questioning-assumptions” paradigm.
Difficulty exists in
describing this amorphous paradigm. Even as this description will no doubt
reveal, new suppositions and opinions are made about this paradigm at an
increasing rate. It would be impossible to produce a set of rules or
characterize the identities of all who support the questioning-assumptions
paradigm. Not only does the style of this paradigm subvert an explicit
definition, as we shall see later, but it is also impossible to describe the
differing views of each individual in the debate community who supports the
kritik as an argumentative form. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is similar to
what Kuhn describes as a “challenging” paradigm. While discussing the scientists’
response to the revolutionary notions of
They can, that is, agree
on their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even
attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization
of it. Lack of a standard interpretation of an agreed reduction to rules will
not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. . . .Indeed, the existence of a
paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exist. (1970, p. 44)
Although Kuhn does not do much to describe the
“maturing” process of a challenging paradigm, he clearly expresses that even
the formation of a paradigm may be classified as a worldview:
To that end it may help to point out that
the transition need not (I now think should not) be associated with the first
acquisition of a paradigm. The members of all scientific communities, including
the schools of the “pre-paradigm” period, share the sorts of elements which I
have collectively labelled [sic] a “paradigm.” (1970, p. 179)
Thus, our conception of
questioning assumptions might also be labeled a “paradigm.” While we agree with
Kuhn in describing the nature of a paradigm, we part with his belief that
paradigms are mutually exclusive, or that when one paradigm emerges it
necessarily displaces the existing paradigm. We believe that paradigms can
co-exist and even, at times, share common threads within their respective
worldviews. With the so-called judging “paradigms” or “philosophies” that exist
in academic debate, we know that some judges have changed their paradigms, even
in the middle of a debate round, because their personal beliefs intervened in
the adjudicating process. Debate participants themselves also undergo
fundamental “worldview” changes that may not be inconsistent with their prior
ways of thinking. Our contention is that these paradigms always already
intersect. It is our failure to negotiate this intersection that has created
the paradigmatic tension.
With this in mind, we maintain that the questioning-assumptions paradigm is comprised of three crucial tenets. These tenets indicate how the questioning-assumptions paradigm is both significant and important for resolving paradigmatic conflict. First, advocates of the questioning-assumptions paradigm hold that debate arguments contain “taken-for-granteds” (Hazen, 1989; Hopper, 1981; Schutz, 1967). The concept of taken-for-granteds, according to Hopper (1981), refers to “[u]ncoded, ‘between-the-lines’ information” (p. 196) that “are missing premises of messages” and are “frequently understood [sic] as if spoken” (p. 207). The questioning