Speaker & Gavel
Volume 42/2005
Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates:
Muted Groups
Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn Prentice
Kritiking as
Argumentative Praxis
Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain
Nothing More than a Little White Lie:
An Examination of Ethics in Extemporaneous
Speaking
Ric L.
Shafer
Winning the Peace:
The “Three Pillars” of George Bush at
Terry Robertson
The Effect
of
Hesham M. Mesbah
Journal of
DELTA SIGMA
Speaker & Gavel
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National Honorary Forensic
Society
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Speaker & Gavel
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Table of
Contents
Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates: 1
Muted Groups
Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn Prentice
Kritiking as
Argumentative Praxis 13
Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain
Nothing More
than a Little White Lie: 28
An Examination of Ethics in Extemporaneous
Speaking
Ric L.
Shafer
Winning the
Peace: 35
The “Three Pillars” of George Bush at
Terry Robertson
The Effect of
on Memory and Metamemory
Hesham M. Mesbah
To Answer,
or Not to Answer— 58
That is the
Question of the Hour:
Speaker & Gavel
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National Honorary Forensic Society
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Daniel Cronn-Mills
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James
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David
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JanieM.
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Karla
Leeper, Baylor U
Allan
Louden,
Mark
Meister, North Dakota State U
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Panetta, U of
Jeff
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Powell, Luther C
David
Williams,
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Third Party
Candidates in Political Debates:
Muted
Groups Struggling to Express Themselves
Carolyn
Prentice
With the rise of a multitude of
political parties, some campaign debate organizers are beginning to include
third party candidates in their public debates. However, these third party
candidates have been ignored in campaign debate literature. This study analyzed
the transcripts of three campaign debates that included third party candidates,
using muted group theory to understand the impact of third party candidates in
campaign debates. The analysis demonstrates that third party candidates
experience the communication obstacles of muted groups.
Since World War II, party affiliation
among
As pointed out by
Since the exploration of the impact of
third party candidates in debates is a new frontier, I sought the guidance of
an overarching theory to direct my analysis. Third party candidates seem to me a
marginalized group in society, excluded and vilified by major parties and their
cohorts. Thus I considered theories of standpoint and power, but one with an
emphasis on language, since I would be studying third party candidates’ debate
dialogue. The theory that seemed more applicable is muted group theory, which
has heretofore been used principally to examine feminist issues.
Muted group theory was first conceived
by a male anthropologist and later expanded by a feminist communication
scholar. Anthropologist Edwin Ardener first described the concept of muted
groups, specifically focusing on how anthropological research used only male
informants, ignoring and disparaging female informants as inarticulate
(Ardener, 1975a). He suggested that ethnographers were thereby missing the
entire experience of half the population because the informants were muted by
being required to use the language of the dominant half. Because men created
and normed the language, it reflected their experiences, but it also left women
unable to express their experiences except in a crude translation effort to
make the language fit. Cheris Kramarae expanded Ardeners’s ideas to
particularly address feminist issues:
The language of a particular culture does not serve
all its speakers equally, for not all speakers contribute in an equal fashion
to its formulation. Women (and members of other subordinate groups) are not as
free or as able as men to say what they wish, when and where they wish, because
the words and the norms for their use have been formulated by the dominant
group, men. So women cannot as easily or as directly articulate their experiences
as men can. Women’s perceptions differ from those of men because women’s
subordination means they experience life differently. However, the words and
norms for speaking are not generated from or fitted to women’s experiences.
Women are thus “muted.” Their talk is often not considered of much value by
men—who are or appear to be, deaf and blind to much of women’s experiences. Words
constantly ignored may eventually come to be unspoken and perhaps even
unthought. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 1)
Ardener noted that “muted” has two
distinct meanings relevant here: “Mute” means “without speech” and also
“reduced in perceptibility” (Ardener, 1975b). Although Kramarae and others
(Kramarae, 1981; Rubin, 1993; Spender, 1984; Turner, 1992) have used muted
group theory to explore women’s issues in society, the theory is not limited to
gender issues. As Ardener pointed out when he introduced the concept, “The woman
case is only a relatively prominent example of muting; one that has clear
political, biological, and social symbols. The real problem is that all
world-structures are totalitarian in tendency” (Ardener, 1975b, p. 25). Thus
Ardener recognized that other groups, particularly political groups, might also
be seen as muted groups. This paper will use muted group theory to examine how
third party candidates, when allowed to participate in public campaign debates,
seem inarticulate and undependable because they are judged by the standard of
the political rhetoric and worldview of the major parties.
If third party candidates exemplify the
communication problems of a muted group, then Kramarae’s three assumptions
should be true of them, with the language adjusted by substituting “major
parties” for “men” and “third party” for “women.” Thus adjusted, the three
assumptions include:
1.
Third parties
perceive the world differently from major parties because of third parties’ and
major parties’ different experiences and activities rooted in different
political ideologies.
2.
Because of their
political dominance, the major parties’ system of perception is dominant,
impeding the free expression of the third parties’ alternative models of the
world.
3.
In order to
participate in debates third parties must transform their own models in terms
of the received major party system of expression. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 3)
Method
To test
these assumptions as adjusted to apply to third party candidates in debates, I
analyzed three campaign debates that included third party candidates: (1) Anne
Northrup vs. Eleanor Jordan vs. Donna Mancini (Kentucky Third District
Congressional race, 2000); (2) Jean Carnahan vs. Jim Talent vs. Daniel Romano
vs. Tamara Millay (Missouri Senate race, 2002); and (3) Howard Dean vs. Ruth
Dwyer vs. Anthony Pollina (Vermont gubernatorial race, 2002). These debates
were chosen because they each included at least one third party candidate who
was not a nationally known figure that had defected from another party. In addition,
the three represent a cross-section of the different levels where third party
candidates are most likely to be invited to participate in campaign debates. For
my analysis I reviewed both the videotapes and the transcripts of these three
debates. The
Analysis
In this section I examine the three
debates in terms of the three assumptions of the muted group theory, simplified
as Different Worldview, Impeded Free Expression, and Attempt to Transform
Model.
The Kentucky Third District
Congressional race in 2000 included incumbent Anne Northrup (Republican), Donna
Mancini (Libertarian), and Eleanor Jordan (Democrat). The debate included a
two-minute opening statement from each candidate, followed by four questions
from local journalists that were answered in turn by all candidates for 90 seconds.
Then each candidate had 30 seconds to ask one question of another candidate of
her choosing, with a one-minute response, and a one-minute rebuttal. Then the
journalists asked different questions to each individual candidate. And
finally, each candidate made a two-minute closing statement. Excerpts from this
debate clearly show that the third party candidate expresses a different
worldview and this expression is impeded by the worldview of the major party
candidates.
As a Libertarian candidate, Donna
Mancini differed from the others in that she did not view the debate as
increasing her chances to win an election, but as an opportunity to share the
Libertarian message with a larger audience. In both her opening and closing
statements she expressed thanks for being invited, saying it was a “wonderful
opportunity to share my views with the citizens.” She did not explicitly ask
for a vote. Her opening and closing statements express a clearly different
perception of the political world:
The Libertarian offer is to keep your money and run
your own life . . . This is to end the personal income tax and to replace it
with nothing, end the insane war on drugs, and to free you of the social
security pawn scam and let you plan your own secure retirement. [opening
statement]
I think that the important
thing that the American people really have to start to think about is how much
more control do we want to give the federal government over our lives? . . . I
truly believe that our country is going downhill quick. I think that we have to
turn this thing around and put people back in charge of their own lives, give
them their money back, their freedom back, let them make their own choices. . .
. I love
What’s striking about these statements
is that no major party candidate would make such a doomsday proclamation about
the state of the country nor likely characterize an anointed political reality
such as Social Security as a “scam.”
Major party candidates typically impede
the free expression of third party candidates’ worldview by three principal
tactics: Ignoring their claims, appearing confused (verbally or nonverbally) by
the claims, or actively attacking the claims made. In the Kentucky House
debate, the major party candidates chose to simply ignore the claims made by
the third party candidate, a tactic supported by the format of the debate,
which basically allowed only 90-second answers to specific questions. Therefore,
the major party candidates focused on their own records and ideology and
occasional attacks on their major party opponent. Although Mancini was able to
state her views in the debate, the two other candidates addressed her only
once, and did not refer to her positions or refute her claims. When given an
opportunity to question another candidate, the major party candidates simply
traded questions with each other. When Mancini got her opportunity to ask a
question of Jordan, the Democrat, Mancini rambled a little, but when pressed
for time, she asked a very specific question: “What is your answer to the
insane war on drugs, what is your plan to end it?” To this very direct
question,
One of the problems of a debate format
in which the same questions are asked of all candidates is that questions are
specifically worded to reflect the worldviews of the major parties. In the
Kentucky House debate, all candidates were asked whether they favored the Bush
or Gore plan for retirement savings, both of which specifically mentioned a
Social Security Trust fund. The major party candidates expressed support along
the expected party lines, but as a Libertarian, Mancini could not directly
answer the question:
Well, I prefer Harry Brown’s plan, which is
the great Libertarian offer, and that would allow people to take care of their
income tax money, to keep it themselves . . . There is no social security trust
fund . . . it’s a pawn scheme that’s insolvent with younger workers paying for
older workers . . . it’s my responsibility to take care of my own retirement
and we would all be better off if we just put our money in a savings account
than invest it in social security.
Similarly, when asked how to spend the projected
budget surplus, she replied:
How can you say we have a
budget surplus when we are so many trillion dollars in debt? . . . As far as
I’m concerned, when people are in debt, they have no extra money, they need to
use the money they have to pay their bills.
Both of these examples demonstrate that
questions formulated for major party candidates set up the third party
candidates to express seemingly “way out” views in contrast to the saner, more
familiar views of major party candidates. Without adequate discussion and
rebuttal time, third party candidates are thus muted by an inability to clearly
articulate their worldviews.
Similar to Mancini, the Libertarian
candidate discussed above, Millay expressed a different worldview early in the
debate. She said that she did not expect to win, and then addressed why she
would choose to run in an election she had no hope of winning:
This election has seemed so far, flip a coin. Public
dialogue has revealed no substantive difference between my major party opponents.
They both want lower taxes and higher spending and a balanced budget. They both
want more damaging intrusions into health care. They both want to save a failed
and dishonest Social Security System, instead of getting serious about replacing
it while there’s still time. They’re both willing to sacrifice American lives
on the altar of a failed foreign policy and to sacrifice American rights on
failed schemes like the war on drugs and gun control. I’m the only candidate on
this stage that stands for less government and more freedom. I’m the only one
who can swear the oath with a clear conscience, to defend and protect the
Constitution. I believe that Missourians deserve the opportunity to vote for
those things.
Thus, Millay framed her view of the race
as between her and everyone else, that the major party opponents really had the
same political worldview, and that she stood in opposition as the only real
choice, the only person for the government that is enacted by the
Constitution—a worldview that differed dramatically from the major party
candidates.
Similarly, although he did
not state explicitly that he did not expect to win, Green Party Candidate
Romano voiced a different reason for running for office, reflecting a different
alternative worldview:
I am the Missouri Green Party’s candidate, because I
want to open up the political dialogue in this country. I feel that there are a
lot of issues that have been suppressed and are off the radar screen, important
issues. And the reason is because the major political parties in this country
have become dependent on money from corporate sources. So what happens is that
they end up representing the interests of big money, instead of the working people.
I’m talking about issues like the over-consumption of oil in this country,
which has necessitated intervention and invasion of a foreign country to secure
access to fossil fuels.
Like Millay, Romano positioned himself
as standing in opposition to the major party candidates who are essentially
identical in their worldviews. He bothered to run in a sure-to-lose campaign
because he wanted to share his worldview with voters. Romano’s comment about
issues being “off the radar screen” indicated that he recognizes that he
represented a different worldview that had been muted by the major parties.
Even though the third party candidates
were invited to debate, their free expression of their worldviews was impeded
by the dominance of the major parties’ model. In this debate major party
candidates for the most part ignored the claims made by the third party
candidates, although at times pointing out disagreements or obliquely attacking
the third party stance. For example, when Romano expressed his opposition to
drilling in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge and suggested supporting
alternative energy, Talent said, “Digger and I have a mild disagreement on this
one” (notice his casual use of his opponent’s nickname). This rather flippant
reference to the Green Party worldview casts their stances as “other”—and
thereby muted.
In this debate, the third party
candidates attempted to transform their worldviews in terms of the major party
models principally through pointing out agreements with the major party
candidates and refraining from attacking the major party candidates. For example,
when asked about criteria for choosing Supreme Court judges, Millay explicitly
expressed agreement with Jim Talent that competency and honesty were more
important than partisan issues. Later on, Romano pointed out a similarity that
he had with Senator Carnahan in being a newcomer to the politics of elected
positions. In a statement that supported both himself and Carnahan, he says: “But
I think that we can see that fresh voices in the legislature can add a lot to a
legislative process.” Similarly, Millay expressed mild support for Carnahan
with these words: “I’m sure that there is quite a learning curve for any new
legislator. And personally I don’t have any issues with Mrs. Carnahan’s
learning curve.” Other than a very brief joint attack on Attorney General John
Ashcraft—not a contender in the election—the third party candidates simply
attacked the political system in general, never their individual opponents, a
tactic that made them appear reasonable and considerate in a campaign that had
been marked by the major parties trading accusations and attacks.
As is typical for campaign debates, the
journalist’s questions controlled the format, being formulated principally for
the major party candidates, even though the journalists attempted to offer the
third party candidates alternative questions. For example, one of the
questions, “Who is your political role model?” on the surface seemed a sincere
attempt to more fully engage the third party candidates, although it is not
clear how one’s role model predicts one’s ability to serve in office. Nevertheless,
in answering the question, Romano reveals his non-traditional political roots,
roots that many Americans might find disturbing:
Political role model . . . Well, that’s an interesting
. . . One of the many that I can think of would the Zapatistas of Mexico and
Comandante Marcos. Because although they have exercised their right to arm
themselves, they have stayed away, for the most part from using this violence
as a way to protect the peasants’ rights to access the land. And they’re
standing up for the poor people that are getting rolled over in this so-called
globalization.
Although he was able to frame his answer
as related to his ideology, to most of the mainstream American public, holding
up what they perceive to be Mexican rebels as political role models is almost
traitorous! The other three candidates chose more familiar American
politicians. Thus a question that could have been intended to facilitate third
party candidates, actually served to emphasize their marginal, possibly
traitorous positions as muted groups.
The 2000
But this attempt for the muted group
member to transform his worldview in order to participate more fully backfired.
Since
Another issue that illustrates the
dominance of major party rhetoric in muting third party candidates is the
popular perception that third party candidates are spoilers and vote stealers. Preliminary
research has suggested that many of those who vote third party would otherwise
not vote at all (Ardener, 1975a; Luks et al., 2003; Sifry, 2002; Winger, 2002);
nevertheless, one often hears that a vote for a third party candidate is wasted
or is really a vote for the other major party opponent. Major party candidates
promote this worldview because it preserves their power. However, in the
debates analyzed here, third party candidates articulated a different vision of
how third party candidates enhance democracy and how voters must exercise their
responsibility to vote for the best choice. For example, Romano from
The Green Party is not taking away votes from any
other party because no other party owns those votes. The voters own those
votes. And look at our elections. We’re seeing 70 percent of people not voting.
So they’re making a statement there. The statement they’re making is that no
party, none of the major parties, is representing us. (Romano, 2002)
Similarly, Mancini from
I think the average person in this day . . . think
maybe that this is hopeless and that’s why so many people just don’t go to the
polls, and they think they’re going to get opposite sides of the same coin. . .
. (Mancini, 2000)
The third party candidates
offer disillusioned citizens a different vision of democracy, one that asks
them to participate in changing the system. However, this different vision is
muted by the format and rhetoric of campaign debates geared toward major party
candidates.
Discussion
This study represents an exploration of
uncharted territory using a traditionally feminist theory to examine how the
voices of third party candidates although invited to participate, are
nevertheless muted in campaign debates. The dominance of the major party
worldview prevents third party candidates from effectively articulating their
alternative worldviews in a debate. When third party candidates are not
considered serious contenders, major party candidates simply ignore their
positions or act confused by them. The debate format may not allow adequate
time to fully articulate a position or questions may be inappropriate for third
party candidates, leading them to make statements that can be misinterpreted by
the voting public. However, when third party candidates come close to being
taken seriously, their issues may be taken up by the major party, thus blurring
the differences between the ideologies. This blurring is not a bad thing in
itself because such movement shows that third parties do impact the political
system. However, they remain muted groups and many of their issues remain “off the
radar screen,” and they are viewed with suspicion because major parties refuse
to seriously engage them in dialogue.
This analysis demonstrates the dilemma
that confronts members of muted groups when they seek to gain greater
consideration and participation in their societies. An invitation to
participate in campaign debates may be problematic for third party candidates. On
one hand, the debate is a golden opportunity to showcase their beliefs and to
get media coverage for their critical perspectives. On the other hand, the deck
is stacked against them. Because major party candidates are more familiar, the
major party positions are more easily articulated to and grasped by the public
in 90-second sound bites. Encapsulating an entirely different political
worldview in a few short answers is an impossible task for third party
candidates. In addition, questions may be inappropriate, patronizing, or
booby-trapped for third party candidates, and thus answering them may result in
simply confirming their “way-out” image in the public’s eye. In addition, in
order to enter the system they criticize and seek to change, they have to play
the game and develop a discourse strategy that is closer to major party
politics as usual—resulting in a blurring of difference and the possibility of
becoming what they criticize.
Third party candidates must evaluate the
benefits and losses that may come with accepting an invitation to participate
in a campaign debate. Specifically, third party candidates should consider the
following:
·
What are their
goals in participating in a debate? Do they hope to garner more votes or simply
educate the public on their positions?
·
How can they
emphasize their political records and not simply their political ideologies?
·
Can they clearly
articulate their party differences in the short response times allotted?
·
Can they be
ideologically loyal and yet articulate a worldview that will appeal to the
American public?
·
How will they
respond to agreement by major party candidates on their issues?
·
How will they
address the image of third party candidates as election spoilers who somehow
steal the votes that belong to major party candidates?
Thus third party candidates may find
that the invitation to debate should be considered carefully to see if their
participation will advance their political goals.
Further study of third party campaigns
is warranted, but it will be hindered by the fact that debates that include
third party candidates are uncommon, not to mention rarely recorded and
transcribed, and thus are unavailable for examination. Complicating third party
study is that the fact that there are so many different parties with different
ideologies and approaches. Nevertheless, a concerted effort to locate, record
and transcribe these debates on a variety of levels could yield interesting
research findings. These, coupled with research into who votes for third party
candidates and why, might dispel the notion that third party candidates are
spoilers that threaten the stability of the
Works Cited
Ardener,
E. (1975a). Belief and the problem of women. In
Ardener,
E. (1975b). The ‘problem’ revisited. In
Kramarae,
C. (1981). Women and men speaking.
Lacy,
D., & Monson, Q. (2002). The origins and impact of votes for third-party
candidates: A case study of the 1998
Luks,
S., Miller, J. M., & Jacobs, L. R. (2003). Who wins? Campaigns and the
third party vote. Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 33, 9-30.
Miller,
W. E., & Shanks, J. M. (1996). The
new American voter.
Rubin,
D. (1993). Gender influences: Reading
student texts.
Sachs,
D. C. (2003). D.C.’s political report: Minor parties link. Retrieved December
15, 2003 from http://dcpoliticalreport.com/PartyLink.htm
Sifry,
M. L. (2002). Spoiling for a fight:
Third-party politics in
Southwell,
P. L. (2003). The politics of alienation: Nonvoting and support for third-party
candidates among 18-30-year olds. The
Social Science Journal, 40, 99-107.
Spender,
D. (1984). Defining reality: A powerful tool. In C. Kramarae & M. Schulz
& W. M. O’Barr (Eds.), Language and
Power (pp. 194-205).
Turner,
L. H. (1992). An analysis of words coined by women and men: Reflections on the
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Winger, R.
(2002). More choice please! Why
Carolyn Prentice (Ph.D.,
University of Missouri-Columbia) is an assistant professor of Communication
Studies at the
Kritiking
as Argumentative Praxis
Joseph P.
Zompetti and Brian Lain
Introduction
Controversies in the
realm of academic debate are often assessed with the standards used for other
social science confrontations. The notion of paradigms, introduced by Thomas
Kuhn (1970) to describe scientific revolutions, provides a starting point for
analyzing the current conflict over kritiking.1 Despite this, previous
discussions concerning the so-called “kritik” have focused mainly on whether it
should be considered a legitimate argument form in contemporary policy debate
(Berube, 1996; Katsulas, 1996/1997; Morris, 1996/1997). In this way, these
discussions have become embroiled in a back-and-forth squabbling.
Overcoming the tendency to steadfastly proclaim the legitimacy/illegitimacy of
kritiks as an argument form is necessary if we are to extend argument theory in
relation to the kritik.
In an effort to explore
and extend argument theory, we offer three main positions in this essay. First,
we argue that there is an emerging paradigm,2 which we call the
“questioning-assumptions paradigm” that is evolving out of a conflict with the
current policy-making paradigm. After describing the current controversy
between these paradigms in debate, the major arguments lodged against kritiking
(as a way of viewing argument rather than as an argument form) will be
explained as a way of analyzing the paradigmatic differences, especially with
the concept of fiat. Second, we suggest that there is room for dialogue among
these two paradigms that lies within the concept of fiat. Policy-making is concerned
with what the judge does when adjudicating a “policy.” The
questioning-assumptions paradigm is concerned with how a judge endorses a
“process,” which we call “fiat kritiking.” We argue that a bridge of compromise
can be forged between these two concepts of fiat. Finally, we offer this
conception of kritiking as a means of argumentative praxis, whereby argument
theory is coupled with a unique experience of debate “action.” In this way, we
suggest that kritiking is an exciting area for both argument theory and
contemporary debate practice that, at the very least, deserves an investigation
which transcends the already stale “legitimate/illegitimate” dispute that has
characterized previous kritik discussions.
Thomas Kuhn (1970), in
his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, introduces the idea of systems of thought operating in
paradigms. Along these lines, we may view a paradigm as a worldview or
conceptual model “shared by members of a scholarly community that defines how
inquiry within the community should be conducted” (Smith, 1988, p. 299). More
specifically, Kuhn explicates the idea of a paradigm in two ways:
On the one hand, it stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members
of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that
constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the
remaining puzzles of normal science. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175)
Paradigms, therefore,
are characterized by their different ways of seeing and “knowing” the world.
This feature removes the “truth” variable of one paradigm from another; in
other words, paradigms simply see the world differently. Kuhn explains that it
is inaccurate to describe different paradigms as unscientific just because
several of their tenets are called into question by the preceding paradigm,
since “What differentiated these various schools was not one or another failure
of method — they were all ‘scientific’ — but what we shall come to call their
incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it”
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 4).
Paradigms are often
applied to systems of debate theory (Pfau, Thomas & Ulrich, 1987).
Paradigms are used to examine how the entire worldview of debate participants
and judges is affected in different ways. Usually, two or more paradigms are
compared to illustrate the conflicts between the differing worldviews. In fact,
as one paradigm emerges, it is often thought that the existing, predominant
paradigm becomes replaced. Within the debate context, Pfau and his colleagues
(1987) have expressed that “[d]ebate is generated by shifts in paradigms.
During this period of transition between the era dominated by the ‘normal’
paradigm, and the new era when the alternative paradigm replaces it, many
controversies and debates are conducted over the whole nature of the field and
the specific methods used to study and advance the field” (pp. 6-7).
The policy-making
paradigm has been described as the prevailing paradigm in contemporary debate
history. Generally, this paradigm prescribes the roles of debaters and judges
by using a making-of-policy model, such as the U.S. Congress. Ziegelmueller,
Harris and Bloomingdale (1995) explain:
A . . . model of debate is derived from
an analogy to the policy making process typified by congressional decision
making. The subject matter of the debate is typically concerned with the
development of public policy. Consequently, theorists have suggested modeling
the argument practices found in congressional debates. (pp. 18-19)
Without going into all
of the formal tenets of the policy-making paradigm, we should have a general
feeling of what this view of debating is about. As a deductive model of debate,
it seeks to “force nature [debate] into the conceptual boxes supplied by
professional education” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 5).
Given the predominance
of the policy-making paradigm, alternative or competing paradigms have been
relatively few in number in the past few years. One such recent challenge has
been the hypothesis-testing paradigm which views the debate round as a
laboratory that “tests” different (and not necessarily mutually-exclusive)
methods of change, as if they were “hypothesis” statements (Hollihan, 1983;
Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Zarefsky & Henderson, 1983). Yet, the
prevailing support for the policy-making paradigm has resulted in a general
dismissal of the hypothesis-testing paradigm as a viable or accepted worldview.
In the wake of this type of paradigmatic flux, we believe this is the first
time that the argument style of “kritiking” has been presented as a separate
paradigm. Indeed, we feel that this paradigmatic flux may mean that
policy-making as a paradigm is particularly vulnerable to challenge, or that
“kritiking” as a paradigm may be premature. Nevertheless, the responses from
the margins of the debate community concerning the viability of the kritik as
an appropriate argument form has gained increasing acceptance. Thus, for our
purposes here, we suggest that engaging in kritiking may represent a developing
worldview that might be called the “questioning-assumptions” paradigm.
Difficulty exists in
describing this amorphous paradigm. Even as this description will no doubt
reveal, new suppositions and opinions are made about this paradigm at an
increasing rate. It would be impossible to produce a set of rules or
characterize the identities of all who support the questioning-assumptions
paradigm. Not only does the style of this paradigm subvert an explicit
definition, as we shall see later, but it is also impossible to describe the
differing views of each individual in the debate community who supports the
kritik as an argumentative form. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is similar to
what Kuhn describes as a “challenging” paradigm. While discussing the scientists’
response to the revolutionary notions of
They can, that is, agree
on their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even
attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization
of it. Lack of a standard interpretation of an agreed reduction to rules will
not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. . . .Indeed, the existence of a
paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exist. (1970, p. 44)
Although Kuhn does not do much to describe the
“maturing” process of a challenging paradigm, he clearly expresses that even
the formation of a paradigm may be classified as a worldview:
To that end it may help to point out that
the transition need not (I now think should not) be associated with the first
acquisition of a paradigm. The members of all scientific communities, including
the schools of the “pre-paradigm” period, share the sorts of elements which I
have collectively labelled [sic] a “paradigm.” (1970, p. 179)
Thus, our conception of
questioning assumptions might also be labeled a “paradigm.” While we agree with
Kuhn in describing the nature of a paradigm, we part with his belief that
paradigms are mutually exclusive, or that when one paradigm emerges it
necessarily displaces the existing paradigm. We believe that paradigms can
co-exist and even, at times, share common threads within their respective
worldviews. With the so-called judging “paradigms” or “philosophies” that exist
in academic debate, we know that some judges have changed their paradigms, even
in the middle of a debate round, because their personal beliefs intervened in
the adjudicating process. Debate participants themselves also undergo
fundamental “worldview” changes that may not be inconsistent with their prior
ways of thinking. Our contention is that these paradigms always already
intersect. It is our failure to negotiate this intersection that has created
the paradigmatic tension.
With this in mind, we
maintain that the questioning-assumptions paradigm is comprised of three
crucial tenets. These tenets indicate how the questioning-assumptions paradigm
is both significant and important for resolving paradigmatic conflict. First,
advocates of the questioning-assumptions paradigm hold that debate arguments
contain “taken-for-granteds” (Hazen, 1989; Hopper, 1981; Schutz, 1967). The
concept of taken-for-granteds, according to Hopper (1981), refers to
“[u]ncoded, ‘between-the-lines’ information” (p. 196) that “are missing
premises of messages” and are “frequently understood [sic] as if spoken” (p.
207). The questioning-assumptions paradigm holds that when advocates make
claims, a part of these claims is unstated. Whenever an argument is made,
“implicit assumptions” or hidden parts of the argument persist. For example, to
say that
The second tenet of the
questioning-assumptions paradigm is that these hidden assumptions are open for
debate. Some debaters may say that advocates are responsible for the unstated
portions of their claims; others may simply say that is the hidden assumptions
that are the precursors to the present argument. If they are called into
question, the present argument is also called into question. The allowance of
the questioning of these assumptions is what primarily distinguishes this
paradigm from other debate paradigms.
Finally, the
questioning-assumptions paradigm upholds a particular way of advocacy. Advocacy
requires taking a position on a side of controversy. Advocacy, then, is acting
out what the advocate believes. We suggest that thinking of advocacy in this
way is a method of praxis. The choices made in debate rounds which, in-turn,
affect the choices we or on-lookers make in our lives and within the
questioning-assumptions paradigm is a way not only to engage in critical
thinking, but also to engage in an action of advocacy. This action of advocacy
is the coupling of debate theory/beliefs with purposeful action in and outside
the debate round. In short, advocacy is a way of engaging in praxis. Because
critical thinking and advocacy are “traditionally” elements of the
policy-making paradigm, we suggest that praxis is yet another way that
paradigmatic conflict can be overcome.
The descriptions
provided here are primarily definitions of what the terms policy-making and
questioning-assumptions mean in this context. Surely the most complete
descriptions of these paradigms will come as one evolves in opposition to the
other, or when we realize that the worldviews can effectively co-exist. Since
the questioning-assumptions paradigm is still emerging, there can be no
definitive statement of its views for all debate situations. However, the paradigm
is sculpted by the areas in conflict (with policy-making) over the issues of
fiat and, consequently, debatability. Despite this conflict, we believe that we
need to rethink the relationship between these paradigms. If we begin to see
their relationship through the concept of fiat, we may find that the paradigms
can co-exist.
Describing debate
paradigms in this way demonstrates major controversies in kritiking among the
advocates and judges. Both the policy-making and the questioning-assumptions
paradigms have different conceptions of advocacy. Primarily, the question
concerning advocacy is, what is fiat? This difference in opinion is multiplied
when we see that proponents of each paradigm argue about the fundamental
purpose of the debate round. We will try to use the language of each paradigm
to describe the problems found in two major contentions: 1) no alternative/no uniqueness
vs. kritiking as an alternative, and 2) doing nothing vs. the thought/action
dichotomy.
The idea that a “policy”
must be advocated is a crucial element within the policy-making paradigm. At
the end of the debate either a proposed policy (the affirmative plan or a
negative counterplan) or the policy of the status quo should be embraced. The
benefits and drawbacks to each proposal is weighed carefully before the final
determination is made. In short, the policy-making paradigm upholds that the
judge needs a “policy” to vote for. In this way, the claim that kritiks
offer “no alternative” has been a major complaint of the policy-making
paradigm. The argument goes something like this:
The negative (or
affirmative) questions the affirmative (or negative), but they don’t provide us
with anything to question. They simply poke out problems with the our proposal,
but they don’t defend anything themselves. If we are to reject the system (or
whatever), we need something to adopt. The negative (or affirmative) can’t just
kritik; they must also advocate something.
Recently,
uniqueness has been tacked onto this argument:
The status quo is also guilty of the
problems the negative describes. Even if the plan weren’t done, there would
still be sexism, racism, classism, etc. The problems inherent in the world
system aren’t the fault of the affirmative. Therefore, the problem is
non-unique to the affirmative plan.
The combination of these
two answers has been the most common criticism lodged against kritiking. In a
recent defense of the new American Debate Association rule that all kritiks be
“unique,” Stefan Bauschard “takes a walk out on the plank” to suggest that “one
thing that all critiques [sic] have in common is that they are all
disadvantages which are not unique to the affirmative plan” (1995, p. 3).3
Thus, the “no alternative” argument mutates into an argument that is familiar
in the policy-making style of argument.
In their often cited
work criticizing what they call “Critiques,” Shors and Mancuso contribute to
the uniqueness attack:
The strategic benefit of
running a Critique lies in its set of rules, namely its rejection of
conventional argument burdens. For example, the burden of “uniqueness,” which
requires both the affirmative and negative to demonstrate that advantages and
disadvantages are uniquely caused by the plan, is wholly irrelevant to the
Critique as its rules currently operate. Herein lies one of the biggest defects
of the Critique, because its insistence on adhering to the rigid rule of rejection
is artificial. (1993, p. A-16)4
According to this
perspective, since there is no alternative and the kritik is a non-unique
disadvantage, there is no reason to reject the affirmative. “Doing nothing” is
also a common criticism placed against kritik advocates. This late-breaking
monster is usually seen in rebuttals. Although it comes into play in most
kritiking debates, it is rarely considered as a distinct line-by-line attack.
Yet, this argument speaks volumes about how the policy-making paradigm describes
its view of fiat. The answer can be characterized this way:
Even if the negative is right, they aren’t going to
accomplish anything. The plan advantages are real. If you do not vote
affirmative, millions will die. While you will be sitting around “rethinking,”
millions will die.
This characterization
zooms-in on the thought that kritiking is separate from action. It also places
a direct comparison between the plan advantages and the advantage/benefit of
kritiking.
There have been many
replies fired against the “no alternative/uniqueness” queries that are offered
by kritiking opponents. At the heart of the issue is what one considers
fiatable action/thinking. The questioning-assumptions paradigm suggests that
kritiking may (is allowed to) be the “alternative.”
Rather than just accept
policy options as considerations for voting, the judge can consider endorsing a
process of kritiking. The over-adherence to the “cult of uniqueness” leaves
advocates who seek radical overhauls of any given system without a rhetorical
leg to stand on. The reply in theory has been to accept the process as
fiatable. Take the example of Edward Said’s (1978) orientalism argument during
the recent NDT Middle East topic. Negatives advocated a system of rethinking
particular to a questioning of history, culture, military, social systems,
etc., that seeks to expose how knowledge (as Truth) has been used coercively
against oppressed Middle Eastern peoples in U.S. policy. What would a judge be
voting for in this instance? He or she would be voting for kritiking,
rethinking, questioning. The judge is voting to place this interrogative,
dynamic process into motion.
We might imagine
attempting to break down all the components of a debate into columns of what
one would be voting for and how they would be voting for it. An analogy can be
drawn with traveling. Vehicles are used to get to places; destinations
are what is sought after. Both are critical to traveling.
The
Lake The
Third Path in the
This analogy can be
broadened with debate in mind. The What column below represents
desirable ends that are sought after in the debate context. The How
column describes the mechanism used to achieve those ends. For example:
What How5
Advantage Plan
Disadvantage Status Quo
Disadvantage Counterplan
Net
Benefit Permutation
Advantage Plan
Stop
nuclear war Harvard’s
plan
Disadvantage Plan mechanism
Disadvantage Counterplan
Federalism States do the plan
This categorization
separates value specifications and things that are fiatable. Up to this point,
there is no controversy with the policy-making paradigm. However, when kritiks
(noun) are included in the what/destination column, then the problems with the
“cult of uniqueness” start to emerge. What does the column look like from this
perspective?
Kritik Status
quo?
Kritik Cool negative team?
Kritik Our
Chevette
We can see that as an
argument type (a noun), the kritik creates a stale and even unproductive
debate, especially with respect to our understanding of policy-making. However,
it is here that the advocacy of kritiking (verb) inserts a new option into the
mix:
Avoid
orientalism Rethinking
Prevent
gendered problems Use gender
lenses
Destroy
government hierarchy Question
statism
It is the notion that
fiat applies to the process of kritiking that primarily defines what we have
been calling the questioning-assumptions paradigm. The affirmative suggests a
plan to travel to the advantages, the negative suggests rethinking as a way to
achieve the value (or other element) that they suggest is paramount. Kritiking
in this way functions as a sort of counterplan.6 In some senses, kritiking may
claim the affirmative advantage, just as a counterplan may claim to “solve” the
advantage. We might also view this as an ends/means distinction. We may agree
with the ends of the plan (i.e., the advantage), but not the mechanism (i.e.,
the plan).7
The
questioning-assumptions paradigm also has a major reply to the “doing nothing”
criticism. The questioning-assumptions paradigm views thinking as fiatable. As
such, the other paradigm is accused to adhering to a thought vs. action
dichotomy. In other words, policy-making may ask, “What are you doing?” We may
respond, “Just thinking.” Then the retort, “Well, then, you are doing nothing!”
There is a long line of
philosophy that questions the ability to distinguish thought from action (e.g.,
Hegel, 1931; Heidegger, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Sartre, 1976). Not only does
thought influence action and action influence thought, but it is also difficult
to distinguish, especially in debate, where the thinking ends and where the
action begins.
Fiat is the best example
of where thinking and acting blur in debate. Using the tenets of fiat based on
the policy-making tradition, we may ask ourselves the following: Does the plan
actually happen? Does the Congress actually pass the plan? Are we just doing
nothing? This is not intended as an illegitimacy argument about fiat. The
ability to suspend disbelief over whether or not the plan would occur is
essential if we are to have productive, educational and fun debates. However,
kritiking isn’t “doing nothing” in debate either. The process of debating might
be likened to the process of (re)thinking. There is some action involved —
speaking, researching, lifting boxes, etc. — but it is primarily the (critical)
thinking that we encourage and reward in debate. When asked what is endorsed by
kritiking, the negative should reply, “We are actively exploring, questioning,
rethinking, kritiking the problem. We are not endorsing the status quo. We seek
the rejection of both the affirmative plan and the status quo. Vote to adopt
rethinking as a process of change!”
Although the suggestion
of kritiking as an alternative was intended as a compromise from the
questioning-assumptions paradigm, it has yet to be accepted fully among policy
makers. Three different interpretations of how signing the ballot as action
present themselves for consideration.8 Under each of them, the option of
fiating kritiking9 exists. Fiating kritiking “uses” fiat as a mechanism to
adopt a process of (re)thinking. Perhaps fiating kritiking can best be
explained by way of example.
The first option for
fiat is that the judge plays the role of “debate person,” or simply a person
who operates within the debate activity. The judge is seen as a coach or bus
driver or parent who sees the activity for its educational value. To fiat
kritiking is easy to see in this case. Voting affirmative could occur because
the plan is a “good idea” or because the affirmative did the “better job of
debating.” Likewise, voting negative can also be viewed as an endorsement for
kritiking — a rejection of the plan as a “bad idea,” or the negative did the
better job of debating. The endorsement in this case may be intellectual or
punishment-oriented, as in cases of rejecting sexist or racist language.
Nevertheless, the judge would be voting for kritiking.
A second example views
the judge as an actual policy maker. The judge has the ability to force
Congress to do the plan. Whether this ability is metaphorical or something
actually believed is irrelevant. All arguments are assessed in this manner. The
judge views the advantage to the plan as greater than the disadvantages, or
vice versa. There is a large difference between weighing the (dis)advantages of
the plan as a reason for voting and “they did a better job of debating.”
A third model of fiat
places the judge not as an overseer of policy, but rather as a participant. For
some reason the judge is the policy maker who has the deciding vote on the
question of the plan/counterplan/status quo. The scene of the debate is the
floor of Congress and the judge has to give a speech for or against the plan,
counterplan, or status quo. That speech will determine the outcome. We might
envision some of the constraints suggested as impositions of kritiking under
this vision of judging: “this is the wrong forum; Congress wouldn’t discuss
these issues of philosophy,” or “we are constrained to do policy here!”
Under the latter two
views, the judge has several options to fiat (it clearly is a verb in this
sense). The plan may be done, a counterplan, or staying the course may be
suggested. All of these fiated actions are executed by a governing body. Why
not then have the judge endorse the kritiking option on the governing body? We
could have the judge force Congress to rethink. The judge could fiat that the
U.S. Government question threat construction as a reason for conducting foreign
policy. The deciding speech given on the question of health care reform could
be a well-constructed discussion of the problems of Western medicine, concluded
by endorsing not the present system nor the policy on the floor, but rather a
third option of beginning a quest of rethinking to uncover the problems of
medicine and how Western medicine is flawed. Fiat the kritiking by the government
on the problem outlined by the debate team. Fiat the kritiking!
A response to this view
may be that the option is already present in the strategy of counterplanning. A
two-fold rejoinder is offered here. First, the criticism that a counterplan is
needed begs the question that there is some distinction between fiating
kritiking and counterplanning. Another way of stating this alternative may be
“counter-thinking.”10 The though/action dichotomy is disputed in this form of
fiat. Is there a difference between saying, “plank one, we suggest the Congress
rethink,” and saying, “the Congress should rethink?” If there is, we must
reside in a “cult of planks” since having a plank (for the sake of having a
plank) is the only real difference.
Second, several modes of
kritiking call policy-making into question. The idea that a plan should be
done, that we can ever find a solution, that a “course of action” ought to be
taken might be the thesis of the kritiking process. For example, several
strands of feminism hold the view that the problem/solution format is a
patriarchal tool (e.g., Anzaldua, 1987; Benhabib, 1987; Butler, 1990, 1992,
1995; Ganguly, 1992) Announcing that we have a solution not only forecloses
future discussion, but it also chills the discussion of the problems for which
there are no available solutions.
Fiating kritiking is not
suggested as solution, but rather as a wholesale way of questioning/thinking.
It is an exploration of the problem that may produce not a solution, but a
better understanding of the problem which, for policy-making, should be
appealing. In other words, a particular policy may be racist, classist, sexist,
etc., but forcing the institution to rethink these problems is not an endorsement
for the institution or for a policy. It is, rather, an endorsement for
questioning.
Our position is that the
debate round is more than just a “game.” It is, rather, a forum for advocacy.
Even if the debate team does not (in “reality”) believe their position, they
nevertheless must take a position in the debate context. The debate round becomes,
if nothing else, a training ground for how to advocate a position. Integral to
this concept is the ability to think critically, which is obtained by, among
other things, intense research experience, anticipation of opposing arguments,
skills in cross-examination, mastery of reasoning by analysis and synthesis,
and the ability to take a position of advocacy on opposite sides of a
proposition. In other words, critical thinking is the ability to know how and
when to ask questions. We view this combination of advocacy with the ability to
think critically as a coupling of theory with action (advocacy). Simply put,
kritiking occurs as a form of praxis, or at least helps to frame praxis, in an
argumentative format.
The ability to think
critically should not be limited to a situation where X is chosen for
discussion, researched, and then debated. Instead, critical thinking in debate
can be (and is) expanded to ask questions about X: what is it, how does it
function, is it valuable, does it contribute to the good of society? Arguments
in the form of kritik ask such questions, among others. To this end, the
critical thinking skills in debate are polished to include factors otherwise
ignored. In fact, if we are going to emphasize the critical thinking skills that
debate fosters as a selling point to recruits, parents and administrators, then
we should inquire about how we can improve such skills. Ignoring critical
factors and questions about the nature of the topic, such as X, does not bid
well for an activity that stresses its ability to think critically.
Additionally, while most
contemporary debates are absent of spectators, except typically for final
rounds which are attended by fellow debaters, the debate is still a public
event. Nothing precludes or forbids observations of NDT debates. Also, many
debates are videotaped or transcribed for classes, public officials and parents
throughout the country. Thus, academic debate is not decoupled from the
non-debate world. As such, academic debate is a forum for arguments meant to
advance the skills and education of its participants but also to influence
others who do not debate. Oral advocacy, then, becomes a serious enterprise in
which “real” thoughts, stereotypes, beliefs, and policies are affected.
Furthermore, the debate participants themselves, after years of debating,
become conditioned to their style of debating and ways of thinking. This
educational process and experience undoubtedly affects the way debaters think
and act once they graduate and enter society. Thus, as we have been arguing,
kritiking can help expand and intensify the quality of oral advocacy in
contemporary academic debate. It promotes a range of possibilities that can
serve effective oral advocacy. Additionally, because debate is a forum with
multiple audiences and with the potential to influence different social groups,
kritiking can have “real” consequences other than those typically encountered
in a debate round.
In essence, then, by
advocating that their positions are better, the participants make value
judgments. They take a position about an issue and make arguments about that
issue’s worthiness, especially as it is compared to competing issues. The
debate round becomes a forum whereby the merits of issues are articulated.
The debate round also
allows feedback from the audience and judge(s). After the debaters conclude
their positions of advocacy, the effect of the round can be seen in post-round
critiques. Judges can explain why they were or were not persuaded from the
policy arguments presented in the debate. Of course, judges do not actually
implement an affirmative plan. However, judges may be (can be) persuaded —
based upon the debating — to take personal action, such as changed ways of
thinking, writing letters to NGOs or government leaders, and the adoption of
certain positions when they talk to friends or teach classes. Additionally,
judge comments after the round may influence the debaters in a similar fashion.
Of course, arguments presented in the debate have unlimited possibility in influencing
other audience members as well.
The debate round,
therefore, can serve to persuade people about policy implications that
transcend the hypothetical issues of debate, such as fiat and topicality.
Substantive issues that affect the participants in an everyday fashion can be
(are) discussed. Debaters have often used these types of arguments to persuade
judges, such as “Judge, you have children, and I doubt that you relish the
thought of your kids growing up in a nuclear winter.” Such arguments bring the
often abstract nature of policy positions down-to-earth and function as a
particular type of persuasive technique. Kritiking supplements this process by
encouraging participants to adhere to critical thinking once the debate round
is over. In other words, a kritiking can encourage the judge not only to vote a
certain way because a hypothetical policy may result in nuclear winter, but
also, for example, to take personal action against nuclear power or nuclear
weapons.
Debate’s nature of
persuasion and advocacy creates an atmosphere where debaters talk and judges
listen. If compelled, judges may reciprocate with their own thoughts and
opinions after the last speech. In any case, the debate round provides a forum,
not only for intellectual competition, but also social activism. It offers an
opportunity for “real” people with “real” problems to persuade others about
“real-world” solutions.
In this way, the debate
round can become a site for political struggle. Political concerns that are
germane to the policy being debated can be waged into the debate round. Actual
persuasion and personal transformation can occur if participants remain open to
how viewing debate arguments (i.e., kritiking) relates to their non-debate
lives. Kritiking, therefore, can be a form of social activism.
Kritiking opens a space
for social activism in another way. Kritiking requires additional ways of
thinking and arguing, an openness for alternative perspectives, and new methods
of research. Just as “traditional” debate skills help debaters in other areas
of life both during and after their debate careers, skills in kritiking also
help participants in other areas. For example, the expanded ways of thinking
that kritiking instills helps people become better critical thinkers and more
sensitive to political concerns than do other debate skills. Kritiking helps
train participants to recognize certain ways of thinking that typically
entrench power relationships. As such, people who engage in kritiking become
more likely to engage in social activism. At the very least, the critical
skills that are intrinsic to kritiking encourage people to be active socially
and politically because such concerns are given primacy by the
questioning-assumptions paradigm.
Constructed
scenarios and far-fetched nuclear war scenarios sometimes appear to have no
grounding in reality, but are instead productions of the most clever and most
researched debate squads. While we maintain that these “traditional” ways of
arguing are valuable and should be encouraged, another way of seeing argument —
kritiking — helps bring debate back to “reality.” The participants in the round
can take positions, criticize, and attempt to persuade their audience for
reasons other than intellectual stimulation or skills development. Instead,
participants who feel strongly about the values underlying policy questions can
take a critical position that encourages personal reflection and action outside
of the debate round. Through kritiking, participants are more likely to
increase their involvement in society than they are with “traditional”
debating. The reason is simple. Kritiking fosters a spirit of responsibility
and a call to action. Each person is important and should embrace their civic
responsibility. When calling into question the values underlying types of
policies, this spirit of activism can emerge. Thus, kritiking — as a way of
viewing argument — can function as a median for praxis. Furthermore, kritiking
is representative of what we have been calling the questioning-assumptions
paradigm. Since kritiking allows room for fiat and for a proposal to be
advocated, we believe a reconciliation between the policy-making and
questioning-assumptions paradigms is possible. It is our hope that future
debate forums and debate rounds will continue in this benevolent pursuit.
1 We are using the verb
“kritiking,” not the noun “kritik,” for two main reasons. First, the idea of
THE kritik suggests there is just one possible kritik. However, we feel a
“kritik” represents an argument style, not a monolithic argument form. Second,
the verb usage implies a process, not a static image. Rather than suggesting an
argument that has a known description, such as a disadvantage, kritiking is
dynamic and evolutionary.
2 To reflect our
perspective of kritiking as a process — or a way of thinking, questioning or
approaching a problem — we have chosen to use the word “paradigm” to describe
it. We feel other descriptive words, such as field or philosophy, do not
adequately illustrate the current tension that is occurring in the debate
community concerning kritiking.
3 Bauschard’s negative
criticism toward the argument style of kritiks pervades his article. As he
states on the question of what the focus of the debate should be: “[o]pening up
this theoretical can of worms is a waste of time that could be spent discussing
unsettled questions” (1995, p. 4). We feel this is proof of the current
paradigmatic conflict over taken-for-granteds in debate.
4 One might wonder what
argument strategy is open to the negative. Shors and Mancuso state, “The
Critique [sic] can and should be used as an instrument to challenge
questionable thinking, be it ethnocentric, or whatever. It can be useful in
casting perspective on issues, but it should not be considered independent of
comparison; it cannot be and remain meaningful. The Critique can be used as a
disadvantage, solvency turn, a PMN, etc. — essentially anything but a kritik”
(1993, p. A-17). This seems to harken back to Kuhn’s description of how old
paradigms attempt to modify and take new anomalies into account — a sort of
argumentative cooptation. The nuance of adopting kritiking is rejected, yet the
system is said to always already represent such arguments. This is not to say
that types of arguments such as disadvantages, solvency turns, PMNs, etc., are
illegitimate. Rather, we feel these argument types can also co-exist with
kritiking, or at the very least must also meet the burden of defending the
assumptions that lie underneath them.
5 This particular analogy
has its origins with Bill Shanahan.
6 We take these words
from Chris Lundberg of the
7 Lundberg again.
8 It is quite possible that
there are more than three options. However, we feel these accurately represent
the different paradigms under scrutiny.
9 We find it ironic that
such an argument is now discussed since the genesis of kritiking sprung from
what was first called a “kritik of fiat.” Now, with the usage of the verb and
the movement inside of affirmative constructions of fiat, we have a “fiat of
kritiks.”
10 Please note the usage of
a verb in this statement. Counter-thinking may be described above, but the
option of a counter-thought (noun) has not been discussed in this article, and
it is a totally different beast altogether. The counter-thought may be another
negative argument/argument strategy available to debaters under the
questioning-assumptions paradigm. As far as we know, the only execution of a
“counter-thought” has been by Chris LaVigne and Brian Wassom (
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Joseph P. Zompetti (Ph.D.,
Nothing More than
a Little White Lie
An Examination of
Ethics in Extemporaneous Speaking
Ric L. Shafer
The
majority of text books in public speaking define extemporaneous speaking as the
act of delivering a speech using limited notes. Despite what we teach in our
classes, however, cultural norms in competitive speech tend to reward those
students that compete in the event without the use of notes. Recent research
highlights erroneous source citations and outright fabrications by contestants,
many of which can be attributed to the unspoken expectation that students
refrain from using notes. This paper attempts to challenge that norm by
questioning the educational benefits of teaching, promoting and rewarding this
practice. The paper will compare what we teach in our classes to what has become
the norm inside forensics.
A
first year student of mine told me one semester that he had found the perfect
impromptu example. He explained that the book Mad Man, by Robert Parks, was
“applicable in virtually every round.” I cautioned the student against
overusing this book, explaining that its applicability was probably the result
of him s t r e t c h and manipulating the example. I later learned that
although the title and author of the book stayed the same, the plot and
characters were altered from round to round as needed to fit the quotation. The
book, I discovered, didn’t actually exist. Although I have caught isolated
students on my team cheating before, this was the first time in my coaching
career that a student had volunteered that information.
As
I began to further investigate this case, and as we began to discuss ethics as
a team, I discovered that this wasn’t the only event that my student was cheating
in, nor was he the only student on that team guilty of the same offense. Although
not all of my students were involved, I discovered that a great number of
individuals on my team had committed ethical violations. The event where this
seemed most apparent was extemporaneous speaking. Several of my students
admitted that they were careless with the accuracy of source citations. Others
admitted to the outright fabrication of sources. Most argued that this practice
was widespread not only on our team, but also across our national circuit. It
seemed as if Burnett, Brand & Meister (2001) were correct when they argued
“the educational value of forensics has been supplanted by the desire to win.”
These authors continue by suggesting “the value of competition has come to
outweigh the value of education in intercollegiate individual events practice”
(pg. 106). Although I would disagree with this sentiment on the whole, the discovery
that my own students were cheating opened my eyes to the pervasiveness of these
ethical violations.
Although
there are a plethora of reasons that students cheat in extemporaneous speaking,
this paper argues that this phenomenon exists partially because of our
unrealistic expectations for the event. Despite the fact that the majority of
our text books in public speaking define extemporaneous speaking as the act of
delivering a speech using limited notes, many student choose not to use notes
because of the unspoken, and many times spoken expectation that they refrain
from doing so. This paper attempts to challenge that norm by questioning the
educational value of teaching, promoting and rewarding this practice. I will begin
with a discussion of ethics in forensics, with an emphasis placed on extemporaneous
speaking. The paper will then compare what we teach in our classes to what has
become the norm inside our activity. Finally, I will offer suggestions for how
both coaches and student can decrease ethical violations in this event by
challenging cultural norms and unwritten expectations.
This
paper is not the first to question the ethical behavior of students in both
debate and individual events. As Cronn-Mills (2000) notes, the American Forensics
Association has responded to similar essays by creating a comprehensive code
covering both debate and individual events (pg 61). Without enforcement,
however, these codes provide little incentive for student to follow ethical
principles. Mason (1989) argues that without proper punishment for ethical
violations these practices will continue. A message posted to the Individual
Events Listserv (IE-L) concurs when it suggests that the practice of using
erroneous citations and the fabrication of sources is “being taught (if only
through allowing the practice to occur) as not only acceptable, but necessary
for success” (IE-L, November 11, 2003, 10:28).
A
host of reasons are offered to explain why students commit ethical violations.
One message posted to the IE-L suggested that citation errors were a result of
“sloppiness, a lack of defined standards, willfulness, cheating and memory
problems” (IE-L, November 11,2003, 10:23). This post was in reference to an
article written by Daniel Cronn-Mills and Larry G. Schnoor in the 2003 edition
of the National Forensics Journal. Cronn-Mills and Schnoor (2003) examined the
six final round contestants in Informative Speaking at the 1998 American
Forensics Association National Individual Events Tournament. They discovered
that “all six speakers appear to have violated the AFA code (198211998) in one
manner or another” which they argue “clearly indicates a systemic issue within
intercollegiate individual events competition” pg. 16).
When
you consider that the Cronn-Mills and Schnoor article examined prepared events,
it stands to reason that ethical violations and/or source citation mistakes in
a limited-prep event, like extemporaneous speaking, would find similar or even
more egregious results. Markstrom (1994) notes students in extemporaneous
speaking often cite inaccurate or fabricated information. He found only 44
percent of sources cited “matched the general topic nature of the source” (pg.
25). This fails to account for those sources that matched the topic but failed
to accurately portray the evidence being used. When commenting on these results,
Cronn-Mills and Schnoor suggest “speakers were clearly misrepresenting the
evidence used in extemporaneous speeches” (pg. 5).
There
are differing opinions as to why students feel compelled to commit ethical
violations, as well as varying opinions as to how the community should address
these violations. Some researchers argue that judges have an unrealistic
expectation regarding the number of sources a speaker cite. Williams (1997)
argues that too many judges are more concerned with the number of sources that
a speaker cites as opposed to the quality of said sources (pg. 107). Evidence
of this, a series of hash marks, can be found near the top of many ballots.
Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) note that despite checking numerous public
speaking text books, not one references the quantity of sources, while all
examine the importance of quality source citations @g 19) Kuster (2002)
describes the number of sources expected in extemporaneous presentations as
“stultifying” (pg. 52). He argues that “unwritten” rules create and reinforce
these expectations.
One
post to the I-EL dismisses these claims, arguing instead that we should raise
our expectations regarding source citations. The author notes that “it may be
because I’m in a business where you provide a source for nearly everything, but
this study [the Cronn-Mills & Schnoor study] suggests that we ought to stop
worrying about the excuses and start asking contestants to meet a higher standard”
(IE-L, November 11,2003, 10:23). The same author argues that many errors are a
result of memory mistakes, like “flipping citations or mixing up dates, even
though the information is correct in their notes.” The author states that “I
don’t consider that a real problem—the contestants generally have the right intent
and just mix things up” (EL, November 11,2003, 10.23).
I
respectfully disagree with two of the preceding statements. First, I agree with
Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) when they argue “we sincerely believe most
student do not commit ethical violations” (pg. 16). I understand that students
make mistakes, and it would be wrong to conclude that the majority of students
intentionally cheat. However, I think we are too quick to dismiss the research.
The research indicates that an overwhelming number of the sources cited in prepared
speeches are cited erroneously, and the numbers are even more alarming in i
extemporaneous speaking. It would be naive to suggest that all of these
students mistakenly cite erroneous information, or even that the students who
intentionally cheat is low.
It
is also unethical and anti-educational for us to continue to allow students to
cite inaccurate sources and misrepresent information, even if we believe most
are simple mistakes. These mistakes, and a great deal of the intentional
ethical violations, are a result of our unrealistic expectations and unwritten
rules that govern the event. The AFA-NIET Description of Events page notes that
students in extemporaneous speaking are allowed to use limited notes (2003-
2004 Description of Events- AFA-NIET). Ballots from a host of regional and
national tournaments also indicate that notes are allowed. Despite this, judges
often write that they dropped a student because he or she used notes. One recent
ballot informed one of my students that “in a close round like this sometimes
the only way you can separate competitors is based on who uses notes and who
doesn’t” (Student Ballot, October 2003). 1 recognize that despite written
rules, judges are allowed to have their own evaluative standards. I ask you,
however, how you would react if a ballot included as part of the “reason for
decision” that a student was dropped because he or she failed to use notes?
Current
norms and practices not only violate written rules that govern the activity,
they also run counter to what we teach in our public speaking classrooms.
Seiler and Beall (2001) argues that individuals who speak extemporaneously use
“a carefully prepared and researched speech, but delivers it from notes, with a
high degree of spontaneity.” They note that “speakers depend on a brief
presentational outlines or notes and choose the actual wording of the speech at
the time of delivery” (pg. 275). Greggory (1987) argue that speakers glace at
their notes occasionally to remind themselves of their next point (pg. 275).
Zarefsky (2002), one of the many public speaking text book authors who coached
forensics, defines extemporaneous speaking as “a speech that is prepared and
rehearsed but is neither written out nor memorized (pg. 303). Devito ( 2002),
(2003), Wood (2001), Rothwell (2004), Adler & Rodman (2003), Jaffe (2001),
Pfeiffer (2002), Morreale, Spitzberg and Barge (2001), Dunn and Goodnight
(2003), O’Hair and Stewart (1999), and Beebe, S. A., Beebe, S. J., & Ivy
(2001) all define extemporaneous speaking in similar fashions.
Hybels
and Weaver (2004) do offer some advice as to what students should memorize, if
anything, when performing extemporaneous speeches. They argue that “the speaker
might commit the main ideas of the speech to memory-possibly the introduction
and the conclusion-but will rely on notes to remember most of the speech” (pg.
538). Out of the fifteen public speaking text books surveyed, only one even
suggested the possibility of a student memorizing their outline or sources for
an extemporaneous presentation. Ross (1998) suggests that “an extemporaneous
speech is most effective when given from a brief but meaningful outline, which
is carried in either your head or your hand and which is supported by thorough
preparation” (pg 181). Although this text does inform its readers that they can
carry the outline in “their heads,” it doesn’t advocate that students do so.
Why
then do we teach one thing during the week and reward the opposite each weekend?
Some argue that certain occupations “require” that speakers memorize
extemporaneous speeches (IE-L, November 11,2003, 1 O:23). In the past, others
have t k argued that some professions, like that of a lawyer, require memorized
1 extemporaneous presentations. This, however, is not the norm. In the court
cases that I have observed, including the capital murder case that I recently
served as a jury, I member for, the lawyers all used notes for their presentations.
Nor, I argue, was there an expectation that any of the lawyers prepare their
speeches in a thirty-minute timeframe. Wood (2001) argues attorneys, politicians
and others “most often use an extemporaneous style of presentation” (pg. 290).
Devito (2002) reminds readers most of us in the teaching profession use this
mode of presentation as well. He notes “good lecturing by college teachers is
extemporaneous” (pg. 337). Even in classes I have taught a number of times
before I use notes during my extemporaneous presentations. Do you teach without
notes to improve your ethos amongst your students?
This
paper highlights the contradictions between what we teach in our classrooms and
how we coach our competitors. Several steps are offered that can be taken in
order to challenge these cultural norms and unwritten expectations.
First,
as coaches and educators we have an obligation to make our students aware of
the ethical uses of evidence. Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) suggest
directors “reinforce and explicitly teach the AFA Code of Forensics Programs
and Forensics Tournaments Standards for Colleges and Universities” (pg. 18).
This is true in both limited prep and platform events. As one post to the IE-L
suggests, we should all renew our commitment to “teaching students about
evaluating evidence and how to engage in effective documentation of materials”
(IE-L, November 10, 2003, 18:22). If judges write sources on ballots, take that
as an opportunity to sit down and read through some of those articles with your
students. This not only gives you as the coach a mechanism for checking your
students, it may also facilitate discussions about using evidence, or promote a
discussion about the topic area in general. This is also a technique that
should be utilized more often during practice sessions.
Second,
document your reason for rank on each ballot. Make sure that your comments are
based on sound pedagogy, not on tradition, norms, or unwritten rules. As Casale
(2003) notes, “there are very definite written rules which we can all reference
and follow ... however, confusion is sure to abound (and conflicts arise) when
ballots literally tell a student they are doing an event-such as Impromptu or
Extemporaneous Speaking- wrong” (pg. 91). When you host tournaments, make sure
all hired and volunteer judges are aware of the rules that govern your
tournament. If you personally prefer that students refrain from using notes,
please indicate so on your ballot. If you instead prefer students use notes,
also indicate that on your ballot. I would encourage those in both camps to
resist the temptation to use it as a basis for a decision. If you must, please
educational reasons that justify your decision.
Finally,
although I disagree adamantly with some of the conclusions drawn by Burnett,
Brand and Meister (2001), 1 do believe that we must be careful not to place
competitive goals above educational goals. Many students who choose to compete
without notes in extemporaneous speaking, and many of the coaches and judges
who encourage and reward it, do so for competitive gain, not educationally
sound reasons. Although I believe that competition and education are both
valuable, and both support each other, if one is to be sacrificed it should be
competition. This thought is illustrated best in one last post to the IE-L,
written by a person responding to an accusation of ethical violations. The
author concludes by saying “take the pewter and the lucite back, because, at
least for me, that represents the tiniest part of why I do this” (IE-L, November
14, 2003). Hopefully we can all make that same claim, and place ethics and
education above competition.
Adler, R.B., & Rodman, G. (2003).
Understanding Human Communication.
8th edition.
American Forensic Association. (1982,
1998). AFA Code of Forensics Program and
Forensics Tournament Standards for College and Universities. available
online:http://www.americanforensics.org/afacode.html.
Burnett, A., Brand, J., & Meister, M.
(2001). Forensics education? How the structure and discourse of forensics
promotes competition. Argumentation and
Advocacy, 38, 106-1 14.
Casale, R.D. (2003). To rule or not to rule: these are
(just some of) the questions. Speaker and
Gavel, 40, 91-96.
Cronn-Mills, D. (2000). Interpretation,
ethics and education: an analysis of the AFA-NIET “Ethical Use of Literature
Policy.” Speaker and Gavel, 37,
61-65.
Cronn-Mills, D. & Schnoor, L.G (2003). Evidence and ethics in individual
events: An examination of an AFA-NIET final round. National Forensics Journal, 21, 35-51.
DeVito, J.A. (2002). Essentials of Human Communication. 4th edition.
Devito, J.A. (2003). Human Communication: The Basic Course. 9th edition.
Dunn, D.M., & Goodnight, L.J. (2003).
Communication: Embracing Difference.
Gregory, H. (1987). Public Speaking for College and Career.
Hybels, S., & Weaver, R.L. (2004). Communicating Effectively. 7th edition.
Jaffe, C. (2001). Public Speaking: Concepts and Skills for a Diverse Society. 3rd edition.
Kuster, T. (2002). A preliminary
indictment of the current slate of individual events (and what to do about it).
Speaker and Gavel, 39, 50-57.
Markstrom, R.L. (1 994). A Case Study of Source Citations Found in
the 1993 AFA-NIET Final Round of Extemporaneous Speaking. Unpublished master’s
thesis.
Mason, S. (1989). Looking in from the
fringe: A need for commonality and accountability in professional ethical
standards in forensics. In L. Schnoor and V. Kams (Eds.), Perspective on Individual Events: Proceedings of the First
Developmental Conference on Individual Events (pp. 85-89).
Morreale, S.P., Spitzberg, B.H., & Barge,
J.K. (2001). Human Communication:
Motivation, Knowledge, & Skills.
O’Hair, D., & Stewart, R. (1999). Pocket Guide to Public Speaking: Challenges and Choices.
Pfeiffer, W.
S. (2002). Public
Speaking.
Ross, R.S. (1 998). The
Speechmaking Process. 1lth edition.
Rothwell, J.
D. (2004). In
the Company of Others: An Introduction to Communication. 2nd edition.
Seiler, W.J., & Beall, M.L. (2003). Communication:
Making Connections. 5th edition.
Williams, D.
(1997). Over-quantification of sources in public address events. The
Southern Journal of Forensics, 2, 106-1 09.
Wood, J.T. (2001). Communication
Mosaics: an Introduction to the Field of Communication. 2nd edition.
Zaresfsky, D. (2002). Public
Speaking: Strategies for Success. 3rd edition.
Ric L. Shafer is the director of
forensics at
Winning the Peace:
The “Three
Pillars” of George Bush at
Terry
Robertson
The November, 19, 2003
speech given by George W. Bush at Whitehall Palace in Great Britain was one of
the most significant in the President’s political career. Mr. Bush attempts, in
the speech, to reinforce his proponents as well as negate the arguments of his
skeptics. This work illustrates, through Neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism
how the President met the rhetorical situation, how he utilized language and
rhetorical devices, and critiques the means of persuasion utilized by Mr. Bush.
Introduction
Richard Nuestadt (1969)
eloquently argued that, “Presidential power is the power to persuade.” The
beginning of the 21st century finds President George W. Bush in the unenviable
of persuading not only the citizens of the United States, but the peoples of
the world that the US incursion into Iraq was not only justified, but that it
would bring about a new democratic Middle Eastern State. On November 19, 2003
President Bush strode into
It’s rightly said that
Americans are a religious people. That’s, in part, because the “Good News” was
translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example William
Booth. At times, Americans are even said to have a puritan streak—where might
that have come from? (the audience laughs) (Remarks by the President at
It may seem strange to
listeners that a sitting US President invoked the ghost of William Tyndale, the
16th century translator of the Christian Bible, yet in retrospect perhaps not.
Bush’s speech was much
more than a defense of the war on terrorism. It was justification for a
British-American crusade that, he argues, is indispensable to the security and
freedom the planet. Since 9-11,
The
Rhetorical Situation
Lloyd F. Bitzer suggests
that the construct of rhetorical situation is founded on the understanding in
which something happens or does not happen, thus causing the rhetor to speak
out. This is coined the exigency of a speech (Bitzer, 1968). Bitzer bases his
argument on the concept that the ancient Greeks gave special attention to
timing--the "when" of the rhetorical situation. They called this kairos,
and it identifies the combination of the "right" moment to speak and
the "right" way (or proportion) to speak.
President Bush had
planned to present his speech to a joint session of Commons and Lords following
the precedent set by his counterpart, Tony Blair, when he spoke to the US
Congress. Indeed, senior White House adviser Dr. Harlan Ullman said: "They
would have loved to do it because it would have been a great photo-opportunity”
(Roberts, 2003). However, in the end, the Bush team abandoned the idea because
they feared backbenchers in the Labour party would walk out, embarrassing the
president. Instead the only speech presented by Mr. Bush on November 2003 trip
to
Aboard Air Force One, en
route to
President George W. Bush
visited
Another group associated
with rhetorical situation was the protesters who took to the street to
demonstrate against the Bush visit. An estimated 100,000 protesters marched
through
Language
and Rhetorical Devices
No animal but man ever laughs (antiquity, Aristotle, 1991)
President Bush begins
the
It was
pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit
Bush was referring to
the illusionist David Blaine who, in, his latest stunt, encased himself in a
plastic box over the River Thames. He spent 44 days suspended beside the
One general paradigm for
humorous reduction to absurdity is that one may believe something, but when
considering a type humorous statement, it will contradict or make one’s value
or belief unintelligible. In other words no one is going to treat the head of
state in such a manner. The juxtaposition of Blaine and Bush is an effective
rhetorical device. Thus, Bush further strengthens the bond with his listeners,
by using it. The commonality that humor brings between Bush and his listeners
is extended as is the commonality between the British and the
Americans
traveling to
The verbal irony in
Bush’s statement “exercised with enthusiasm” is a wink and a nod toward the
audience. Indeed, let the demonstrators protest, Bush is saying. It is people
like us (Bush, his fellow, neo-cons, and Blair supporters) who protect that
right for them, just as we have given the right of free speech and assembly to
the Iraqis in
Common
Ground
If rhetoric is to be valuable, if it is to motivate or lead
to mutual understanding, it is necessary for the rhetor and audience to share
some common ground. Rhetorical sensitivity is the "tendency to adapt
messages to audiences" (Littlejohn, 1996, p. 107). This idea has its
foundation in Aristotle's notion of the enthymeme (Aristotle, trans.
1991). Aristotle
suggests that in order to be an effective communicator a speech must share
common ground between communicator and audience. The speech will lose its sway
unless rhetors find parallels between themselves and the audience.
The language used by
Bush is inclusive between as it finds common ground between the two nations.
For example, the faith in liberty and the crusading moralism described by Bush
in the speech are parts of
The
people of
Bush references men who
helped to construct the shared Anglo-American experiment in democracy. Indeed,
as Bush argues "whether one learns these ideals in
The purpose of the
extensive use of we is to exploit the existing relationships between the rhetor
and the audience. The relationship between the rhetor and the audience is fluid
and the linguistic forms used to convey or even to manipulate the audience
exists in the connections between personal identity and pronominal choice
(Íñigo-Mora, 2004).
President Bush’s address
begins with a humorous enthymeme that attacks those who might be protesting the
war in
The narrative in the
speech begins with Bush telling the tale of 9/11. He delivers a eulogy of
sorts, describing those who died in the
But who is this speaker,
explaining what the narrative is and what its result will be? Interestingly, it
is not the voice of the President only, but that of all peoples – both east and
west. It refers to, for example, a collective first person by stating that the
“natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behinds us
(italics added), as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has
passed is comforting, is understandable, and it is false. The attacks that
followed - on Bali,
Aristotle (antiquity,
1991) does tell speakers to utilize narrative to credit themselves (ethos) and
to discredit adversaries. Book 3, chapter 16 notes, “You may also narrate as
you go anything that does credit to yourself, e.g. "I kept telling him to
do his duty and not abandon his children"; or discredit to your adversary,
e.g. "But he answered me that, wherever he might find himself, there he
would find other children," the answer Herodotus' records of the Egyptian
mutineers. Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy.” Bush creates and
discredits the antagonists in his narration by stating, “These terrorists
target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they
gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished…The evil
is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial.” Obviously, if the speaker
can utilize his/her narrative to achieve the better moral end, his/her ethos is
enhanced. It is difficult to imagine a better end than protecting the world
from mass destruction.
Bush goes on to explain
how the
Constructive
and Refutation Proofs
The question that frames
the constructive and refutation proofs in the speech is simply; how can
terrorism be eliminated? The answer is founded upon the construction of the
three pillars. The first is that international organizations must be equal to
the challenges of our world, from lifting up falling states to opposing
proliferation. The second is to restrain aggression and evil by force. Finally,
the global expansion of democracy must be a commitment. This solution to world
terrorism is fallacious, Non Causa Pro Causa, as it does not solve the problem
as to how terrorists are created. In other words, Bush’s remarks treat the
symptoms of terrorism without impacting the disease. Bush describes terrorism
by inferring that terrorists are caused by the failure of international
organizations; may be eliminated through military intervention; and will not
grow where democracy is implanted. By accepting any of this however, one must
create a link between halting acts of terrorism and foreign policy forged by
nation-state realities. This link, in many instances, simply does not exist.
Lifting falling states and opposing proliferation between nation states does
little to stop the budding terrorist or change his/her mind concerning the
injustice that he/she perceives. Second, military intervention has a woeful
record in its use against terrorism. Indeed, every time
Mr. Bush’s refutation
proof exists in his argument surrounding the third pillar. He states that
peoples in the west must change their own thinking concerning Islam. He
suggests that critics argue that Moslem people are not capable of self
government and that these critics see Islam as being inconsistent with democratic
cultures. This attack on critics leads to a passage that sums up the argument
on moral high ground, “Peoples of the
The epilogue reinforces
Mr. Bush’s thoughts concerning the identification between the American and
British peoples. Further, he again draws upon the memory of the Second World
War to justify the Iraqi incursion. It exhorts the British people as being
firm, steadfast, generous, and brave. Aristotle suggests that epilogues should
summarize, build ethos, and forge good will. The president’s speech does just
that.
President Bush’s speech
at
The enthymeme, as
explained by Aristotle, is "a kind of syllogism" that is used in
rhetoric. According to Aristotle, the speaker is to prove a case to the
satisfaction of an audience....and does it by presenting considerations for the
audience to think about (enthumema)" (Burnyeat, 93). Further, because
most audiences are usually not made up of experts on the subject being
discussed, speakers should be wary of arduous of reasoning. Knowing this
information, one could say the following about enthymemes: “(1) they must be
arguments about things which are capable of being otherwise than they are, (2)
they must restrict the number of premises that they use” (Bunyeat 100).
In order to evaluate the
methods of persuasion that is at the crux of Aristotelian analysis, two issues
must be contemplated. The first is determining major premises upon which
enthymemes that form “proofs” are founded. Second, the critic must determine
how the audience is moved in the direction of a favorable feeling toward the
premises and their subsequent conclusions. In this instance Bush utilized
several enthymemes in order persuade the audience of his argument.
The first premise is
that Americans and Brits are a religious and moral people. Subsequently, the
actions taken by the Anglo-American alliance must be just because it is based
upon testament from God. This conclusion ferments from an unusually rich mix of
religion and politics within the public sphere that result from a convergence
of factors that surround 9/11. Religious passion has been stirred and faith is
placed on center stage. Further, Bush’s own faith has been publicly displayed
to inform his policies and decisions.
This enthymeme is
interesting based on the construct of Bush’s audience. Obviously, the war is
popular with the evangelical right wing of his party, but presumably less so
with those who portray their devotion in different ways. Pope John Paul II, for
example, questioned the moral authority utilized by Bush when invading
Bush is, however,
successful in burying these type questions in his second enthymeme. His
presentation of the supporter of the Iraqi policy as ideal moral patriot is
offered in such a manner that possible detractors are not encouraged to raise
dissent. The conclusion to the enthymeme suggests that supporters of Iraqi
policy are idealists in the vein of Woodrow Wilson, are guardians of civil liberties,
and act to suppress poverty and oppression. The ideal patriot is actually
sacrificing him/herself in order to bring freedom and peace worldwide. It is difficult
to attack the premises of these two enthymemes, especially, when Bush utilizes
the second enthymeme to protect the first. The target audience lives in the
western world and has participated in a western worldview that idolizes sacrificial
duty to democratic ideals. To dissent is to question the foundation of one’s
lived experience.
Bush also plays upon a
pathetic appeal through the premise that the world is a better place for these
actions, no matter what the means. He states:
And
who will say that
Bush gives two premises
in the paragraph. First, his actions made the Arab world as well as the western
world (by definition the
Perhaps the President’s most overarching argument and
enthymeme, however, is indicating that the expansion of western democracy is
the ultimate weapon in halting terrorism. The conclusion to this argument is
that the lone way to stop terrorist attacks is to form democratic governments
in rogue Middle Eastern states. Standing as his third pillar, it is also the
most prominent of the three. Several rhetorical devices are utilized to point the
audience in the direction of acceptance to the conclusion. First, Mr. Bush
defines compulsory democracy, enforced through occupation and outside invasion,
in terms that are palatable to the audience. In antithetical rhetorical form
the president argues:
In
democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to
malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better
lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack
their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own
people. (Remarks by the
President at
The definition brackets
democracy in western terms, and is developed through a lens of western
democratic evolution. Second, Bush presents his view of democracy confidently;
disregarding arguments to the contrary that enforcing democracy from the
outside is much different than evolving democracy from within.
Finally, Bush portrays a
confidence that helps to implant the conclusion. Confidence, according to
Aristotle, is the counterpart of fear.
Having
now seen the nature of fear, and of the things that cause it, and the various
states of mind in which it is felt, we can also see what Confidence is, about
what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear,
and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the
expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us
safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to
the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes
alarm. (Aristotle, Antiquity, 1991)
Presidential abilities
to create and sustain confidence have oft been at the core of successful
administrations. Houck (2004), in his critique of the rhetoric of the
Bush understood that a
bold confident policy is best presented to an audience that is still fearful of
attack. He mollifies an anxious populace with a conclusion that will, according
to the president, bring about safety and security through making the “other”
just like us. He presents the idea that if the Anglo-American coalition can
reduce the anxiety brought about by trepidation toward values held by an
unknown culture, the west will be safe. This pathetic appeal holds as its
premise that western democratic expansion, implemented in any manner, is an
almost unqualified good.
A final enthymeme in the
speech is the consequence of doing nothing. Bush argues that for decades the
west has done little in the
Following the enthymeme
is a series of ethos building statements that credit the president’s policy.
This is a particularly effective strategy as it gives the Bush administration
rhetorical authority to make the claims concerning democracy. In addition it
gives the audience the perception that the Iraqi policy has been radically
successful.
Since
the liberation of
Appeals such as this
attempt to persuade by calling attention to the utility and noble character of
the administration’s policy. In this Bush realizes that his public, both
American and British, have adopted the postmodern view that politics is not
just about appearances -- it is appearances. Assertions concerning
An understanding of
Aristotle illustrates that rhetoric is interested with matters that are
contingent rather than absolute (i.e., since rhetoric is based on probability
rather than on necessity). Further, Aristotle suggests that the persuasive
appeal of the speaker's character must be seen as based on the speech itself,
not on prior reputation. This particular appeal to ethos, however, is effective
because it brackets out the arguments against invasion, i.e. oil interests,
pre-emptive strike, American hegemony, etc. In its place is the unselfish
motive assertion by Bush – that we went to war to lend a hand to the Iraqi
people. This view helps to reinforce the image of
Overall
Evaluation
What can be said about President Bush’s speech at
Aristotle. (1991). Aristotle on rhetoric: A theory
of civic discourse. Trans. G. A. Kennedy,
Bitzer, L.
F. (1968). The Rhetorical Situation. Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions.
Burnyeat, M.F. (1996). Enthymeme: Aristotle on the
rationality of rhetoric. In Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric.
Amelie O. Rorty (Ed.)
Íñigo-Mora, I, (2004). On
the use of the personal pronoun we in communities. Journal
of Language and Politics 3:1.pp. 27–52.
Houck, D. W. (2001). Rhetoric as currency:
Littlejohn,
S. W. (1996). Theories of human communication (5th ed.).
Roberts,
B. (2003). Bush pulls out of speech to parliament. The Daily Mirror. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/allnews/content.
Remarks by the President at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html
Zwick, M.
& Zwick, L. (2003). The Pope’s response to the Iraqi war.
Terry Robertson (troberts@usd.edu)
is at the
The Effect
of
Hesham M.
Mesbah
From which news medium can audiences acquire information
best? To what extent does the news source affect receivers’ feelings of
knowing? Will the effect of a news source on confidence in knowledge, if any,
stay over time?
Exposure to either print or electronic news media is a daily
habit for an average person in today’s world. Computerized news transmitted via
networks and online services led to more diversification in news presentations.
Such diversity inspired many scholars to investigate the comparative
effectiveness of news media on memory processes. The study reported here
examines the effect of exposure to different news media on the variance in
subjects’ levels of recall immediately after exposure and two hours later. The
three media used in the experiment are television, newspapers, and computer.
Special attention to subjects’ metamemory, or their awareness of what they have
learned is also given in this paper. Metamemory is tested immediately after
exposure, and two hours later.
McLuhan (1964: 22) argued that effectiveness of any source
of information is determined by their mechanical nature. He defined radio as a
“hot” medium as it extends one single sense in "high definition” and is
low in “receivers’ participation,” whereas he identified television as a cool
medium that gives out little visual information compared to the movie.
Therefore, a hot medium like radio has very different effects on the user from
a cool medium.
However, the reason behind this comparative effectiveness of
news sources might be more multifaceted than McLuhan puts it. The mechanical
nature of a given news medium is one thing; and its contextual features that
characterize exposure to it is another thing. A newspaper occupies space and is
there whenever needed, whereas broadcast media are volatile. Some experimental
studies sought to control this factor. Stauffer et al. (1980) divided their
subjects into viewers, listeners, and readers. Each group was exposed once to a
variety of news stories. The readers were not allowed to read the story more
than once, yet they showed better levels of recall. Applying a similar design,
Gunter and his colleagues (1984) came up with consistent findings.
Wicks and Drew (1986), on the other hand, did not find
differences between television and newspapers in terms of subsequent recall
levels. They attributed this equality between the two media to the experimental
conditions that differ from normal exposure at home. Accordingly, contextual
factors might not be sufficient in explaining this variance in news recall
among news consumers. In a later study, Wicks (1995) found out that subjects
exposed to certain televised news stories recorded higher recall scores
immediately after exposure and two days later. He suggests that televised
images might have this potential of stimulating accelerated recall better than
do equivalent newspaper stories .
Another group of studies revealed that “cognitive processing
requirements” explain the superiority of printed materials over electronically
presented materials. The process of reading requires more cognitive effort, and
this results in better levels of knowledge acquisition. Gavriel Solomon (1984)
found that learning from printed materials was better than learning from
television among children. He based his explanation for this result on the way
children perceive both media. Television for them is an easy medium that does
not require the same cognitive effort exerted while reading. Kathy Pezdek and
her colleagues (1987) showed similar results among adults. This might explain
the evidence from the accumulated literature that reflects the superiority of
newspaper presentations over televised presentations (M. DeFleur et al., 1992;
D. Graber, 1988; McLeod et al., 1982; E. Wilson, 1974). In a more recent
experiment comparing television and print news, Gunter and colleagues (2001)
found that children learn most from television, whereas adults learn most from
print. The superior recall of print news observed with adults was attributed to
“the fact that print offers more opportunity to exercise control over the
processing of information than television does,” whereas children could show
better memory performance with redundant televised news presentations.
Comparing children’s recall of news stories in print , photos, and audio
formats, Walma and Tom (2000), indicated that the television presentation was
recalled better than any of the other media.
According to the concept of “cognitive processing
requirements” newspapers are cognitively superior because they are read, not
because of the context in which they are consumed. When an electronic medium is
apt to be read, rather than watched, newspaper’s superiority is expected to be
at stake. DeFleur and his colleagues (1992) found that the levels of recall
from newspaper versus computer screen presentations did not differ
significantly, whereas the print media were significantly more effective than
the broadcast media. However, most studies that experimentally examined the
comparative effectiveness of news sources used the “talking head” format in
presenting television news to control for the effect of picture (M. DeFleur,
1992; B. Gunter, 1989; W. Dommermuth, 1974; Ogilvie, 1957). When pictures
accompanied television presentations, memory performance changed. Furnham and
Gunter (1985) found that memory for violent news was better among male subjects
who watched it on television compared to those who were exposed to the same content
via newspapers or radio. Wicks and Drew (1991), using news stories that offered
congruence between audio and video, failed to support research showing that
television leads to less information gain than newspapers. The body of findings
is inconsistent, however. DeFleur and Cronin (1991), using a visual story
versus a printed version, reported that subjects in the newspaper presentation
passed on more details more accurately than those in the television group.
This presents study examines the relative effectiveness of
print versus electronic news media using a television news story accompanied by
redundant video track. Building on the notion of ‘cognitive requirements’, it
is expected that subjects who read the news in either newspaper or computer presentations
would show better performance than those who watch the same news story. Furthermore,
the style of news writing (inverted pyramid vs. narrative reporting) is sought
to be controlled by presenting the written version of news story in both
styles.
H1:
Verbal recognition scores will be significantly higher for news that is ‘read’
than for news that is ‘watched’.
The comparative effectiveness of different media as sources
of news might be explained according to how much individuals are confident in what
they learn from each medium. Certain news media might be perceived as
prestigious, serious, or deep, whereas other media are considered common or
entertaining by definition. This raises two questions here: (1) does confidence
in news recall vary according to the type of news source used? (2) Is there a
relationship between confidence in answers and levels of memory performance?
Various studies suggest that there is a relationship between
people’s confidence in their performance and their accuracy. Lichtenstein and
Fischhoff (1977) reported improved confidence-accuracy calibration. They
concluded that the confidence-accuracy relationship is likely to be best
calibrated at about 80% accuracy levels. There is a marked degree of agreement
in the cognitive literature that there is a moderate yet robust positive
relation between subjects’ confidence evaluations and their performance
(Perfect et. Al., 1993:144). Schneider and Laurion (1993), testing memory for
radio news, reported strong positive confidence-accuracy relationships.
H2:
Levels of verbal recognition scores of news facts will be affected by levels of
subjects’ confidence in their answers.
To date, investigators have rarely examined whether levels
of confidence in retrieval are affected by the type of news source. Such a
psychological factor may add to explaining the comparative effects of news
media. New news sources, such as computers, are perceived as a novelty by many
receivers in
H3:
There is a significant relationship between the kind of news source and
subjects feeling of knowing.
On the other hand, does the variance in confidence levels
according to the type of news source used hold over time? Hovland and Weiss
(1951) reported that the effect of the message source on opinion change tends
to dissolve over time. When subjects were tested four weeks after the experiment,
the percentage of those exposed to a high credibility source who had changed
their opinions decreased. The percentage of opinion change among those exposed
to a low credibility source tended to increase in the second test. The authors
termed this the “sleeper effect”. In a later experiment conducted by Kelman and
Hovland (1953), similar results were reported. It has been predicted that
although the subjects might have not forgotten the source, they apparently had
dissociated the content from the source of communication.
The sleeper effect did not receive much attention in memory
studies, however. Long-term memory was tested to either assess retrieval of
stimuli that were not recalled shortly after exposure (reminiscence), or
examine improvement in recall over time (hypermnesia). Effect of type of source
on long-term recall still needs to be clarified. By the same token, different
levels of confidence in answers caused by exposure to different kinds of news
sources are susceptible to change significantly over time. Applying the sleeper
effect perspective, information may be stored in and retrieved from long-term
memory in isolation from its source.
H4:
There is a significant difference in the degree of confidence in answers
between the first test immediately after exposure and the second test two hours
later.
Subject
One hundred and twenty
subjects volunteered to participate in the experiment. All subjects were senior
students studying mass communication at
Design and Stimulus Material
Using name rosters of students, subjects were randomly
assigned to four groups. Each group comprised 30 Ss who were exposed to one
news story presented through different media according to the experimental
conditions.
The news story used in the experiment consisted of
approximately 300 words. It is actually a news report on AIDS in the world,
which was broadcast on the Egyptian television in April 1996. Different
criteria were used in selecting this particular story material for the
experiment. First, previous exposure will be controlled as the story was aired
years ago. Second, subjects’ background knowledge will be ruled out as well,
because all the facts and figures mentioned in the story are now history or
have changed dramatically. Third, the global nature of the topic dealt with in
the story is of general interest that is not restricted to the local community.
This televised news story was transcribed and printed in a
column format and font characteristic of newspapers. Two versions of the story
were presented in the newspaper form. The first one was just a typical
recitation of the voice over of the story. This format was termed ‘the broadcast-style
printed version’. The other version was edited according to print journalism
standards. Two specialized news editors were asked to rewrite the story in the
print format using typically the same information and words in the original
story. Another version of the story was prepared using the computer. The story
was written in its original format and it occupied 36 lines on the screen.
Each subject was told at the beginning of the experiment
that she/he would be asked several general questions on the news story
presented. Subjects were not allowed to take any notes during reading or
viewing the story. They either read or viewed the material just once. Subjects
in the newspaper and the computer conditions were closely watched by the
experimenters to make sure that the instructions were clear and thoroughly
followed. Two hours later, subjects were asked to take the same recognition and
confidence test again. During the time lapse between the two tests, the
students were seated for a lecture on a totally different topic. This was done
to prevent any interpersonal communication among the students concerning the
experiment or the story presented.
Measurement
Memory was measured by giving the students a twelve-item
multiple choice test on the content of the presented news story. The total
number of the correct answers on this test was the measure of aided recall for
factual information in the experiment.
As subjects answered each multiple-choice item, they also
rated to what extent they were confident that their answer was correct. This
was done using a 5-point-Likert type scale, ranging from not at all sure (1),
to completely sure (5).
Analysis and Results
Effect
of source.
The
mean recognition score immediately after exposure for the news story was calculated
for each group. The findings showed consistency with research literature that
reveals superior cognitive effects of written materials. Readers in both
computer and newspaper presentations showed better performance on the test.
Table 1: ANOVA of Immediate
Memory According to Type of News Source
|
P Probability |
F Ratio |
df |
Source of Variance |
|
0.01 |
3.86 |
3 |
Between groups |
|
|
|
116 |
Within groups |
|
|
|
119 |
Total |
Subjects in the computer group remembered the
story best (M=8.23). Those who read the story written in broadcast style were
able to remember details (M=8.17) more than those who read the story written
according to the traditional Inverted Pyramid style (M=7.77). Memory
performance was at its lowest among those in the television group (M=6.73).
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the
significance of difference between these different levels of immediate memory.
As Table 1 illustrates, the effect of type of news source
produced a statistically significant difference (F= 3.86, p< 0.01) supporting
the hypothesis that differences between groups in terms of news recall are
statistically significant. In order to identify whether each medium differed
significantly from each other, Benferroni test with significance level 0.05 was
further run (see Table 2).
Table 2: Significant
Differences Between Groups (Benferroni Test)
|
Computer |
Broadcast Style |
Newspaper |
Television |
Medium |
Mean |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Television |
6.73 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Newspaper |
7.77 |
|
|
|
|
|
* |
Broadcast
Style |
8.17 |
|
|
|
|
|
* |
Computer |
8.23 |
|
*Denotes
significance in difference between new media
The data in Table 2 supports the hypothesis that subjects’
recognition scores in the ‘reading condition’ are significantly higher than
those in the viewing condition. However, only two groups who read the story
(computer (M= 8.23) and broadcast style (M= 8.17) presentations) showed
significantly better memory performance than subjects in the television group
(M= 6.73). No significant difference was detected between the television group
and the newspaper group (M= 7.77). This suggests that “reading” the news is
more cognitively effective than “watching” it.
Table 3: ANOVA of
Delayed Memory Scores according to News Media
|
F Probability |
F Ratio |
df |
Source of variance |
|
0.12 |
1.96 |
3 |
Between
groups |
|
|
|
116 |
Within
groups |
|
|
|
119 |
Total
|
Delayed
memory and news source. The influence of the type of news source was not
found when subjects’ recognition memory was tested again after two hours. As
Table 3 suggests, there is no significant difference between groups in terms of
recognition memory performance two hours after exposure to the news story (F=
1.96, p> 0.12). Mean of correct answers in each group in both tests is
displayed in Table 4.
Table 4: Mean Recognition Scores for News Facts
varied by Source of News and Time of Testing
|
Mean (time 2) |
Mean (time 1) |
News source |
|
7.10 |
6.73 |
Television |
|
7.79 |
7.77 |
Print |
|
8.23 |
8.17 |
Broadcast format |
|
8.00 |
8.23 |
Computer |
Memory performance in both the “TV” and “print” groups
improved slightly when retested. Although memory for news facts was better for
“read” materials, superiority of written presentation of news was not confirmed
statistically when delayed memory was tested. This could be explained according
to the familiarity of the test. In the second time, the students were more
familiar with the multiple-choice questions. Reading the items again might have
triggered long-term memory traces and led to almost equal performance among the
four groups.
Memory-confidence
relationship.
Analysis
of subjects’ metamemory suggests that they are primarily aware of what they
know. Aggregate score of confidence ratings correlated significantly with total
number of correct answers in both immediate test of memory (r= 0.57, p<
0.001) and delayed test (r=0.55, p< 0.001). This result supports the
hypothesis that subjects’ feeling of knowing positively correlates with their
levels of memory performance.
News
source and metamemory. Subjects differed in their degrees of confidence
in answers according to the type of news source. Differences were greater in
the first test (time 1), whereas in the second test (time 2) the gap tended to
be closer (see Table 5).
Table 5: Mean Confidence
Scores Varied according to Medium and Time
|
M time 2) |
M (time 1) |
News source |
|
41.03 |
39.87 |
Television |
|
45.30 |
43.67 |
Broadcast
format |
|
44.47 |
45.10 |
Computer |
|
45.03 |
45.50 |
Print |
In both tests, television was the least initiator of the
feeling of knowing among the four groups. The other written presentations of
the same news story contributed to higher levels of confidence, however.
Analysis of variance was used to examine the significance of differences in
subjects’ metamemory based on medium and time of testing.
The data supports the hypothesis that both style of news
presentation and time of testing exert effects on subjects’ metamemory (see
Table 6).
Table 6: Analysis of Variance in Confidence
Scores According to Medium and Time
|
Time 2 F Ratio p |
Time 1 F Ratio p |
df |
Source of variance |
|
1.97 0.12 |
4.19
0.007 |
3 |
Between
groups |
|
|
|
116 |
Within |
|
|
|
119 |
Total |
Significant differences in levels of confidence were
uncovered immediately after exposure, whereas no such significance was detected
when subjects were tested two hours later (F= 4.19, p< 0.007 at time1; F=
1.97, p> 0.12 at time2). In other words, the effect of medium on feeling of
knowing tended to diminish over time.
Discussion
The study aimed at examining the effect of the news source
on both memory performance and feeling of knowing. The results show consistency
with previous research in showing superiority of written news over televised
news. Reading news via a computer screen or a newspaper is a cognitively more demanding
task that results in better levels of memory recognition. Subjects who read the
news story either on a computer screen or via a traditional newspaper clipping
showed a significantly higher level of recognition compared to the television
groups. On the other hand, memory performance in the “newspaper” group and
“computer” group was almost similar. This finding is consistent with the body
of literature that shows similar cognitive effects of reading the news via
printed materials or the screen. For example, Sundar and colleagues (1998)
examined memory from print and online versions of a newspaper article. The
found no significant differences in memory for news across different media. The
structure of reading the news in both the “newspaper” and “computer” conditions
was linear, reading from beginning to end. Adding the structural norm in
hypermedia to computerized news text is expected to introduce some variance in
memory performance, however. Several studies showed that print conditions have
higher memory scores than other nonlinear conditions (Eveland and Dunwoody,
2001b;
This could be explained according to how highly subjects
evaluate computer as a sophisticated source of news that is handled with
attention. This might also explain the high levels of confidence in answers
among the computer group.
Moreover, the study reveals that the traditional format of IP
(Inverted Pyramid) is not necessarily the most relevant for writing print news.
Many feature and human interest stories are better formulated in the narrative
style common in currently in both print and broadcast journalism.
On the other hand, the delayed test of memory showed
equality among the different news sources utilized in the study. Performance
among the television group was improved to be almost similar to the other
groups. Confidence in answers was not an exception. Repeated testing of the
subjects might be responsible for this leveling. When taking the test again,
subjects might have performed inner rehearsals that facilitated retrieval of
correct answers in time 2.
Finally, the sleeper effect materialized significantly in
the study. When subjects were tested immediately after exposure, they showed
varying degrees of confidence in their answers. Confidence-accuracy
relationship appeared to be positively significant.
When tested two hours later, confidence levels turned out to
be almost equal among the four groups. Applying the concept of the sleeper
effect, subjects might have associated information with its source in the first
test, whereas dissociation was more prevalent in the second test. When
dissociation took place, confidence scores were leveled out, and the effect of
the type of news source on the feeling of knowing was neutralized.
On the other hand, the results suggest that while broadcast
news media are gaining popularity and prominence, they are less effective in
initiating stronger memory traces for the news compared to print materials or
the news that are presented in a "written" format. Consequently,
broadcast news could strive for more effectiveness by using additional
techniques such as captions, superimposed statements, figures, and excerpts.
Television news stories need to be "verbalized" as much as they have
been "visualized." The use of factoids (lists of boiled-down facts)
inside the televised news items could be one of the answers. On the other hand,
the writing styles for different news media should be developed to meet the
requirements of new technologies. Although print and online journalism are
organized in space, they do have inherent dissimilarities that dictate the use
of different news writing styles for both media. Professionals agree that he
Inverted pyramid style is more suitable for print news, whereas the square
format is more relevant to broadcast news. Agreement on the most suitable
writing style for online news is still lacking, however.
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Hesham M. Mesbah, Dept. of Journalism &Mass
Communication, Kuwait University This paper has been presented at the 28th
Southeast Colloquium of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication held at
This study
analyzed the relationship between image restoration strategies and media
coverage, specifically, the image restoration strategies utilized by Bill
Clinton in 1992 and George W. Bush in 1999 in response to questions of past
drug use and the ensuing media coverage during the respective campaigns. A
literature review of political apologia and image restoration strategies is presented,
followed by potential explanations for the extensive media coverage of the drug
issue. Articles published in 7 newspapers during the respective political
campaigns were retrieved and textually analyzed to determine the candidates’
image restoration strategies. The reported presidential comments were then critically
analyzed to demonstrate the potential influence of image restoration strategies
on the media coverage of the drug questions.
Introduction
During
their respective campaigns, Bill Clinton in 1992 and George W. Bush in 1999
used multiple image restorations strategies when questioned about past drug
use. Their responses to these questions provide interesting examples for
political communication research and analysis. Future political candidates and
their staffs may find it useful to review notable candidates' strategies and
the influence of these strategies on media coverage when developing rhetoric to
promote and protect the candidate’s political image.
Trent and
Friedenberg (2000) describe one’s political image as how voters perceive a
candidate or elected official. This perception is based on “a candidate’s
personal traits, job performance, and issue positions” (Denton & Stuckey,
1994, p. 7). Once an image has been established, strategies may be required to
protect that image. Brinson and Benoit (1996) recognize that “when a reputation
is threatened, individuals and organizations are motivated to present an image
defense: explanations, justifications, rationalizations, apologies, or excuses
for behavior” (p. 30). Sellnow, Ulmer, and Snider (1998) agree, “[Individuals]
must engage in a discourse with their public that provides an adequate
justification for whatever actions are under scrutiny” (p. 62).
It is in
this discourse that political candidates may utilize apologia or image
restoration strategies to defend their image against overzealous questions and
accusations. While candidates cannot dictate the media’s coverage of certain
issues, by taking into account other potential influencers, one can analyze
media coverage and determine if image restoration strategies can also influence
the media.
Research Questions
To
determine the potential influence of image restoration strategies on media
coverage, three relevant research questions were asked.
RQ1) What image restoration
strategies were utilized by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in response to
questions about past drug use?
RQ2) Was there a difference
in the amount of media coverage of the drug issue pertaining to the candidates?
RQ3) Is there a relationship
between the image restoration strategies utilized and the media coverage of the
candidates’ responses to questions of past drug use?
To
investigate these questions, a literature review of political apologia and
image restoration strategies is presented, followed by potential explanations
for the extensive media coverage of the drug issue. Retrieved articles are then
textually analyzed to determine candidates’ image restoration strategies.
Finally, the media coverage in correlation to the image restoration strategies
used is analyzed to provide implications of the study and offer suggestions for
future research.
Literature Review
A
respectable body of research on political apologia has developed over the
years, spanning the decades between Sam Houston’s speech of self-defense in the
House of Representatives in 1832 (Linkugel & Razak, 1969) and President
Clinton’s 1999 self-defense in the Monica Lewinsky scandal (Kramer & Olson,
2002). While the majority of political apologia research has focused on single
speeches, as in Nixon’s 1952 “Checkers” speech (Vartabedian, 1985) and Edward
Kennedy’s 1969 “Chappaquiddick” address (Ling, 1970), more recent research has
concentrated on the progressive apologia of individuals facing a crisis, such
as the multiple messages of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal (Kramer & Olsen,
2002). Another body of apologia discourse has focused on corporations going
through crisis (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brinson & Benoit,
1996; Hearit, 1995; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001). According to Benoit (1997), “The
basic options are the same for both individual and corporate image repair efforts”
(p. 177).
In
apologetic discourse, an individual can use several strategies to respond to
image-damaging attacks. Ware and Linkugel (1973) posit these strategies include
denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Denial involves the
disavowal of “any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward
whatever it is that repels the audience” (276). Bolstering requires reinforcement
of “the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship that is viewed
favorably by the audience” (277). Differentiation changes the meaning of an
event by separating the elements of that event from the larger context. Transcendence
cognitively joins “some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some
larger context within which the audience does not presently view that attitude”
(p. 280).
Building
on apologia discourse, Benoit (1997) offers five broad categories of image
restoration strategies to use when one’s reputation is under attack: denial,
evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification.
Within each broad category, Benoit details variants of the “message options”
(p. 178). Denial can be classified as simple denial or shifting the blame to
another party. Evasion of responsibility includes the variants of provocation,
defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Provocation is used in claiming
the accused was provoked into committing the offensive act. Defeasibility is
used when stating there was not enough information available or the accused was
unable to avoid the offensive act. The third variation is used in claiming the
offensive act was an accident, and the fourth variation of good intentions is
used in claiming the accused meant well in the act. Reducing offensiveness of
the act includes bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence,
attacking the accuser, and compensation. Beniot (1997) describes bolstering as
“stressing good traits,” minimization as claiming the act was not serious,
differentiation as claiming the act was less offensive than other acts,
transcendence as claiming there are more important issues than the offensive
act, attacking the accuser as reducing the credibility of the accuser, and
compensation as reimbursing the victim of the offensive act. Corrective
action—a plan to solve or prevent a problem—and mortification—an apology for
the act—do not have subcategories but are often used in conjunction with other
image restoration strategies (p. 179). Sellnow, et al. (1998) contends that
“individual strategies used to restore an image may interact with other
strategies” (p. 69) and “one image restoration strategy can imply or combine
with other strategies” (p. 71).
Benoit
(1997) also addresses the issue of not responding. In identifying the options
of redefining the attack, refocusing attention, and simply ignoring the issue,
Benoit contends that an individual does not need to respond to accusations,
although he notes that “if a charge is important to the audience,” one “may
well be forced to deal with that accusation” (p. 183). I posit that, by doing
nothing, an individual is still responding. The individual is attempting to
reduce the offensiveness of the act by responding with a message that the issue
is not important enough for a response.
While it
is true that, if the issue is not important it will likely go away, it is not
the individual’s perception of the issue but the public’s that determines if a
full-blown crisis will be avoided by ignoring the situation. As Benoit (1997)
suggests, “The key question is not if the act was in fact offensive, but
whether the act is believed by the relevant audience(s) to be heinous” (p.
178).
In
furthering image restoration strategy discourse, I propose an additional
option, ambiguity, that does not fall into Benoit’s image restoration strategy.
Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) offer advice that initially seems contradictory to
standard crisis management practice. They contend that “ambiguity, when viewed
in the context of a crisis situation, enables organizations to strategically
communicate seemingly contradictory messages to distinct audiences” (p. 146).
By tailoring organizational ambiguity to image restoration strategies, an
individual may be able to extend the life of certain strategies. Rescinding a
denial delivered before all the facts are known may actually damage an
individual’s image. Ulmer and Sellnow’s (2000) review of Weick’s (1988)
explanation of “appropriate action” contends that organizations and individuals
“limit their potential for coping with a crisis when they make a firm
commitment to a single strategy” (p. 146).
Allowing
the potential for coping with a crisis is not the same as deception, however.
It is the intent of the ambiguity that can infringe upon ethics. Seeger,
Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) warn, “withholding information as a form of deception
may deny individuals the ability to make informed judgments” (p. 235). Ulmer
and Sellnow (1997) agree, “There exists an ethical obligation for those in
positions of influence to provide the information to their constituencies that
is necessary for making well-reasoned decisions” (p. 216). Nilsen (1974) labels
this ability to make decisions “significant choice.” Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) contend
that stakeholders should have the opportunity to engage in significant choice.
The question addressed with the Clinton and Bush drug inquiries is whether
there was an ethical obligation to answer the question. While this study does
not examine the ethical implications of the image restoration strategies,
crisis communication research suggests the quickest way to end a crisis is for
the individual or organization to be open and avoid withholding important
information from the public (Benoit, 1997; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Sellnow,
et al., 1998; Ulmer, 2001). If the public finds out at a later date that
information was withheld, the individual’s or organization’s image will be
damaged by the discovery and by the perception that the individual or
organization was dishonest in withholding the information. Benoit (1997)
attends that, “Apart from the fact that this is morally the correct thing to
do, attempting to deny true accusations can backfire” (p. 184).
Regardless
of the strategies used, Scott and Lyman’s (1968) framework of accounts suggests
that the strategies and accounts will be accepted when they (1) outweigh the
offense, (2) offer a motive acceptable to the audience, and (3) reflect
ordinary social knowledge of reasonable behavior. Blaney and Benoit (2001)
describe the theory of image restoration as having two primary assumptions:
first that communication is a goal-oriented activity, and second, is that
maintenance of a favorable image is one of the primary goals.
While the
maintenance of a favorable image is an obvious goal for a political candidate,
that image is subject to the scrutiny of the public and the media as the
public’s eye. Benoit and Brinson (1999) note, “One’s image is influenced by
one’s own words and actions, as well as by the discourse and behavior of others”
(p. 145). By analyzing Clinton’s and Bush’s own words, categorizing the image
restoration strategies used to address the drug questions, and examining the
behavior of the media pertaining to the coverage of the drug issue, this essay
demonstrates how image restoration strategies, along with additional factors,
influence media coverage.
Media Coverage
The amount
of media coverage a certain issue warrants can be attributed to a number of
different factors, including bias. Because Clinton and Bush belong to different
political parties, any difference found in the coverage of their drug use could
be attributed to left or right wing bias. While Lichter (2001) and Lowry and
Shidler (1998) found that Democrats have received slightly more favorable
coverage than Republicans in the past 50 years, repeated analysis of news
coverage of presidential elections has found no evidence of partisan bias in
news reporting (Gulati, Just, & Crigler, 2004; D’Alessio & Allen, 2000;
Hofstetter, 1976; Just, et al., 1996; Patterson, 1980; Patterson & McClure,
1976).
Bias can
also be seen in how a story is framed. Theories of framing suggest that news
coverage can foster changes in public opinion by promoting particular
definitions and interpretations of political issues (Shah, Watts, Domke, &
Fan, 2002; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). Patterson (1980) notes that
the news frames campaigns within a competitive game in which there is always a
loser. Hofstetter (1976) contends that news is biased against losing
candidates, not because of their policies, but because of what reporters deem
to be news. Some researchers have found candidates receive negative coverage
when they are behind in the polls (Bennett, 2001; Stevenson, Eisinger,
Feinberg, & Kotok, 1973) while others have found that it is the
front-runner who receives more negative coverage (Robinson & Sheehan,
1983). During their respective campaigns, both Clinton and Bush were already
the front-runners for their respective parties in the primaries when the initial
stories of the drug questions broke (Boyarsky, 1992; Yardley, 1999).
While
framing an election as a game or race can add excitement to a campaign, the
juicy details of a politician’s past life have become a part of the sensationalism
inherent to today’s news repertoire. “Overall, the network news, the cover
stories of news magazines, and the front pages of major newspapers witnessed an
increase from 15% to 43% between 1977 and 1997 in celebrity, scandal, gossip,
crime, and other human interest stories” (Hickey, 1998, p. 49). Gulati, et al.
(2004) contend that campaigns that are not competitive or do not have a scandal
erupting are rarely covered. Television is one of the most influential
catalysts to increased sensationalism and has “enhanced the discrepancy between
the ‘hoopla’ and substance observed in print” (Gulati, et al., 2004, p. 241).
Because television also has a greater tendency to dramatize politics (Bennett,
2001; Graber, 2001), the trend of increasing attention on political drama could
be attributed to any increase in media coverage between the elections.
Aside from
political bias, game-framing, and sensationalism, there could be many other
reasons why one candidate receives more media coverage than another, including
timing, relevance, or lack of more important news stories. In the analysis of
the media coverage of candidates’ past drug use, I do not attempt to claim
image restoration strategies have a direct correlation with the amount of media
coverage an issue receives since I cannot control any other factors. However, I
do posit that image restoration strategies are an additional influence on the
media coverage. As future research on image restoration strategies and media
coverage develops, additional studies may further prove this hypothesis.
Method
To
determine whether image restoration strategies have an influence on media
coverage, I analyzed each candidate’s use of image restoration strategies and
the media’s coverage over the course of the presidential campaigns before the
1992 and 2000 elections. I completed a textual analysis of the quotations from
news articles in various metropolitan area newspapers, including Chicago Tribune,
Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Orlando Sentinel, Star Tribune, The Washington
Post, and Wall Street Journal (retrieved through ProQuest). I also studied the
evening news on three major television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, over the
course of the campaigns (retrieved through the Vanderbilt Television News
Archives). The articles and television news clips were retrieved using the
following key word combinations:
Textual Analysis of Image Restoration Discourse
During the
1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton engaged in multiple image restoration
strategies when questioned about marijuana use. While he eventually admitted to
using the drug, it was only through a series of strategically ambiguous
statements and minimization, denial, attacking the accuser, bolstering, and
mortification strategies that the awkward admission occurred.
Using
ambiguity,
In his now
famous admission, “When I was in
When asked
to assess the political impact of his admission,
As
questions about
After
taking hit after hit from the media,
Despite
the instances of ambiguity and image restoration strategies,
Bill
Clinton engaged in multiple image restoration strategies in the progressive
apologia surrounding the question of marijuana use. While he eventually
admitted to using the drug, it was only through a series of strategically ambiguous
statements and the utilization of the image restoration strategies of ambiguity,
minimization, denial, attacking the accuser, bolstering, and mortification.
Image Restoration and Bush’s Refusal to
Reply
George W.
Bush had seen the media’s fascination with presidential candidates’ past drug
use when
Simon and
Walsh (1999) accounted that “Bush asks voters to dismiss his past sins, real or
imagined, as the result of an occasionally ‘irresponsible’ youth” (p. 31). By
acknowledging his “past sins,” Bush used mortification to imply that what he
did (or did not do) in the past was wrong. He used ambiguity by saying that his
sins were “real or imagined” but did not admit whether he had actually
“sinned,” or used cocaine. Bush sought to minimize the offense by saying any
sins are the result of an occasionally “irresponsible” youth. By focusing on “occasional”
and “youth,” Bush attempted to distinguish claims that he was an avid partier
and that it was not a recent activity.
Bush often used his youth as a
minimization strategy. In response to the questions: “Have you ever used drugs?
Marijuana? Cocaine?” Bush replied: “I’m not going to talk about what I did as a
child” (Kurtz, 1999a, p. C1), and “I’m not going to talk about what I did years
ago” (Kurtz, 1999b, p. A2). In one account Bush stated that he would have been
able to pass security clearance in Clinton’s administration, which required
reporting drug use in the past seven years, and in Bush’s father’s
administration, which would have required reporting drug use 15 years prior to
1989 (Barringer, 1999b, p. 1.28). When pushed to answer the question beyond
1974, Bush refused. Barringer (1999b) reported that Bush rebuffed the question
of past drug use with the words: “What I did as a kid? I don’t think it’s
relevant” (p. 1.28). Bush used minimization by concentrating on the “relevance”
of youthful indiscretions and by implying that anything prior to 1974 was not
important enough for a response.
Bush
attacked his accusers when stating that rumors were being planted and the media
was taking the bait. Barringer (1999b) reported that Bush said he was convinced
that rumors about his personal life were being planted, but he didn’t identify
who he believed was planting the rumors. “They’re ridiculous and they’re
absurd, and the people of
Bush used
transcendence in his reasoning for not answering the question. Benoit (1995) suggests
that a transcendent appeal “directs our attention to other, allegedly higher
values, to justify the behavior in question” (pp. 77-78). Apple (1999) reported
that Bush said, “I have told the American people all I’m going to tell them . .
. I hope the people appreciate a candidate who comes along and says, enough is
enough. Enough is enough digging into people’s background years ago” (p. A14)
In a later interview, he said he was determined to end what he called “the
politics of personal vilification,” and he was going to give his “best shot at
cleansing and reinvigorating the system” (Apple, 1999, p. A14). According to
Walsh (1999), Bush said, “I’ve learned that sometimes politics can be
unnecessarily ugly and I’m trying to purge the system of ugly politics” (p.
A5). Bush used transcendence when he said his reason for refusing to answer the
question was to draw the line on invasive questions and “cleanse” and “purge”
the system. Bush contended that he was taking the high road and would sacrifice
the election in order to take a stand against invasive questions: “If the
American people don’t like my position they can go out and find someone else to
vote for” (Apple, 1999, p. A14).
While both
Clinton and Bush utilized image restoration strategies, they varied in their
use of the different strategies. I propose that the image restoration
strategies used demonstrate, not a direct correlation, but a potential
influence on the media coverage of the issue.
To
determine if candidates’ image restoration strategies influenced media
coverage, the study included an analysis of news articles from Chicago Tribune,
Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Orlando Sentinel, Star Tribune, The
Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, and news clips from the evening news
on ABC, NBC, and CBS over the course of the campaigns. There were differences
in the newspaper and television coverage of the candidates.
Twenty-seven
news articles and nine evening news stories covered
The Media of Marijuana
The
initial newspaper coverage of questions about
Table 1: Newspaper
articles in the initial story break of
marijuana questions
Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run
New
York Times 2 March
30 – April 24, 1992
Star
Tribune 1 March
30, 1992
Wall
Street Journal 1 March
30, 1992
The
Table 2: Television news stories
in the initial story break of
marijuana
questions
Network # of Stories Dates Run
ABC 2 March 29 – March 31, 1992
CBS 3 March 29 – April 17, 1992
NBC 4 March 29 – April 7, 1992
Table 3: Newspaper articles in the revival of the
story of
marijuana question
Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run
New York Times 1 October 4, 1992
Star
Tribune 2 July
14 – August 18, 1992
The initial newspaper
coverage of Bush’s responses to drug questions included 38 articles in seven
publications (Table 4). The coverage ran August 5 to September 20, 1999.
Television coverage during the evening news included three stories on two
stations (Table 5). The coverage ran three days, from August 19 to August 21,
1999. Bush also saw a revival of the drug question when an unauthorized
biography alleging drug use was pulled from the shelves. Nine articles in 6 of
the 7 publications (Table 6) covered the story, running 6 days from October 22
to October 27, 1999.
Table 4: Newspaper articles in the initial story break
of Bush’s
cocaine questions
Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run
New
York Times 7 August
19 – August 26, 1999
Star
Tribune 1 August
22, 1999
Wall
Street Journal 2 August
20 – August 30, 1999
The
Table 5: Television news stories in the
initial story break of Bush’s
cocaine questions
Network # of Stories Dates Run
ABC 1 August 19, 1999
CBS 2 August 19 – August 21, 1999
Table 6: Newspaper articles in revival of the story
of Bush’s
cocaine questions
Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run
New
York Times 2 October 22 – October 23, 1999
Star
Tribune 1 October
22, 1999
Wall
Street Journal 1 October
22, 1999
The
Implications
In
reviewing the image restoration strategies and the potential influence on media
coverage, I found that
Bush,
however, in refusing to fully answer the question, left reporters still looking
for answers. By using transcendence in his image restoration strategy, Bush may
have also offended reporters by saying the system needed to be purged of “ugly
politics” (Walsh, 1999, p. A5). Transcendence is an aggressive strategy and
implies that the user of the strategy has “higher values.” Bush’s strategy of
transcendence may have been seen as a challenge to some reporters, causing an
increase in questioning rather than a decrease in coverage. Clymer (1999)
contends that Bush’s answers made the issue linger rather than go away (p. A8).
Based on the difference between the amount of media coverage of the drug
question in the two campaigns and the empirical research described in this
study, I maintain image restoration strategies do influence the amount of media
coverage an issue receives.
While a
continuing trend in covering scandals can help explain the increase in
newspaper coverage of Bush’s cocaine query, it does not explain the decrease in
television coverage from 1992 to 1999. However, the availability of video can
explain the difference.
Based on
the timing of the story breaks, it is also difficult to draw conclusions from
the length of the time the stories were in the media. The amount of time the
issue was in the news is relevant to when the story broke. Because
After
analyzing the image restoration strategies and the media coverage of the
campaigns, I determined that image restoration strategies do influence media
coverage; however, other factors also influence media coverage, including the
availability of video and timing of the story. While some implications can be
drawn from this study, others require future research.
Limitations and Future Research
This study
was limited to news articles in seven national newspapers and news stories on
three television news programs. Future research could take into account the
coverage of the drug issue in newspaper opinion columns. While I did not
analyze whether the content of the opinion columns was positive or negative, an
initial count of opinion, editorial, letters to the editor, commentary, and
perspective columns in the 7 publications revealed 21 articles on Clinton and
50 articles on Bush. Analysis of editorials could suggest a possible slant in
the news coverage due to the opinions of the editors. A qualitative analysis of
letters to the editor could be compared with a quantitative analysis of the
polls to determine if the public really is disinterested in the past drug use
of presidential candidates. The study could also be expanded to other
newspapers and other mediums, including cable and satellite television as well
as newsmagazines. While it was not used in 1992, the Internet could be added as
a medium in future studies comparing other campaigns. An interesting twist
considering the gossip value of the drug issue would be to analyze the content and
coverage of entertainment programs like The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Late
night with David Letterman, and Saturday Night Live. Smith and Voth (2002) note
that shortly before the 2000 Presidential election, the
Conclusion
This study
analyzed the image restoration strategies utilized by Bill Clinton in 1992 and
George W. Bush in 1999 and the ensuing media coverage of their alleged past
drug use. Despite polling evidence that the public is not interested in
presidential candidates’ past drug use (Balz, 1999), reporters continue to
broach the subject when questioning politicians, forcing candidates to employ
various strategies to protect their images. While the glaring headline in The
Washington Post embodies the predicament of politicians faced with the nagging
questions of past drug use: “To Answer, or Not to Answer: That is the Question
of the Hour” (Woodward, 1999, p.A.05), continued coverage of this issue could
lead to interesting longevity studies of image restoration strategies and
improved strategic campaign rhetoric.
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Shari Veil (Shari.Veil@ndsu.edu)
is a Ph.D. Student at