Third Party Candidates in Political Debates:

Muted Groups Struggling to Express Themselves

Carolyn Prentice

Abstract

With the rise of a multitude of political parties, some campaign debate organizers are beginning to include third party candidates in their public debates. However, these third party candidates have been ignored in campaign debate literature. This study analyzed the transcripts of three campaign debates that included third party candidates, using muted group theory to understand the impact of third party candidates in campaign debates. The analysis demonstrates that third party candidates experience the communication obstacles of muted groups.

Since World War II, party affiliation among U.S. voters and straight-ticket voting has been on the decline (Miller & Shanks, 1996). Fewer and fewer people vote, perhaps because they feel their vote doesn’t make a difference, they think that politics is inherently corrupt, or they just don’t care. In this vacuum of political disaffection and apathy, a large number of independent parties have sprung up, seeking to revitalize voters by offering them alternative visions of government and alternative choices for elected officials. At present more than 100 independent parties can be identified in the US, some operating in only very circumscribed regions or with very narrow platforms (Sachs, 2003). However, these parties on a large or small scale manage to place their candidates on ballots and attempt to garner limited media attention for their causes. As some of these parties have gained at least local prominence, they have been included in campaign debates, although rarely on the presidential level (with the exception of Ross Perot in 1992 and John Anderson in 1980). Since our nation is so deeply entrenched in a two-party system, these alternative candidates are viewed with suspicion by major parties who see them as threats to their own electability because they are perceived as spoilers, stealing the votes that somehow should belong to one or the other of the major candidates. In this paper, I will refer to any candidate who is not affiliated with the two major parties as “third party.” The purpose of this study is to explore how inclusion of third party candidates in campaign debates affects the dynamics of the debate.

Literature Review

As pointed out by McKinney and Carlin (in press) very little is known about the impact of third party candidates in debate. Part of this can easily be attributed to researchers’ focus on presidential debates, which have for the most part excluded third party candidates. McKinney and Carlin (in press) identify only four published studies that analyzed non-presidential debates, none of which focused on a debate that included third-party candidates. To gather information about third party campaigns, one must reach beyond debate studies; yet even here, one finds few studies of third party campaigns. The few available studies reveal the struggle but growing importance of third party candidates, particularly in sub-presidential campaigns. As outlined by Winger (2002), third party candidates were able to get on the ballot fairly easily until the late 1960s when several Supreme Court decisions upheld state laws that obstructed third party candidates from being on ballots. However, today as the public begins to demand greater choice, recent ballot reform measures may facilitate third party candidates’ inclusion on ballots (Sifry, 2002). Contrary to the popular belief that third party candidates steal votes from major party candidates, several studies have suggested that third party candidates mobilize alienated voters who would otherwise choose not to vote (Luks, Miller, & Jacobs, 2003; Southwell, 2003). In addition, an examination of third party candidate Jesse Ventura’s victory in Minnesota showed the victory to be correlated with a dissatisfaction with state government, not federal government (Lacy & Monson, 2002; Sifry, 2002). Thus the few studies on third party candidates suggest that they struggle against obstacles, but manage to attract otherwise uninterested voters, impacting local and statewide politics more than national elections.

Since the exploration of the impact of third party candidates in debates is a new frontier, I sought the guidance of an overarching theory to direct my analysis. Third party candidates seem to me a marginalized group in society, excluded and vilified by major parties and their cohorts. Thus I considered theories of standpoint and power, but one with an emphasis on language, since I would be studying third party candidates’ debate dialogue. The theory that seemed more applicable is muted group theory, which has heretofore been used principally to examine feminist issues.

Muted group theory was first conceived by a male anthropologist and later expanded by a feminist communication scholar. Anthropologist Edwin Ardener first described the concept of muted groups, specifically focusing on how anthropological research used only male informants, ignoring and disparaging female informants as inarticulate (Ardener, 1975a). He suggested that ethnographers were thereby missing the entire experience of half the population because the informants were muted by being required to use the language of the dominant half. Because men created and normed the language, it reflected their experiences, but it also left women unable to express their experiences except in a crude translation effort to make the language fit. Cheris Kramarae expanded Ardeners’s ideas to particularly address feminist issues:

The language of a particular culture does not serve all its speakers equally, for not all speakers contribute in an equal fashion to its formulation. Women (and members of other subordinate groups) are not as free or as able as men to say what they wish, when and where they wish, because the words and the norms for their use have been formulated by the dominant group, men. So women cannot as easily or as directly articulate their experiences as men can. Women’s perceptions differ from those of men because women’s subordination means they experience life differently. However, the words and norms for speaking are not generated from or fitted to women’s experiences. Women are thus “muted.” Their talk is often not considered of much value by men—who are or appear to be, deaf and blind to much of women’s experiences. Words constantly ignored may eventually come to be unspoken and perhaps even unthought. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 1)

Ardener noted that “muted” has two distinct meanings relevant here: “Mute” means “without speech” and also “reduced in perceptibility” (Ardener, 1975b). Although Kramarae and others (Kramarae, 1981; Rubin, 1993; Spender, 1984; Turner, 1992) have used muted group theory to explore women’s issues in society, the theory is not limited to gender issues. As Ardener pointed out when he introduced the concept, “The woman case is only a relatively prominent example of muting; one that has clear political, biological, and social symbols. The real problem is that all world-structures are totalitarian in tendency” (Ardener, 1975b, p. 25). Thus Ardener recognized that other groups, particularly political groups, might also be seen as muted groups. This paper will use muted group theory to examine how third party candidates, when allowed to participate in public campaign debates, seem inarticulate and undependable because they are judged by the standard of the political rhetoric and worldview of the major parties.

If third party candidates exemplify the communication problems of a muted group, then Kramarae’s three assumptions should be true of them, with the language adjusted by substituting “major parties” for “men” and “third party” for “women.” Thus adjusted, the three assumptions include:

1. Third parties perceive the world differently from major parties because of third parties’ and major parties’ different experiences and activities rooted in different political ideologies.

2. Because of their political dominance, the major parties’ system of perception is dominant, impeding the free expression of the third parties’ alternative models of the world.

3. In order to participate in debates third parties must transform their own models in terms of the received major party system of expression. (Kramarae, 1981, p. 3)

Method

To test these assumptions as adjusted to apply to third party candidates in debates, I analyzed three campaign debates that included third party candidates: (1) Anne Northrup vs. Eleanor Jordan vs. Donna Mancini (Kentucky Third District Congressional race, 2000); (2) Jean Carnahan vs. Jim Talent vs. Daniel Romano vs. Tamara Millay (Missouri Senate race, 2002); and (3) Howard Dean vs. Ruth Dwyer vs. Anthony Pollina (Vermont gubernatorial race, 2002). These debates were chosen because they each included at least one third party candidate who was not a nationally known figure that had defected from another party. In addition, the three represent a cross-section of the different levels where third party candidates are most likely to be invited to participate in campaign debates. For my analysis I reviewed both the videotapes and the transcripts of these three debates. The Kentucky debate lasted only an hour, while the other two were one and a half hours in length. The transcripts, double-spaced, ranged in length from 34 pages to 65 pages and were compared for accuracy against the videotapes.

Analysis

In this section I examine the three debates in terms of the three assumptions of the muted group theory, simplified as Different Worldview, Impeded Free Expression, and Attempt to Transform Model.

The Kentucky Third District Congressional race in 2000 included incumbent Anne Northrup (Republican), Donna Mancini (Libertarian), and Eleanor Jordan (Democrat). The debate included a two-minute opening statement from each candidate, followed by four questions from local journalists that were answered in turn by all candidates for 90 seconds. Then each candidate had 30 seconds to ask one question of another candidate of her choosing, with a one-minute response, and a one-minute rebuttal. Then the journalists asked different questions to each individual candidate. And finally, each candidate made a two-minute closing statement. Excerpts from this debate clearly show that the third party candidate expresses a different worldview and this expression is impeded by the worldview of the major party candidates.

As a Libertarian candidate, Donna Mancini differed from the others in that she did not view the debate as increasing her chances to win an election, but as an opportunity to share the Libertarian message with a larger audience. In both her opening and closing statements she expressed thanks for being invited, saying it was a “wonderful opportunity to share my views with the citizens.” She did not explicitly ask for a vote. Her opening and closing statements express a clearly different perception of the political world:

The Libertarian offer is to keep your money and run your own life . . . This is to end the personal income tax and to replace it with nothing, end the insane war on drugs, and to free you of the social security pawn scam and let you plan your own secure retirement. [opening statement]

I think that the important thing that the American people really have to start to think about is how much more control do we want to give the federal government over our lives? . . . I truly believe that our country is going downhill quick. I think that we have to turn this thing around and put people back in charge of their own lives, give them their money back, their freedom back, let them make their own choices. . . . I love America and I want our country to be returned to the basic principles. [closing statement]

What’s striking about these statements is that no major party candidate would make such a doomsday proclamation about the state of the country nor likely characterize an anointed political reality such as Social Security as a “scam.”

Major party candidates typically impede the free expression of third party candidates’ worldview by three principal tactics: Ignoring their claims, appearing confused (verbally or nonverbally) by the claims, or actively attacking the claims made. In the Kentucky House debate, the major party candidates chose to simply ignore the claims made by the third party candidate, a tactic supported by the format of the debate, which basically allowed only 90-second answers to specific questions. Therefore, the major party candidates focused on their own records and ideology and occasional attacks on their major party opponent. Although Mancini was able to state her views in the debate, the two other candidates addressed her only once, and did not refer to her positions or refute her claims. When given an opportunity to question another candidate, the major party candidates simply traded questions with each other. When Mancini got her opportunity to ask a question of Jordan, the Democrat, Mancini rambled a little, but when pressed for time, she asked a very specific question: “What is your answer to the insane war on drugs, what is your plan to end it?” To this very direct question, Jordan replied, “I’m not sure I completely understand your question, but let me just tell you. . .” and then spoke of her record of co-sponsoring legislation. Whether this confusion was feigned or real, the message clearly conveyed was that the third party question did not make sense because it came from a “weird” worldview. In this debate, no one actively attacked the third party claims. Thus the third party candidate’s free expression of ideas was marginalized because the major party never took them seriously enough to address her claims.

One of the problems of a debate format in which the same questions are asked of all candidates is that questions are specifically worded to reflect the worldviews of the major parties. In the Kentucky House debate, all candidates were asked whether they favored the Bush or Gore plan for retirement savings, both of which specifically mentioned a Social Security Trust fund. The major party candidates expressed support along the expected party lines, but as a Libertarian, Mancini could not directly answer the question:

Well, I prefer Harry Brown’s plan, which is the great Libertarian offer, and that would allow people to take care of their income tax money, to keep it themselves . . . There is no social security trust fund . . . it’s a pawn scheme that’s insolvent with younger workers paying for older workers . . . it’s my responsibility to take care of my own retirement and we would all be better off if we just put our money in a savings account than invest it in social security.

Similarly, when asked how to spend the projected budget surplus, she replied:

How can you say we have a budget surplus when we are so many trillion dollars in debt? . . . As far as I’m concerned, when people are in debt, they have no extra money, they need to use the money they have to pay their bills.

Both of these examples demonstrate that questions formulated for major party candidates set up the third party candidates to express seemingly “way out” views in contrast to the saner, more familiar views of major party candidates. Without adequate discussion and rebuttal time, third party candidates are thus muted by an inability to clearly articulate their worldviews.

Missouri had an off-year Senate election because Mel Carnahan’s sudden death just weeks before the 2000 election resulted in a dead man being elected and his wife Jean being appointed to take his seat. The election two years later allowed Missouri’s voters to select a Senator for a full term. Four candidates were invited to the debate on October 24, 2002: Incumbent Democrat Jean Carnahan, Republican Jim Talent, Libertarian Tamara Millay, and Green Party Daniel Romano. The format allowed a two-minute opening statement, followed by questions from a panel of journalists addressed to all four candidates, in rotating order. Each candidate was allowed a two-minute closing statement. The presence of two third party candidates represents a more complex situation than the usual one-on-one debate context.

Similar to Mancini, the Libertarian candidate discussed above, Millay expressed a different worldview early in the debate. She said that she did not expect to win, and then addressed why she would choose to run in an election she had no hope of winning:

This election has seemed so far, flip a coin. Public dialogue has revealed no substantive difference between my major party opponents. They both want lower taxes and higher spending and a balanced budget. They both want more damaging intrusions into health care. They both want to save a failed and dishonest Social Security System, instead of getting serious about replacing it while there’s still time. They’re both willing to sacrifice American lives on the altar of a failed foreign policy and to sacrifice American rights on failed schemes like the war on drugs and gun control. I’m the only candidate on this stage that stands for less government and more freedom. I’m the only one who can swear the oath with a clear conscience, to defend and protect the Constitution. I believe that Missourians deserve the opportunity to vote for those things.

Thus, Millay framed her view of the race as between her and everyone else, that the major party opponents really had the same political worldview, and that she stood in opposition as the only real choice, the only person for the government that is enacted by the Constitution—a worldview that differed dramatically from the major party candidates.

Similarly, although he did not state explicitly that he did not expect to win, Green Party Candidate Romano voiced a different reason for running for office, reflecting a different alternative worldview:

I am the Missouri Green Party’s candidate, because I want to open up the political dialogue in this country. I feel that there are a lot of issues that have been suppressed and are off the radar screen, important issues. And the reason is because the major political parties in this country have become dependent on money from corporate sources. So what happens is that they end up representing the interests of big money, instead of the working people. I’m talking about issues like the over-consumption of oil in this country, which has necessitated intervention and invasion of a foreign country to secure access to fossil fuels.

Like Millay, Romano positioned himself as standing in opposition to the major party candidates who are essentially identical in their worldviews. He bothered to run in a sure-to-lose campaign because he wanted to share his worldview with voters. Romano’s comment about issues being “off the radar screen” indicated that he recognizes that he represented a different worldview that had been muted by the major parties.

Even though the third party candidates were invited to debate, their free expression of their worldviews was impeded by the dominance of the major parties’ model. In this debate major party candidates for the most part ignored the claims made by the third party candidates, although at times pointing out disagreements or obliquely attacking the third party stance. For example, when Romano expressed his opposition to drilling in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge and suggested supporting alternative energy, Talent said, “Digger and I have a mild disagreement on this one” (notice his casual use of his opponent’s nickname). This rather flippant reference to the Green Party worldview casts their stances as “other”—and thereby muted.

In this debate, the third party candidates attempted to transform their worldviews in terms of the major party models principally through pointing out agreements with the major party candidates and refraining from attacking the major party candidates. For example, when asked about criteria for choosing Supreme Court judges, Millay explicitly expressed agreement with Jim Talent that competency and honesty were more important than partisan issues. Later on, Romano pointed out a similarity that he had with Senator Carnahan in being a newcomer to the politics of elected positions. In a statement that supported both himself and Carnahan, he says: “But I think that we can see that fresh voices in the legislature can add a lot to a legislative process.” Similarly, Millay expressed mild support for Carnahan with these words: “I’m sure that there is quite a learning curve for any new legislator. And personally I don’t have any issues with Mrs. Carnahan’s learning curve.” Other than a very brief joint attack on Attorney General John Ashcraft—not a contender in the election—the third party candidates simply attacked the political system in general, never their individual opponents, a tactic that made them appear reasonable and considerate in a campaign that had been marked by the major parties trading accusations and attacks.

As is typical for campaign debates, the journalist’s questions controlled the format, being formulated principally for the major party candidates, even though the journalists attempted to offer the third party candidates alternative questions. For example, one of the questions, “Who is your political role model?” on the surface seemed a sincere attempt to more fully engage the third party candidates, although it is not clear how one’s role model predicts one’s ability to serve in office. Nevertheless, in answering the question, Romano reveals his non-traditional political roots, roots that many Americans might find disturbing:

Political role model . . . Well, that’s an interesting . . . One of the many that I can think of would the Zapatistas of Mexico and Comandante Marcos. Because although they have exercised their right to arm themselves, they have stayed away, for the most part from using this violence as a way to protect the peasants’ rights to access the land. And they’re standing up for the poor people that are getting rolled over in this so-called globalization.

Although he was able to frame his answer as related to his ideology, to most of the mainstream American public, holding up what they perceive to be Mexican rebels as political role models is almost traitorous! The other three candidates chose more familiar American politicians. Thus a question that could have been intended to facilitate third party candidates, actually served to emphasize their marginal, possibly traitorous positions as muted groups.

The 2000 Vermont gubernatorial race illustrates what happens when third party candidates attempt to transform their worldview to be more in line with major parties, in an effort to participate more fully in the system. This race included Incumbent Democrat Howard Dean, Republican Ruth Dwyer, and Progressive Anthony Pollina. Unlike the third party candidates in the two previously discussed debates, Pollina was well known in the state and to his opponents, having been active in Vermont political movements for 20 years. Unlike the Libertarian and Green Party candidates discussed above, Pollina never once mentioned his party, instead focusing on his record. This is a tactic usually reserved only for major party candidates because they have held political office. In fact, referring to one’s record is the standard of proof of one’s position among major party candidates (unless of course, they are campaigning as “fresh faces” or “outsiders”). Most third party candidates, since they have not held elected office, cannot discuss their records. However, since Pollina had been, as he described himself in the debate, “a grass roots organizer, a coalition builder and a legislative advocate,” he was able to transform his language and worldview to more closely approximate that of the major party candidates. He articulated a different worldview only briefly in his opening and closing statements with references to “the effort to begin to get big money out of Vermont politics” and kicking “the big money fat cats out of Montpelier, out of the governor’s office, and invite the public in to take a look around and see what it’s like to have . . . a friend in the governor’s office.” Because he had a record, not just an ideology, this third party candidate was able to speak in the debate using the same language as the major party candidates. Also because the governor’s office is concerned with state rather than federal issues, Pollina’s familiarity, experience, and media exposure with Vermont issues positioned him as a more serious challenger than the third party candidates in the debates discussed above.

But this attempt for the muted group member to transform his worldview in order to participate more fully backfired. Since Vermont is the only state in the country whose elected member of Congress is an Independent, perhaps the state is more willing than other states to accept third party candidates. In consideration of this greater acceptance of third party candidates in Vermont, Howard Dean recognized the seriousness of Pollina’s challenge and defused it by agreeing with many of his viewpoints, instead of simply ignoring them. For example, they agreed on some controversial Vermont legislation, which Dwyer wanted to repeal. Dean and Pollina both opposed school vouchers and anything that would undermine the local control of public education. Dean agreed with the Progressive stance on having an instant runoff election rather than the legislature decide a three-way split on a ballot. Dean even supported Pollina’s suggestion that the state help farmers to transition to organic methods. Dean chose to position himself as friendly to Progressive ideas, but in contrast to Republican ideals. This left Pollina scrambling to point out differences between them. In this way although the Progressive party candidate translated his worldview into major party language, at the same time he blurred the distinction between his party and the major party. The result is that the Progressive worldview remained muted and voters could not see a clear advantage to electing a third party candidate.

Another issue that illustrates the dominance of major party rhetoric in muting third party candidates is the popular perception that third party candidates are spoilers and vote stealers. Preliminary research has suggested that many of those who vote third party would otherwise not vote at all (Ardener, 1975a; Luks et al., 2003; Sifry, 2002; Winger, 2002); nevertheless, one often hears that a vote for a third party candidate is wasted or is really a vote for the other major party opponent. Major party candidates promote this worldview because it preserves their power. However, in the debates analyzed here, third party candidates articulated a different vision of how third party candidates enhance democracy and how voters must exercise their responsibility to vote for the best choice. For example, Romano from Missouri emphasized how voters needed more choices:

The Green Party is not taking away votes from any other party because no other party owns those votes. The voters own those votes. And look at our elections. We’re seeing 70 percent of people not voting. So they’re making a statement there. The statement they’re making is that no party, none of the major parties, is representing us. (Romano, 2002)

Similarly, Mancini from Kentucky, focused on how the two major parties were basically the same and that voters needed more choices:

I think the average person in this day . . . think maybe that this is hopeless and that’s why so many people just don’t go to the polls, and they think they’re going to get opposite sides of the same coin. . . . (Mancini, 2000)

The third party candidates offer disillusioned citizens a different vision of democracy, one that asks them to participate in changing the system. However, this different vision is muted by the format and rhetoric of campaign debates geared toward major party candidates.

Discussion

This study represents an exploration of uncharted territory using a traditionally feminist theory to examine how the voices of third party candidates although invited to participate, are nevertheless muted in campaign debates. The dominance of the major party worldview prevents third party candidates from effectively articulating their alternative worldviews in a debate. When third party candidates are not considered serious contenders, major party candidates simply ignore their positions or act confused by them. The debate format may not allow adequate time to fully articulate a position or questions may be inappropriate for third party candidates, leading them to make statements that can be misinterpreted by the voting public. However, when third party candidates come close to being taken seriously, their issues may be taken up by the major party, thus blurring the differences between the ideologies. This blurring is not a bad thing in itself because such movement shows that third parties do impact the political system. However, they remain muted groups and many of their issues remain “off the radar screen,” and they are viewed with suspicion because major parties refuse to seriously engage them in dialogue.

This analysis demonstrates the dilemma that confronts members of muted groups when they seek to gain greater consideration and participation in their societies. An invitation to participate in campaign debates may be problematic for third party candidates. On one hand, the debate is a golden opportunity to showcase their beliefs and to get media coverage for their critical perspectives. On the other hand, the deck is stacked against them. Because major party candidates are more familiar, the major party positions are more easily articulated to and grasped by the public in 90-second sound bites. Encapsulating an entirely different political worldview in a few short answers is an impossible task for third party candidates. In addition, questions may be inappropriate, patronizing, or booby-trapped for third party candidates, and thus answering them may result in simply confirming their “way-out” image in the public’s eye. In addition, in order to enter the system they criticize and seek to change, they have to play the game and develop a discourse strategy that is closer to major party politics as usual—resulting in a blurring of difference and the possibility of becoming what they criticize.

Third party candidates must evaluate the benefits and losses that may come with accepting an invitation to participate in a campaign debate. Specifically, third party candidates should consider the following:

· What are their goals in participating in a debate? Do they hope to garner more votes or simply educate the public on their positions?

· How can they emphasize their political records and not simply their political ideologies?

· Can they clearly articulate their party differences in the short response times allotted?

· Can they be ideologically loyal and yet articulate a worldview that will appeal to the American public?

· How will they respond to agreement by major party candidates on their issues?

· How will they address the image of third party candidates as election spoilers who somehow steal the votes that belong to major party candidates?

Thus third party candidates may find that the invitation to debate should be considered carefully to see if their participation will advance their political goals.

Further study of third party campaigns is warranted, but it will be hindered by the fact that debates that include third party candidates are uncommon, not to mention rarely recorded and transcribed, and thus are unavailable for examination. Complicating third party study is that the fact that there are so many different parties with different ideologies and approaches. Nevertheless, a concerted effort to locate, record and transcribe these debates on a variety of levels could yield interesting research findings. These, coupled with research into who votes for third party candidates and why, might dispel the notion that third party candidates are spoilers that threaten the stability of the United States government. Other democracies, particularly parliamentary forms of government, around the world manage to embrace more than two political parties, and are enriched by the experience. Active third party candidates in elected positions might end partisan gridlock and politics as usual, leading to a democracy in which more American voters want to participate because they feel that their voices are heard. Democracy can only be enhanced by giving voice to muted groups.

Works Cited

Ardener, E. (1975a). Belief and the problem of women. In S. Ardener (Ed.), Perceiving women. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Ardener, E. (1975b). The ‘problem’ revisited. In S. Ardener (Ed.), Perceiving women (pp. 19-28). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Kramarae, C. (1981). Women and men speaking. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

Lacy, D., & Monson, Q. (2002). The origins and impact of votes for third-party candidates: A case study of the 1998 Minnesota gubernatorial election. Political Research Quarterly, 55, 409-437.

Luks, S., Miller, J. M., & Jacobs, L. R. (2003). Who wins? Campaigns and the third party vote. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33, 9-30.

McKinney, M. S., & Carlin, D. B. (in press). Political campaign debates. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), Handbook of political communication. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers.

Miller, W. E., & Shanks, J. M. (1996). The new American voter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rubin, D. (1993). Gender influences: Reading student texts. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Sachs, D. C. (2003). D.C.’s political report: Minor parties link. Retrieved December 15, 2003 from http://dcpoliticalreport.com/PartyLink.htm

Sifry, M. L. (2002). Spoiling for a fight: Third-party politics in America. New York: Routledge.

Southwell, P. L. (2003). The politics of alienation: Nonvoting and support for third-party candidates among 18-30-year olds. The Social Science Journal, 40, 99-107.

Spender, D. (1984). Defining reality: A powerful tool. In C. Kramarae & M. Schulz & W. M. O’Barr (Eds.), Language and Power (pp. 194-205). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Turner, L. H. (1992). An analysis of words coined by women and men: Reflections on the Muted Group Theory and Gilligan’s model. Women & Language, 15, 21-32.

Winger, R. (2002). More choice please! Why U.S. ballot access laws are discriminatory and how independent parties and candidates challenge them. In R. Hayduk & K. Mattson (Eds.), Democracy’s moment: Reforming the American political system for the 21st century. (pp. 45-59). Lanhan, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Carolyn Prentice (Ph.D., University of Missouri-Columbia) is an assistant professor of Communication Studies at the University of South Dakota

Kritiking as Argumentative Praxis

Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain

Introduction

Controversies in the realm of academic debate are often assessed with the standards used for other social science confrontations. The notion of paradigms, introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1970) to describe scientific revolutions, provides a starting point for analyzing the current conflict over kritiking.¹ Despite this, previous discussions concerning the so-called “kritik” have focused mainly on whether it should be considered a legitimate argument form in contemporary policy debate (Berube, 1996; Katsulas, 1996/1997; Morris, 1996/1997). In this way, these discussions have become embroiled in a back-and-forth squabbling. Overcoming the tendency to steadfastly proclaim the legitimacy/illegitimacy of kritiks as an argument form is necessary if we are to extend argument theory in relation to the kritik.

In an effort to explore and extend argument theory, we offer three main positions in this essay. First, we argue that there is an emerging paradigm,2 which we call the “questioning-assumptions paradigm” that is evolving out of a conflict with the current policy-making paradigm. After describing the current controversy between these paradigms in debate, the major arguments lodged against kritiking (as a way of viewing argument rather than as an argument form) will be explained as a way of analyzing the paradigmatic differences, especially with the concept of fiat. Second, we suggest that there is room for dialogue among these two paradigms that lies within the concept of fiat. Policy-making is concerned with what the judge does when adjudicating a “policy.” The questioning-assumptions paradigm is concerned with how a judge endorses a “process,” which we call “fiat kritiking.” We argue that a bridge of compromise can be forged between these two concepts of fiat. Finally, we offer this conception of kritiking as a means of argumentative praxis, whereby argument theory is coupled with a unique experience of debate “action.” In this way, we suggest that kritiking is an exciting area for both argument theory and contemporary debate practice that, at the very least, deserves an investigation which transcends the already stale “legitimate/illegitimate” dispute that has characterized previous kritik discussions.

Paradigmatic Conflict

Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, introduces the idea of systems of thought operating in paradigms. Along these lines, we may view a paradigm as a worldview or conceptual model “shared by members of a scholarly community that defines how inquiry within the community should be conducted” (Smith, 1988, p. 299). More specifically, Kuhn explicates the idea of a paradigm in two ways:

On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175)

Paradigms, therefore, are characterized by their different ways of seeing and “knowing” the world. This feature removes the “truth” variable of one paradigm from another; in other words, paradigms simply see the world differently. Kuhn explains that it is inaccurate to describe different paradigms as unscientific just because several of their tenets are called into question by the preceding paradigm, since “What differentiated these various schools was not one or another failure of method — they were all ‘scientific’ — but what we shall come to call their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 4).

Paradigms are often applied to systems of debate theory (Pfau, Thomas & Ulrich, 1987). Paradigms are used to examine how the entire worldview of debate participants and judges is affected in different ways. Usually, two or more paradigms are compared to illustrate the conflicts between the differing worldviews. In fact, as one paradigm emerges, it is often thought that the existing, predominant paradigm becomes replaced. Within the debate context, Pfau and his colleagues (1987) have expressed that “[d]ebate is generated by shifts in paradigms. During this period of transition between the era dominated by the ‘normal’ paradigm, and the new era when the alternative paradigm replaces it, many controversies and debates are conducted over the whole nature of the field and the specific methods used to study and advance the field” (pp. 6-7).

The policy-making paradigm has been described as the prevailing paradigm in contemporary debate history. Generally, this paradigm prescribes the roles of debaters and judges by using a making-of-policy model, such as the U.S. Congress. Ziegelmueller, Harris and Bloomingdale (1995) explain:

A . . . model of debate is derived from an analogy to the policy making process typified by congressional decision making. The subject matter of the debate is typically concerned with the development of public policy. Consequently, theorists have suggested modeling the argument practices found in congressional debates. (pp. 18-19)

Without going into all of the formal tenets of the policy-making paradigm, we should have a general feeling of what this view of debating is about. As a deductive model of debate, it seeks to “force nature [debate] into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 5).

Given the predominance of the policy-making paradigm, alternative or competing paradigms have been relatively few in number in the past few years. One such recent challenge has been the hypothesis-testing paradigm which views the debate round as a laboratory that “tests” different (and not necessarily mutually-exclusive) methods of change, as if they were “hypothesis” statements (Hollihan, 1983; Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Zarefsky & Henderson, 1983). Yet, the prevailing support for the policy-making paradigm has resulted in a general dismissal of the hypothesis-testing paradigm as a viable or accepted worldview. In the wake of this type of paradigmatic flux, we believe this is the first time that the argument style of “kritiking” has been presented as a separate paradigm. Indeed, we feel that this paradigmatic flux may mean that policy-making as a paradigm is particularly vulnerable to challenge, or that “kritiking” as a paradigm may be premature. Nevertheless, the responses from the margins of the debate community concerning the viability of the kritik as an appropriate argument form has gained increasing acceptance. Thus, for our purposes here, we suggest that engaging in kritiking may represent a developing worldview that might be called the “questioning-assumptions” paradigm.

Difficulty exists in describing this amorphous paradigm. Even as this description will no doubt reveal, new suppositions and opinions are made about this paradigm at an increasing rate. It would be impossible to produce a set of rules or characterize the identities of all who support the questioning-assumptions paradigm. Not only does the style of this paradigm subvert an explicit definition, as we shall see later, but it is also impossible to describe the differing views of each individual in the debate community who supports the kritik as an argumentative form. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is similar to what Kuhn describes as a “challenging” paradigm. While discussing the scientists’ response to the revolutionary notions of Newton, Lavosier, Maxwell, or Einstein, Kuhn states:

They can, that is, agree on their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of it. Lack of a standard interpretation of an agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. . . .Indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exist. (1970, p. 44)

Although Kuhn does not do much to describe the “maturing” process of a challenging paradigm, he clearly expresses that even the formation of a paradigm may be classified as a worldview:

To that end it may help to point out that the transition need not (I now think should not) be associated with the first acquisition of a paradigm. The members of all scientific communities, including the schools of the “pre-paradigm” period, share the sorts of elements which I have collectively labelled [sic] a “paradigm.” (1970, p. 179)

Thus, our conception of questioning assumptions might also be labeled a “paradigm.” While we agree with Kuhn in describing the nature of a paradigm, we part with his belief that paradigms are mutually exclusive, or that when one paradigm emerges it necessarily displaces the existing paradigm. We believe that paradigms can co-exist and even, at times, share common threads within their respective worldviews. With the so-called judging “paradigms” or “philosophies” that exist in academic debate, we know that some judges have changed their paradigms, even in the middle of a debate round, because their personal beliefs intervened in the adjudicating process. Debate participants themselves also undergo fundamental “worldview” changes that may not be inconsistent with their prior ways of thinking. Our contention is that these paradigms always already intersect. It is our failure to negotiate this intersection that has created the paradigmatic tension.

With this in mind, we maintain that the questioning-assumptions paradigm is comprised of three crucial tenets. These tenets indicate how the questioning-assumptions paradigm is both significant and important for resolving paradigmatic conflict. First, advocates of the questioning-assumptions paradigm hold that debate arguments contain “taken-for-granteds” (Hazen, 1989; Hopper, 1981; Schutz, 1967). The concept of taken-for-granteds, according to Hopper (1981), refers to “[u]ncoded, ‘between-the-lines’ information” (p. 196) that “are missing premises of messages” and are “frequently understood [sic] as if spoken” (p. 207). The questioning-assumptions paradigm holds that when advocates make claims, a part of these claims is unstated. Whenever an argument is made, “implicit assumptions” or hidden parts of the argument persist. For example, to say that Egypt should receive more U.S. military training is to say implicitly that Egypt is a legitimate nation-state. Different perceptions inside the paradigm may explain these assumptions as other argument forms, such as an Aristotelian enthymeme, a Toulmin unstated warrant, types of linguistic analogs, etc. Nevertheless, there is agreement that a part of contemporary debate argument contains unstated assumptions.

The second tenet of the questioning-assumptions paradigm is that these hidden assumptions are open for debate. Some debaters may say that advocates are responsible for the unstated portions of their claims; others may simply say that is the hidden assumptions that are the precursors to the present argument. If they are called into question, the present argument is also called into question. The allowance of the questioning of these assumptions is what primarily distinguishes this paradigm from other debate paradigms.

Finally, the questioning-assumptions paradigm upholds a particular way of advocacy. Advocacy requires taking a position on a side of controversy. Advocacy, then, is acting out what the advocate believes. We suggest that thinking of advocacy in this way is a method of praxis. The choices made in debate rounds which, in-turn, affect the choices we or on-lookers make in our lives and within the questioning-assumptions paradigm is a way not only to engage in critical thinking, but also to engage in an action of advocacy. This action of advocacy is the coupling of debate theory/beliefs with purposeful action in and outside the debate round. In short, advocacy is a way of engaging in praxis. Because critical thinking and advocacy are “traditionally” elements of the policy-making paradigm, we suggest that praxis is yet another way that paradigmatic conflict can be overcome.

The descriptions provided here are primarily definitions of what the terms policy-making and questioning-assumptions mean in this context. Surely the most complete descriptions of these paradigms will come as one evolves in opposition to the other, or when we realize that the worldviews can effectively co-exist. Since the questioning-assumptions paradigm is still emerging, there can be no definitive statement of its views for all debate situations. However, the paradigm is sculpted by the areas in conflict (with policy-making) over the issues of fiat and, consequently, debatability. Despite this conflict, we believe that we need to rethink the relationship between these paradigms. If we begin to see their relationship through the concept of fiat, we may find that the paradigms can co-exist.

Paradigmatic Resolution Through Fiat

Describing debate paradigms in this way demonstrates major controversies in kritiking among the advocates and judges. Both the policy-making and the questioning-assumptions paradigms have different conceptions of advocacy. Primarily, the question concerning advocacy is, what is fiat? This difference in opinion is multiplied when we see that proponents of each paradigm argue about the fundamental purpose of the debate round. We will try to use the language of each paradigm to describe the problems found in two major contentions: 1) no alternative/no uniqueness vs. kritiking as an alternative, and 2) doing nothing vs. the thought/action dichotomy.

The idea that a “policy” must be advocated is a crucial element within the policy-making paradigm. At the end of the debate either a proposed policy (the affirmative plan or a negative counterplan) or the policy of the status quo should be embraced. The benefits and drawbacks to each proposal is weighed carefully before the final determination is made. In short, the policy-making paradigm upholds that the judge needs a “policy” to vote for. In this way, the claim that kritiks offer “no alternative” has been a major complaint of the policy-making paradigm. The argument goes something like this:

The negative (or affirmative) questions the affirmative (or negative), but they don’t provide us with anything to question. They simply poke out problems with the our proposal, but they don’t defend anything themselves. If we are to reject the system (or whatever), we need something to adopt. The negative (or affirmative) can’t just kritik; they must also advocate something.

Recently, uniqueness has been tacked onto this argument:

The status quo is also guilty of the problems the negative describes. Even if the plan weren’t done, there would still be sexism, racism, classism, etc. The problems inherent in the world system aren’t the fault of the affirmative. Therefore, the problem is non-unique to the affirmative plan.

The combination of these two answers has been the most common criticism lodged against kritiking. In a recent defense of the new American Debate Association rule that all kritiks be “unique,” Stefan Bauschard “takes a walk out on the plank” to suggest that “one thing that all critiques [sic] have in common is that they are all disadvantages which are not unique to the affirmative plan” (1995, p. 3).3 Thus, the “no alternative” argument mutates into an argument that is familiar in the policy-making style of argument.

In their often cited work criticizing what they call “Critiques,” Shors and Mancuso contribute to the uniqueness attack:

The strategic benefit of running a Critique lies in its set of rules, namely its rejection of conventional argument burdens. For example, the burden of “uniqueness,” which requires both the affirmative and negative to demonstrate that advantages and disadvantages are uniquely caused by the plan, is wholly irrelevant to the Critique as its rules currently operate. Herein lies one of the biggest defects of the Critique, because its insistence on adhering to the rigid rule of rejection is artificial. (1993, p. A-16)⁴

According to this perspective, since there is no alternative and the kritik is a non-unique disadvantage, there is no reason to reject the affirmative. “Doing nothing” is also a common criticism placed against kritik advocates. This late-breaking monster is usually seen in rebuttals. Although it comes into play in most kritiking debates, it is rarely considered as a distinct line-by-line attack. Yet, this argument speaks volumes about how the policy-making paradigm describes its view of fiat. The answer can be characterized this way:

Even if the negative is right, they aren’t going to accomplish anything. The plan advantages are real. If you do not vote affirmative, millions will die. While you will be sitting around “rethinking,” millions will die.

This characterization zooms-in on the thought that kritiking is separate from action. It also places a direct comparison between the plan advantages and the advantage/benefit of kritiking.

There have been many replies fired against the “no alternative/uniqueness” queries that are offered by kritiking opponents. At the heart of the issue is what one considers fiatable action/thinking. The questioning-assumptions paradigm suggests that kritiking may (is allowed to) be the “alternative.”

Rather than just accept policy options as considerations for voting, the judge can consider endorsing a process of kritiking. The over-adherence to the “cult of uniqueness” leaves advocates who seek radical overhauls of any given system without a rhetorical leg to stand on. The reply in theory has been to accept the process as fiatable. Take the example of Edward Said’s (1978) orientalism argument during the recent NDT Middle East topic. Negatives advocated a system of rethinking particular to a questioning of history, culture, military, social systems, etc., that seeks to expose how knowledge (as Truth) has been used coercively against oppressed Middle Eastern peoples in U.S. policy. What would a judge be voting for in this instance? He or she would be voting for kritiking, rethinking, questioning. The judge is voting to place this interrogative, dynamic process into motion.

We might imagine attempting to break down all the components of a debate into columns of what one would be voting for and how they would be voting for it. An analogy can be drawn with traveling. Vehicles are used to get to places; destinations are what is sought after. Both are critical to traveling.

Destination Vehicle

Detroit Our Chevette

Los Angeles Delta Airlines

The Lake The Third Path in the Forest

This analogy can be broadened with debate in mind. The What column below represents desirable ends that are sought after in the debate context. The How column describes the mechanism used to achieve those ends. For example:

What How⁵

Advantage Plan

Disadvantage Status Quo

Disadvantage Counterplan

Net Benefit Permutation

Advantage Plan

Stop nuclear war Harvard’s plan

Disadvantage Plan mechanism

Clinton popularity Keep status quo

Disadvantage Counterplan

Federalism States do the plan

This categorization separates value specifications and things that are fiatable. Up to this point, there is no controversy with the policy-making paradigm. However, when kritiks (noun) are included in the what/destination column, then the problems with the “cult of uniqueness” start to emerge. What does the column look like from this perspective?

What How

Kritik Status quo?

Kritik Cool negative team?

Kritik Our Chevette

We can see that as an argument type (a noun), the kritik creates a stale and even unproductive debate, especially with respect to our understanding of policy-making. However, it is here that the advocacy of kritiking (verb) inserts a new option into the mix:

Value Kritiking

Avoid orientalism Rethinking

Prevent gendered problems Use gender lenses

Destroy government hierarchy Question statism

It is the notion that fiat applies to the process of kritiking that primarily defines what we have been calling the questioning-assumptions paradigm. The affirmative suggests a plan to travel to the advantages, the negative suggests rethinking as a way to achieve the value (or other element) that they suggest is paramount. Kritiking in this way functions as a sort of counterplan.6 In some senses, kritiking may claim the affirmative advantage, just as a counterplan may claim to “solve” the advantage. We might also view this as an ends/means distinction. We may agree with the ends of the plan (i.e., the advantage), but not the mechanism (i.e., the plan).7

The questioning-assumptions paradigm also has a major reply to the “doing nothing” criticism. The questioning-assumptions paradigm views thinking as fiatable. As such, the other paradigm is accused to adhering to a thought vs. action dichotomy. In other words, policy-making may ask, “What are you doing?” We may respond, “Just thinking.” Then the retort, “Well, then, you are doing nothing!”

There is a long line of philosophy that questions the ability to distinguish thought from action (e.g., Hegel, 1931; Heidegger, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Sartre, 1976). Not only does thought influence action and action influence thought, but it is also difficult to distinguish, especially in debate, where the thinking ends and where the action begins.

Fiat is the best example of where thinking and acting blur in debate. Using the tenets of fiat based on the policy-making tradition, we may ask ourselves the following: Does the plan actually happen? Does the Congress actually pass the plan? Are we just doing nothing? This is not intended as an illegitimacy argument about fiat. The ability to suspend disbelief over whether or not the plan would occur is essential if we are to have productive, educational and fun debates. However, kritiking isn’t “doing nothing” in debate either. The process of debating might be likened to the process of (re)thinking. There is some action involved — speaking, researching, lifting boxes, etc. — but it is primarily the (critical) thinking that we encourage and reward in debate. When asked what is endorsed by kritiking, the negative should reply, “We are actively exploring, questioning, rethinking, kritiking the problem. We are not endorsing the status quo. We seek the rejection of both the affirmative plan and the status quo. Vote to adopt rethinking as a process of change!”

Although the suggestion of kritiking as an alternative was intended as a compromise from the questioning-assumptions paradigm, it has yet to be accepted fully among policy makers. Three different interpretations of how signing the ballot as action present themselves for consideration.8 Under each of them, the option of fiating kritiking9 exists. Fiating kritiking “uses” fiat as a mechanism to adopt a process of (re)thinking. Perhaps fiating kritiking can best be explained by way of example.

The first option for fiat is that the judge plays the role of “debate person,” or simply a person who operates within the debate activity. The judge is seen as a coach or bus driver or parent who sees the activity for its educational value. To fiat kritiking is easy to see in this case. Voting affirmative could occur because the plan is a “good idea” or because the affirmative did the “better job of debating.” Likewise, voting negative can also be viewed as an endorsement for kritiking — a rejection of the plan as a “bad idea,” or the negative did the better job of debating. The endorsement in this case may be intellectual or punishment-oriented, as in cases of rejecting sexist or racist language. Nevertheless, the judge would be voting for kritiking.

A second example views the judge as an actual policy maker. The judge has the ability to force Congress to do the plan. Whether this ability is metaphorical or something actually believed is irrelevant. All arguments are assessed in this manner. The judge views the advantage to the plan as greater than the disadvantages, or vice versa. There is a large difference between weighing the (dis)advantages of the plan as a reason for voting and “they did a better job of debating.”

A third model of fiat places the judge not as an overseer of policy, but rather as a participant. For some reason the judge is the policy maker who has the deciding vote on the question of the plan/counterplan/status quo. The scene of the debate is the floor of Congress and the judge has to give a speech for or against the plan, counterplan, or status quo. That speech will determine the outcome. We might envision some of the constraints suggested as impositions of kritiking under this vision of judging: “this is the wrong forum; Congress wouldn’t discuss these issues of philosophy,” or “we are constrained to do policy here!”

Under the latter two views, the judge has several options to fiat (it clearly is a verb in this sense). The plan may be done, a counterplan, or staying the course may be suggested. All of these fiated actions are executed by a governing body. Why not then have the judge endorse the kritiking option on the governing body? We could have the judge force Congress to rethink. The judge could fiat that the U.S. Government question threat construction as a reason for conducting foreign policy. The deciding speech given on the question of health care reform could be a well-constructed discussion of the problems of Western medicine, concluded by endorsing not the present system nor the policy on the floor, but rather a third option of beginning a quest of rethinking to uncover the problems of medicine and how Western medicine is flawed. Fiat the kritiking by the government on the problem outlined by the debate team. Fiat the kritiking!

A response to this view may be that the option is already present in the strategy of counterplanning. A two-fold rejoinder is offered here. First, the criticism that a counterplan is needed begs the question that there is some distinction between fiating kritiking and counterplanning. Another way of stating this alternative may be “counter-thinking.”10 The though/action dichotomy is disputed in this form of fiat. Is there a difference between saying, “plank one, we suggest the Congress rethink,” and saying, “the Congress should rethink?” If there is, we must reside in a “cult of planks” since having a plank (for the sake of having a plank) is the only real difference.

Second, several modes of kritiking call policy-making into question. The idea that a plan should be done, that we can ever find a solution, that a “course of action” ought to be taken might be the thesis of the kritiking process. For example, several strands of feminism hold the view that the problem/solution format is a patriarchal tool (e.g., Anzaldua, 1987; Benhabib, 1987; Butler, 1990, 1992, 1995; Ganguly, 1992) Announcing that we have a solution not only forecloses future discussion, but it also chills the discussion of the problems for which there are no available solutions.

Fiating kritiking is not suggested as solution, but rather as a wholesale way of questioning/thinking. It is an exploration of the problem that may produce not a solution, but a better understanding of the problem which, for policy-making, should be appealing. In other words, a particular policy may be racist, classist, sexist, etc., but forcing the institution to rethink these problems is not an endorsement for the institution or for a policy. It is, rather, an endorsement for questioning.

Kritiking qua Praxis

Our position is that the debate round is more than just a “game.” It is, rather, a forum for advocacy. Even if the debate team does not (in “reality”) believe their position, they nevertheless must take a position in the debate context. The debate round becomes, if nothing else, a training ground for how to advocate a position. Integral to this concept is the ability to think critically, which is obtained by, among other things, intense research experience, anticipation of opposing arguments, skills in cross-examination, mastery of reasoning by analysis and synthesis, and the ability to take a position of advocacy on opposite sides of a proposition. In other words, critical thinking is the ability to know how and when to ask questions. We view this combination of advocacy with the ability to think critically as a coupling of theory with action (advocacy). Simply put, kritiking occurs as a form of praxis, or at least helps to frame praxis, in an argumentative format.

The ability to think critically should not be limited to a situation where X is chosen for discussion, researched, and then debated. Instead, critical thinking in debate can be (and is) expanded to ask questions about X: what is it, how does it function, is it valuable, does it contribute to the good of society? Arguments in the form of kritik ask such questions, among others. To this end, the critical thinking skills in debate are polished to include factors otherwise ignored. In fact, if we are going to emphasize the critical thinking skills that debate fosters as a selling point to recruits, parents and administrators, then we should inquire about how we can improve such skills. Ignoring critical factors and questions about the nature of the topic, such as X, does not bid well for an activity that stresses its ability to think critically.

Additionally, while most contemporary debates are absent of spectators, except typically for final rounds which are attended by fellow debaters, the debate is still a public event. Nothing precludes or forbids observations of NDT debates. Also, many debates are videotaped or transcribed for classes, public officials and parents throughout the country. Thus, academic debate is not decoupled from the non-debate world. As such, academic debate is a forum for arguments meant to advance the skills and education of its participants but also to influence others who do not debate. Oral advocacy, then, becomes a serious enterprise in which “real” thoughts, stereotypes, beliefs, and policies are affected. Furthermore, the debate participants themselves, after years of debating, become conditioned to their style of debating and ways of thinking. This educational process and experience undoubtedly affects the way debaters think and act once they graduate and enter society. Thus, as we have been arguing, kritiking can help expand and intensify the quality of oral advocacy in contemporary academic debate. It promotes a range of possibilities that can serve effective oral advocacy. Additionally, because debate is a forum with multiple audiences and with the potential to influence different social groups, kritiking can have “real” consequences other than those typically encountered in a debate round.

In essence, then, by advocating that their positions are better, the participants make value judgments. They take a position about an issue and make arguments about that issue’s worthiness, especially as it is compared to competing issues. The debate round becomes a forum whereby the merits of issues are articulated.

The debate round also allows feedback from the audience and judge(s). After the debaters conclude their positions of advocacy, the effect of the round can be seen in post-round critiques. Judges can explain why they were or were not persuaded from the policy arguments presented in the debate. Of course, judges do not actually implement an affirmative plan. However, judges may be (can be) persuaded — based upon the debating — to take personal action, such as changed ways of thinking, writing letters to NGOs or government leaders, and the adoption of certain positions when they talk to friends or teach classes. Additionally, judge comments after the round may influence the debaters in a similar fashion. Of course, arguments presented in the debate have unlimited possibility in influencing other audience members as well.

The debate round, therefore, can serve to persuade people about policy implications that transcend the hypothetical issues of debate, such as fiat and topicality. Substantive issues that affect the participants in an everyday fashion can be (are) discussed. Debaters have often used these types of arguments to persuade judges, such as “Judge, you have children, and I doubt that you relish the thought of your kids growing up in a nuclear winter.” Such arguments bring the often abstract nature of policy positions down-to-earth and function as a particular type of persuasive technique. Kritiking supplements this process by encouraging participants to adhere to critical thinking once the debate round is over. In other words, a kritiking can encourage the judge not only to vote a certain way because a hypothetical policy may result in nuclear winter, but also, for example, to take personal action against nuclear power or nuclear weapons.

Debate’s nature of persuasion and advocacy creates an atmosphere where debaters talk and judges listen. If compelled, judges may reciprocate with their own thoughts and opinions after the last speech. In any case, the debate round provides a forum, not only for intellectual competition, but also social activism. It offers an opportunity for “real” people with “real” problems to persuade others about “real-world” solutions.

In this way, the debate round can become a site for political struggle. Political concerns that are germane to the policy being debated can be waged into the debate round. Actual persuasion and personal transformation can occur if participants remain open to how viewing debate arguments (i.e., kritiking) relates to their non-debate lives. Kritiking, therefore, can be a form of social activism.

Kritiking opens a space for social activism in another way. Kritiking requires additional ways of thinking and arguing, an openness for alternative perspectives, and new methods of research. Just as “traditional” debate skills help debaters in other areas of life both during and after their debate careers, skills in kritiking also help participants in other areas. For example, the expanded ways of thinking that kritiking instills helps people become better critical thinkers and more sensitive to political concerns than do other debate skills. Kritiking helps train participants to recognize certain ways of thinking that typically entrench power relationships. As such, people who engage in kritiking become more likely to engage in social activism. At the very least, the critical skills that are intrinsic to kritiking encourage people to be active socially and politically because such concerns are given primacy by the questioning-assumptions paradigm.

Conclusion

Constructed scenarios and far-fetched nuclear war scenarios sometimes appear to have no grounding in reality, but are instead productions of the most clever and most researched debate squads. While we maintain that these “traditional” ways of arguing are valuable and should be encouraged, another way of seeing argument — kritiking — helps bring debate back to “reality.” The participants in the round can take positions, criticize, and attempt to persuade their audience for reasons other than intellectual stimulation or skills development. Instead, participants who feel strongly about the values underlying policy questions can take a critical position that encourages personal reflection and action outside of the debate round. Through kritiking, participants are more likely to increase their involvement in society than they are with “traditional” debating. The reason is simple. Kritiking fosters a spirit of responsibility and a call to action. Each person is important and should embrace their civic responsibility. When calling into question the values underlying types of policies, this spirit of activism can emerge. Thus, kritiking — as a way of viewing argument — can function as a median for praxis. Furthermore, kritiking is representative of what we have been calling the questioning-assumptions paradigm. Since kritiking allows room for fiat and for a proposal to be advocated, we believe a reconciliation between the policy-making and questioning-assumptions paradigms is possible. It is our hope that future debate forums and debate rounds will continue in this benevolent pursuit.

Notes

¹ We are using the verb “kritiking,” not the noun “kritik,” for two main reasons. First, the idea of THE kritik suggests there is just one possible kritik. However, we feel a “kritik” represents an argument style, not a monolithic argument form. Second, the verb usage implies a process, not a static image. Rather than suggesting an argument that has a known description, such as a disadvantage, kritiking is dynamic and evolutionary.

² To reflect our perspective of kritiking as a process — or a way of thinking, questioning or approaching a problem — we have chosen to use the word “paradigm” to describe it. We feel other descriptive words, such as field or philosophy, do not adequately illustrate the current tension that is occurring in the debate community concerning kritiking.

³ Bauschard’s negative criticism toward the argument style of kritiks pervades his article. As he states on the question of what the focus of the debate should be: “[o]pening up this theoretical can of worms is a waste of time that could be spent discussing unsettled questions” (1995, p. 4). We feel this is proof of the current paradigmatic conflict over taken-for-granteds in debate.

⁴ One might wonder what argument strategy is open to the negative. Shors and Mancuso state, “The Critique [sic] can and should be used as an instrument to challenge questionable thinking, be it ethnocentric, or whatever. It can be useful in casting perspective on issues, but it should not be considered independent of comparison; it cannot be and remain meaningful. The Critique can be used as a disadvantage, solvency turn, a PMN, etc. — essentially anything but a kritik” (1993, p. A-17). This seems to harken back to Kuhn’s description of how old paradigms attempt to modify and take new anomalies into account — a sort of argumentative cooptation. The nuance of adopting kritiking is rejected, yet the system is said to always already represent such arguments. This is not to say that types of arguments such as disadvantages, solvency turns, PMNs, etc., are illegitimate. Rather, we feel these argument types can also co-exist with kritiking, or at the very least must also meet the burden of defending the assumptions that lie underneath them.

⁵ This particular analogy has its origins with Bill Shanahan.

⁶ We take these words from Chris Lundberg of the University of Redlands, from the Semifinal round at Baylor University, 1996, where he was endorsing an argument from Spanos/Heidegger.

⁷ Lundberg again.

⁸ It is quite possible that there are more than three options. However, we feel these accurately represent the different paradigms under scrutiny.

⁹ We find it ironic that such an argument is now discussed since the genesis of kritiking sprung from what was first called a “kritik of fiat.” Now, with the usage of the verb and the movement inside of affirmative constructions of fiat, we have a “fiat of kritiks.”

¹⁰Please note the usage of a verb in this statement. Counter-thinking may be described above, but the option of a counter-thought (noun) has not been discussed in this article, and it is a totally different beast altogether. The counter-thought may be another negative argument/argument strategy available to debaters under the questioning-assumptions paradigm. As far as we know, the only execution of a “counter-thought” has been by Chris LaVigne and Brian Wassom (Wayne State University) against Dave Arnett and Jason Renzelman’s (University of Louisville) kritik-like affirmative case during the Octa-finals at Northwestern University, 1995.

References

Agger, B. (1992). The discourse of domination: From the Frankfurt School to postmodernism. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Bauschard, S. (1995, November). Uniqueness: A sacred concept. Extensions: Newsletter of the American Debate Association. 2-5.

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Hazen, M. (1989). The role of argument, reasoning and logic in tacit, incomplete, and indirect communication: The case of Japan. In B. E. Gronbeck (Ed.), Spheres of argument: Proceedings of the sixth annual SCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 497-503). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

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Joseph P. Zompetti (Ph.D., Wayne State University; E-mail: zompetti@aol.com) is currently an assistant professor of communication and the Director of Forensics at Illinois State University. Brian Lain (ABD, University of Iowa; blain@unt.edu), is an assistant professor of communication and Director of Debate at the University of North Texas. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1996 Central States Communication Association annual convention in St. Paul, MN.

Nothing More than a Little White Lie

An Examination of Ethics in Extemporaneous Speaking

Ric L. Shafer

Abstract

The majority of text books in public speaking define extemporaneous speaking as the act of delivering a speech using limited notes. Despite what we teach in our classes, however, cultural norms in competitive speech tend to reward those students that compete in the event without the use of notes. Recent research highlights erroneous source citations and outright fabrications by contestants, many of which can be attributed to the unspoken expectation that students refrain from using notes. This paper attempts to challenge that norm by questioning the educational benefits of teaching, promoting and rewarding this practice. The paper will compare what we teach in our classes to what has become the norm inside forensics.

Introduction

A first year student of mine told me one semester that he had found the perfect impromptu example. He explained that the book Mad Man, by Robert Parks, was “applicable in virtually every round.” I cautioned the student against overusing this book, explaining that its applicability was probably the result of him s t r e t c h and manipulating the example. I later learned that although the title and author of the book stayed the same, the plot and characters were altered from round to round as needed to fit the quotation. The book, I discovered, didn’t actually exist. Although I have caught isolated students on my team cheating before, this was the first time in my coaching career that a student had volunteered that information.

As I began to further investigate this case, and as we began to discuss ethics as a team, I discovered that this wasn’t the only event that my student was cheating in, nor was he the only student on that team guilty of the same offense. Although not all of my students were involved, I discovered that a great number of individuals on my team had committed ethical violations. The event where this seemed most apparent was extemporaneous speaking. Several of my students admitted that they were careless with the accuracy of source citations. Others admitted to the outright fabrication of sources. Most argued that this practice was widespread not only on our team, but also across our national circuit. It seemed as if Burnett, Brand & Meister (2001) were correct when they argued “the educational value of forensics has been supplanted by the desire to win.” These authors continue by suggesting “the value of competition has come to outweigh the value of education in intercollegiate individual events practice” (pg. 106). Although I would disagree with this sentiment on the whole, the discovery that my own students were cheating opened my eyes to the pervasiveness of these ethical violations.

Although there are a plethora of reasons that students cheat in extemporaneous speaking, this paper argues that this phenomenon exists partially because of our unrealistic expectations for the event. Despite the fact that the majority of our text books in public speaking define extemporaneous speaking as the act of delivering a speech using limited notes, many student choose not to use notes because of the unspoken, and many times spoken expectation that they refrain from doing so. This paper attempts to challenge that norm by questioning the educational value of teaching, promoting and rewarding this practice. I will begin with a discussion of ethics in forensics, with an emphasis placed on extemporaneous speaking. The paper will then compare what we teach in our classes to what has become the norm inside our activity. Finally, I will offer suggestions for how both coaches and student can decrease ethical violations in this event by challenging cultural norms and unwritten expectations.

Ethical Violations in Extemporaneous Speaking

This paper is not the first to question the ethical behavior of students in both debate and individual events. As Cronn-Mills (2000) notes, the American Forensics Association has responded to similar essays by creating a comprehensive code covering both debate and individual events (pg 61). Without enforcement, however, these codes provide little incentive for student to follow ethical principles. Mason (1989) argues that without proper punishment for ethical violations these practices will continue. A message posted to the Individual Events Listserv (IE-L) concurs when it suggests that the practice of using erroneous citations and the fabrication of sources is “being taught (if only through allowing the practice to occur) as not only acceptable, but necessary for success” (IE-L, November 11, 2003, 10:28).

A host of reasons are offered to explain why students commit ethical violations. One message posted to the IE-L suggested that citation errors were a result of “sloppiness, a lack of defined standards, willfulness, cheating and memory problems” (IE-L, November 11,2003, 10:23). This post was in reference to an article written by Daniel Cronn-Mills and Larry G. Schnoor in the 2003 edition of the National Forensics Journal. Cronn-Mills and Schnoor (2003) examined the six final round contestants in Informative Speaking at the 1998 American Forensics Association National Individual Events Tournament. They discovered that “all six speakers appear to have violated the AFA code (198211998) in one manner or another” which they argue “clearly indicates a systemic issue within intercollegiate individual events competition” pg. 16).

When you consider that the Cronn-Mills and Schnoor article examined prepared events, it stands to reason that ethical violations and/or source citation mistakes in a limited-prep event, like extemporaneous speaking, would find similar or even more egregious results. Markstrom (1994) notes students in extemporaneous speaking often cite inaccurate or fabricated information. He found only 44 percent of sources cited “matched the general topic nature of the source” (pg. 25). This fails to account for those sources that matched the topic but failed to accurately portray the evidence being used. When commenting on these results, Cronn-Mills and Schnoor suggest “speakers were clearly misrepresenting the evidence used in extemporaneous speeches” (pg. 5).

When Conventional Norms Contradict Scholarly Research

There are differing opinions as to why students feel compelled to commit ethical violations, as well as varying opinions as to how the community should address these violations. Some researchers argue that judges have an unrealistic expectation regarding the number of sources a speaker cite. Williams (1997) argues that too many judges are more concerned with the number of sources that a speaker cites as opposed to the quality of said sources (pg. 107). Evidence of this, a series of hash marks, can be found near the top of many ballots. Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) note that despite checking numerous public speaking text books, not one references the quantity of sources, while all examine the importance of quality source citations @g 19) Kuster (2002) describes the number of sources expected in extemporaneous presentations as “stultifying” (pg. 52). He argues that “unwritten” rules create and reinforce these expectations.

One post to the I-EL dismisses these claims, arguing instead that we should raise our expectations regarding source citations. The author notes that “it may be because I’m in a business where you provide a source for nearly everything, but this study [the Cronn-Mills & Schnoor study] suggests that we ought to stop worrying about the excuses and start asking contestants to meet a higher standard” (IE-L, November 11,2003, 10:23). The same author argues that many errors are a result of memory mistakes, like “flipping citations or mixing up dates, even though the information is correct in their notes.” The author states that “I don’t consider that a real problem—the contestants generally have the right intent and just mix things up” (EL, November 11,2003, 10.23).

I respectfully disagree with two of the preceding statements. First, I agree with Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) when they argue “we sincerely believe most student do not commit ethical violations” (pg. 16). I understand that students make mistakes, and it would be wrong to conclude that the majority of students intentionally cheat. However, I think we are too quick to dismiss the research. The research indicates that an overwhelming number of the sources cited in prepared speeches are cited erroneously, and the numbers are even more alarming in i extemporaneous speaking. It would be naive to suggest that all of these students mistakenly cite erroneous information, or even that the students who intentionally cheat is low.

It is also unethical and anti-educational for us to continue to allow students to cite inaccurate sources and misrepresent information, even if we believe most are simple mistakes. These mistakes, and a great deal of the intentional ethical violations, are a result of our unrealistic expectations and unwritten rules that govern the event. The AFA-NIET Description of Events page notes that students in extemporaneous speaking are allowed to use limited notes (2003- 2004 Description of Events- AFA-NIET). Ballots from a host of regional and national tournaments also indicate that notes are allowed. Despite this, judges often write that they dropped a student because he or she used notes. One recent ballot informed one of my students that “in a close round like this sometimes the only way you can separate competitors is based on who uses notes and who doesn’t” (Student Ballot, October 2003). 1 recognize that despite written rules, judges are allowed to have their own evaluative standards. I ask you, however, how you would react if a ballot included as part of the “reason for decision” that a student was dropped because he or she failed to use notes?

Current norms and practices not only violate written rules that govern the activity, they also run counter to what we teach in our public speaking classrooms. Seiler and Beall (2001) argues that individuals who speak extemporaneously use “a carefully prepared and researched speech, but delivers it from notes, with a high degree of spontaneity.” They note that “speakers depend on a brief presentational outlines or notes and choose the actual wording of the speech at the time of delivery” (pg. 275). Greggory (1987) argue that speakers glace at their notes occasionally to remind themselves of their next point (pg. 275). Zarefsky (2002), one of the many public speaking text book authors who coached forensics, defines extemporaneous speaking as “a speech that is prepared and rehearsed but is neither written out nor memorized (pg. 303). Devito ( 2002), (2003), Wood (2001), Rothwell (2004), Adler & Rodman (2003), Jaffe (2001), Pfeiffer (2002), Morreale, Spitzberg and Barge (2001), Dunn and Goodnight (2003), O’Hair and Stewart (1999), and Beebe, S. A., Beebe, S. J., & Ivy (2001) all define extemporaneous speaking in similar fashions.

Hybels and Weaver (2004) do offer some advice as to what students should memorize, if anything, when performing extemporaneous speeches. They argue that “the speaker might commit the main ideas of the speech to memory-possibly the introduction and the conclusion-but will rely on notes to remember most of the speech” (pg. 538). Out of the fifteen public speaking text books surveyed, only one even suggested the possibility of a student memorizing their outline or sources for an extemporaneous presentation. Ross (1998) suggests that “an extemporaneous speech is most effective when given from a brief but meaningful outline, which is carried in either your head or your hand and which is supported by thorough preparation” (pg 181). Although this text does inform its readers that they can carry the outline in “their heads,” it doesn’t advocate that students do so.

Why then do we teach one thing during the week and reward the opposite each weekend? Some argue that certain occupations “require” that speakers memorize extemporaneous speeches (IE-L, November 11,2003, 1 O:23). In the past, others have t k argued that some professions, like that of a lawyer, require memorized 1 extemporaneous presentations. This, however, is not the norm. In the court cases that I have observed, including the capital murder case that I recently served as a jury, I member for, the lawyers all used notes for their presentations. Nor, I argue, was there an expectation that any of the lawyers prepare their speeches in a thirty-minute timeframe. Wood (2001) argues attorneys, politicians and others “most often use an extemporaneous style of presentation” (pg. 290). Devito (2002) reminds readers most of us in the teaching profession use this mode of presentation as well. He notes “good lecturing by college teachers is extemporaneous” (pg. 337). Even in classes I have taught a number of times before I use notes during my extemporaneous presentations. Do you teach without notes to improve your ethos amongst your students?

Challenging Cultural Norms And Unwritten Expectations

This paper highlights the contradictions between what we teach in our classrooms and how we coach our competitors. Several steps are offered that can be taken in order to challenge these cultural norms and unwritten expectations.

First, as coaches and educators we have an obligation to make our students aware of the ethical uses of evidence. Cronn-Mills & Schnoor (2003) suggest directors “reinforce and explicitly teach the AFA Code of Forensics Programs and Forensics Tournaments Standards for Colleges and Universities” (pg. 18). This is true in both limited prep and platform events. As one post to the IE-L suggests, we should all renew our commitment to “teaching students about evaluating evidence and how to engage in effective documentation of materials” (IE-L, November 10, 2003, 18:22). If judges write sources on ballots, take that as an opportunity to sit down and read through some of those articles with your students. This not only gives you as the coach a mechanism for checking your students, it may also facilitate discussions about using evidence, or promote a discussion about the topic area in general. This is also a technique that should be utilized more often during practice sessions.

Second, document your reason for rank on each ballot. Make sure that your comments are based on sound pedagogy, not on tradition, norms, or unwritten rules. As Casale (2003) notes, “there are very definite written rules which we can all reference and follow ... however, confusion is sure to abound (and conflicts arise) when ballots literally tell a student they are doing an event-such as Impromptu or Extemporaneous Speaking- wrong” (pg. 91). When you host tournaments, make sure all hired and volunteer judges are aware of the rules that govern your tournament. If you personally prefer that students refrain from using notes, please indicate so on your ballot. If you instead prefer students use notes, also indicate that on your ballot. I would encourage those in both camps to resist the temptation to use it as a basis for a decision. If you must, please educational reasons that justify your decision.

Finally, although I disagree adamantly with some of the conclusions drawn by Burnett, Brand and Meister (2001), 1 do believe that we must be careful not to place competitive goals above educational goals. Many students who choose to compete without notes in extemporaneous speaking, and many of the coaches and judges who encourage and reward it, do so for competitive gain, not educationally sound reasons. Although I believe that competition and education are both valuable, and both support each other, if one is to be sacrificed it should be competition. This thought is illustrated best in one last post to the IE-L, written by a person responding to an accusation of ethical violations. The author concludes by saying “take the pewter and the lucite back, because, at least for me, that represents the tiniest part of why I do this” (IE-L, November 14, 2003). Hopefully we can all make that same claim, and place ethics and education above competition.

References

Adler, R.B., & Rodman, G. (2003). Understanding Human Communication. 8th edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

American Forensic Association. (1982, 1998). AFA Code of Forensics Program and Forensics Tournament Standards for College and Universities. available online:http://www.americanforensics.org/afacode.html.

Beebe, S.A., Beebe, S.J., & Ivy, D.K. (2001). Communication: Principles for a Lifetime. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Burnett, A., Brand, J., & Meister, M. (2001). Forensics education? How the structure and discourse of forensics promotes competition. Argumentation and Advocacy, 38, 106-1 14.

Casale, R.D. (2003). To rule or not to rule: these are (just some of) the questions. Speaker and Gavel, 40, 91-96.

Cronn-Mills, D. (2000). Interpretation, ethics and education: an analysis of the AFA-NIET “Ethical Use of Literature Policy.” Speaker and Gavel, 37, 61-65.

Cronn-Mills, D. & Schnoor, L.G (2003). Evidence and ethics in individual events: An examination of an AFA-NIET final round. National Forensics Journal, 21, 35-51.

DeVito, J.A. (2002). Essentials of Human Communication. 4th edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Devito, J.A. (2003). Human Communication: The Basic Course. 9th edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Dunn, D.M., & Goodnight, L.J. (2003). Communication: Embracing Difference. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Gregory, H. (1987). Public Speaking for College and Career. New York: Random House.

Hybels, S., & Weaver, R.L. (2004). Communicating Effectively. 7th edition. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Jaffe, C. (2001). Public Speaking: Concepts and Skills for a Diverse Society. 3rd edition. Australia: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.

Kuster, T. (2002). A preliminary indictment of the current slate of individual events (and what to do about it). Speaker and Gavel, 39, 50-57.

Markstrom, R.L. (1 994). A Case Study of Source Citations Found in the 1993 AFA-NIET Final Round of Extemporaneous Speaking. Unpublished master’s thesis. North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND.

Mason, S. (1989). Looking in from the fringe: A need for commonality and accountability in professional ethical standards in forensics. In L. Schnoor and V. Kams (Eds.), Perspective on Individual Events: Proceedings of the First Developmental Conference on Individual Events (pp. 85-89). Mankato: Mankato State University.

Morreale, S.P., Spitzberg, B.H., & Barge, J.K. (2001). Human Communication: Motivation, Knowledge, & Skills. Australia: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.

O’Hair, D., & Stewart, R. (1999). Pocket Guide to Public Speaking: Challenges and Choices. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins.

Pfeiffer, W. S. (2002). Public Speaking. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Ross, R.S. (1 998). The Speechmaking Process. 1lth edition. Boston: 411yn & Bacon.

Rothwell, J. D. (2004). In the Company of Others: An Introduction to Communication. 2nd edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Seiler, W.J., & Beall, M.L. (2003). Communication: Making Connections. 5th edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Williams, D. (1997). Over-quantification of sources in public address events. The Southern Journal of Forensics, 2, 106-1 09.

Wood, J.T. (2001). Communication Mosaics: an Introduction to the Field of Communication. 2nd edition. Australia: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.

Zaresfsky, D. (2002). Public Speaking: Strategies for Success. 3rd edition. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Ric L. Shafer is the director of forensics at Texas Tech University. An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the National Communication Association National Convention, Miami, FL, November 21, 2003.

Winning the Peace:

The “Three Pillars” of George Bush at Whitehall Palace

Terry Robertson

Abstract

The November, 19, 2003 speech given by George W. Bush at Whitehall Palace in Great Britain was one of the most significant in the President’s political career. Mr. Bush attempts, in the speech, to reinforce his proponents as well as negate the arguments of his skeptics. This work illustrates, through Neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism how the President met the rhetorical situation, how he utilized language and rhetorical devices, and critiques the means of persuasion utilized by Mr. Bush.

Introduction

Richard Nuestadt (1969) eloquently argued that, “Presidential power is the power to persuade.” The beginning of the 21st century finds President George W. Bush in the unenviable of persuading not only the citizens of the United States, but the peoples of the world that the US incursion into Iraq was not only justified, but that it would bring about a new democratic Middle Eastern State. On November 19, 2003 President Bush strode into Whitehall Palace to speak to a group of Brits, hand selected for their support. However, this speech, ghost written after consultation with the president by speechwriter Mike Gerson, was meant to be heard by far more than the few hundred in the audience. It was, after all, a justification of an Anglo-American alliance that is the foundation of the war against terror. A few lines into the speech Mr. Bush invoked the presence of an Almighty God when he stated:

It’s rightly said that Americans are a religious people. That’s, in part, because the “Good News” was translated by Tyndale, preached by Wesley, lived out in the example William Booth. At times, Americans are even said to have a puritan streak—where might that have come from? (the audience laughs) (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

It may seem strange to listeners that a sitting US President invoked the ghost of William Tyndale, the 16th century translator of the Christian Bible, yet in retrospect perhaps not.

Bush’s speech was much more than a defense of the war on terrorism. It was justification for a British-American crusade that, he argues, is indispensable to the security and freedom the planet. Since 9-11, Britain has maintained a staunch kinship to her American cousin. Obviously, both countries share a common political and economic birthright that political that insists that sovereignty depends on pseudo- decentralized power that trickles up. Further, both nations are bound by commercial interests that most often determine political stances in both states. Calvin Coolidge’s argument that the “business of government is business,” holds true in the new millennium. Further, the advent of enlightenment and freedom that was born in the Magna Carta facilitates a distinctive worldview that is shared by both nations. Mr. Bush’s speech develops three distinct reasons (the three pillars) that the war in Iraq is justified. First, he argues that history illustrates that there are instances when a nation must use military options in order to defend herself, keep peace, and uphold democratic principles. He goes on to portray that nations must recognize when the use of force is necessary and that diplomacy may not always work. President Bush’s second pillar is that the US must continue to follow its traditions of long support for international institutions and that he is committed to that path. Finally, the third pillar is the commitment to spreading democracy (and free markets) throughout the world and to disavow the belief shown by some that the Islamic peoples in the Middle East are somehow not ready or capable of instituting democracy. This essay critiques the Whitehall Palace speech delivered by President Bush to the English and American peoples. The paper will begin by developing an overview of the rhetorical situation; discuss the language and rhetorical devices used in the speech, and compare the means of persuasion used by the speaker with the inventory provided by Aristotle’s Rhetoric (antiquity, 1991).

The Rhetorical Situation

Lloyd F. Bitzer suggests that the construct of rhetorical situation is founded on the understanding in which something happens or does not happen, thus causing the rhetor to speak out. This is coined the exigency of a speech (Bitzer, 1968). Bitzer bases his argument on the concept that the ancient Greeks gave special attention to timing--the "when" of the rhetorical situation. They called this kairos, and it identifies the combination of the "right" moment to speak and the "right" way (or proportion) to speak.

President Bush had planned to present his speech to a joint session of Commons and Lords following the precedent set by his counterpart, Tony Blair, when he spoke to the US Congress. Indeed, senior White House adviser Dr. Harlan Ullman said: "They would have loved to do it because it would have been a great photo-opportunity” (Roberts, 2003). However, in the end, the Bush team abandoned the idea because they feared backbenchers in the Labour party would walk out, embarrassing the president. Instead the only speech presented by Mr. Bush on November 2003 trip to London was given to an “invited audience” at the Banquet Parlor in Whitehall Palace.

Aboard Air Force One, en route to London, a senior Bush official explained why Bush needed to go to England and speak out at this time. The official explained that while the administration acknowledged that the US and Europe disagreed, they still “are involved in – in Afghanistan, in Iraq, toward a greater Middle East in which we find partners in the Middle East who want to develop democratically -- this is a great cause around which he believes that we can all unite" (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State).

President George W. Bush visited London as a guest of the British government, and was the first since Woodrow Wilson in 1918 to be invited on a State Visit. The visit had large symbolic significance, as well as being a critical meeting for both President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair. The visit was also made to solidify the Anglo-American nexus, which is of primary importance to both countries. Further goals of President Bush's state visit were to strengthen U.S.-British cooperation in the war against terrorism and provide reassurances to mainland Europe regarding NATO (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State).

Another group associated with rhetorical situation was the protesters who took to the street to demonstrate against the Bush visit. An estimated 100,000 protesters marched through London eventually tearing down a mock statue of the visiting President. Many of the protesters were convinced his policies were to blame for the war. The British and American Secret Services were efficient in keeping the protesters and Bush apart. Further, as will be discussed later, Mr. Bush is quite successful in rhetorically disempowering the protestors during his Whitehall address.

Language and Rhetorical Devices

No animal but man ever laughs (antiquity, Aristotle, 1991)

President Bush begins the Whitehall three pillars speech with dark humor. He quips:

It was pointed out to me that the last noted American to visit London stayed in a glass box dangling over the Thames. A few might have been happy to provide similar arrangements for me. I thank Her Majesty the Queen for interceding. We're honored to be staying at her house. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

Bush was referring to the illusionist David Blaine who, in, his latest stunt, encased himself in a plastic box over the River Thames. He spent 44 days suspended beside the London river.

One general paradigm for humorous reduction to absurdity is that one may believe something, but when considering a type humorous statement, it will contradict or make one’s value or belief unintelligible. In other words no one is going to treat the head of state in such a manner. The juxtaposition of Blaine and Bush is an effective rhetorical device. Thus, Bush further strengthens the bond with his listeners, by using it. The commonality that humor brings between Bush and his listeners is extended as is the commonality between the British and the United States. Bush continues his humorous introduction by bantering:

Americans traveling to England always observe more similarities to our country than differences. I've been here only a short time, but I've noticed that the tradition of free speech -- exercised with enthusiasm -- (laughter) -- is alive and well here in London. We have that at home, too. They now have that right in Baghdad, as well. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

The verbal irony in Bush’s statement “exercised with enthusiasm” is a wink and a nod toward the audience. Indeed, let the demonstrators protest, Bush is saying. It is people like us (Bush, his fellow, neo-cons, and Blair supporters) who protect that right for them, just as we have given the right of free speech and assembly to the Iraqis in Baghdad.

Common Ground

If rhetoric is to be valuable, if it is to motivate or lead to mutual understanding, it is necessary for the rhetor and audience to share some common ground. Rhetorical sensitivity is the "tendency to adapt messages to audiences" (Littlejohn, 1996, p. 107). This idea has its foundation in Aristotle's notion of the enthymeme (Aristotle, trans.

1991). Aristotle suggests that in order to be an effective communicator a speech must share common ground between communicator and audience. The speech will lose its sway unless rhetors find parallels between themselves and the audience.

The language used by Bush is inclusive between as it finds common ground between the two nations. For example, the faith in liberty and the crusading moralism described by Bush in the speech are parts of America’s British legacy.

The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. We're sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If that's an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong. That zeal has been inspired by examples on this island, by the tireless compassion of Lord Shaftesbury, the righteous courage of Wilberforce, and the firm determination of the Royal Navy over the decades to fight and end the trade in slaves. To this fine heritage, Americans have added a few traits of our own: the good influence of our immigrants, the spirit of the frontier. Yet, there remains a bit of England in every American. So much of our national character comes from you, and we're glad for it. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

Bush references men who helped to construct the shared Anglo-American experiment in democracy. Indeed, as Bush argues "whether one learns these ideals in County Durham or in West Texas" the mutual attachment to the democratic ideal has bound the two nations as allies against a dark enemy. Further, since audiences tend to be egocentric, Bush, attempted to find numerous ways for his Anglo audience to identify. That Bush desired to persuade and control the behavior of his audience is apparent throughout his address. The ninth paragraph of the speech contains the inclusive anaphora; We value; We stand; We affirm; We are moved; We seek. Indeed, the rhetorical device is used to illustrate that it is not the United States acting unilaterally, but the plural pronoun “we.” Further, the use of the pronoun reminds one of Winston Churchill’s June, 1940 speech before the House Commons when he declared, "We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France; we shall fight on the seas and oceans. We shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air. We shall defend our island, whatever the cost shall be."

The purpose of the extensive use of we is to exploit the existing relationships between the rhetor and the audience. The relationship between the rhetor and the audience is fluid and the linguistic forms used to convey or even to manipulate the audience exists in the connections between personal identity and pronominal choice (Íñigo-Mora, 2004).

Synopsis

President Bush’s address begins with a humorous enthymeme that attacks those who might be protesting the war in Iraq as well as Mr. Bush. The conclusion implied is that the president “knows better” and is in the mainstream while those protesting are treating him unfairly as well as not understanding international policy. The remainder of the proem is used to bring about identification between the American and British peoples and construct the foundation for the thesis of the address, i.e., “that the peace and security of free nations rests on three pillars…” The address is an adequate example of the Aristotelian pattern. The speech begins with the humorous proem, then the narrative, next constructive proofs are given (as well as refutation to detractors), and finally an epilogue is offered.

The Narrative

The narrative in the speech begins with Bush telling the tale of 9/11. He delivers a eulogy of sorts, describing those who died in the Twin Towers, reinforcing the fact that the blast “took the lives of 67 British citizens.” Aristotle’s view of rhetoric comes from two sources. In addition, there seems to be little overlap between the two. Poetics does not mention the rhetoric of narrative work, and, in addition, Rhetoric does not develop a way to understand the rhetoric of narratives. Perhaps the closest intersection is the suggestion by Aristotle that the well constructed speech should begin with a narrative of the disputed action from the speaker’s point of view.

But who is this speaker, explaining what the narrative is and what its result will be? Interestingly, it is not the voice of the President only, but that of all peoples – both east and west. It refers to, for example, a collective first person by stating that the “natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behinds us (italics added), as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understandable, and it is false. The attacks that followed - on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Mombassa, Najaf, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul – were not dreams.” As the first sentence notes, it is literally the voice of all of “us” who attempt to place right thinking persons from the east and west into the narrative as protagonists.

Aristotle (antiquity, 1991) does tell speakers to utilize narrative to credit themselves (ethos) and to discredit adversaries. Book 3, chapter 16 notes, “You may also narrate as you go anything that does credit to yourself, e.g. "I kept telling him to do his duty and not abandon his children"; or discredit to your adversary, e.g. "But he answered me that, wherever he might find himself, there he would find other children," the answer Herodotus' records of the Egyptian mutineers. Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy.” Bush creates and discredits the antagonists in his narration by stating, “These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished…The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial.” Obviously, if the speaker can utilize his/her narrative to achieve the better moral end, his/her ethos is enhanced. It is difficult to imagine a better end than protecting the world from mass destruction.

Bush goes on to explain how the United States and Britain took up the mantle of this fight, “Great responsibilities fall once again to great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them.” Three propositions lie within this statement. The first is the enthymeme that “once again…great democracies” which implies that like the menace faced in WWII, Britain and America must stand in resolved defiance to the evil antagonist. Second, Bush uses a double connotation to imply that the two nations will be ever vigilant “with open eyes,” thereby providing a watchful eye for those on whom the terrorists might prey and finally, since the evil is in “plain sight,” those that do not recognize it obviously are deliberately shutting their eyes.

Constructive and Refutation Proofs

The question that frames the constructive and refutation proofs in the speech is simply; how can terrorism be eliminated? The answer is founded upon the construction of the three pillars. The first is that international organizations must be equal to the challenges of our world, from lifting up falling states to opposing proliferation. The second is to restrain aggression and evil by force. Finally, the global expansion of democracy must be a commitment. This solution to world terrorism is fallacious, Non Causa Pro Causa, as it does not solve the problem as to how terrorists are created. In other words, Bush’s remarks treat the symptoms of terrorism without impacting the disease. Bush describes terrorism by inferring that terrorists are caused by the failure of international organizations; may be eliminated through military intervention; and will not grow where democracy is implanted. By accepting any of this however, one must create a link between halting acts of terrorism and foreign policy forged by nation-state realities. This link, in many instances, simply does not exist. Lifting falling states and opposing proliferation between nation states does little to stop the budding terrorist or change his/her mind concerning the injustice that he/she perceives. Second, military intervention has a woeful record in its use against terrorism. Indeed, every time Israel acts militarily, more Palestinians cross the border with bombs on their backs. Finally, democracy, in its various implementations, has not proven to be a panacea to halt terrorist acts. Bush’s mistakes about causation are the result of confusing causes of nation states with causes of terrorists. Obviously, for example, Hitler was not a terrorist, but was instead the leader of an aggressive nation state.

Mr. Bush’s refutation proof exists in his argument surrounding the third pillar. He states that peoples in the west must change their own thinking concerning Islam. He suggests that critics argue that Moslem people are not capable of self government and that these critics see Islam as being inconsistent with democratic cultures. This attack on critics leads to a passage that sums up the argument on moral high ground, “Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it.” The straw man fallacy vividly illustrates the nature of this refutation. Bush sets up a fight in which one of the combatants is set up as a man of straw; he then attacks it and proclaims victory. Obviously there is much difference between a democracy that evolves internally and one that is enforced from the outside. Further, most critics decry the Bush administration’s insistence upon the existence of weapons of mass destruction being at the crux of the justification for invading Iraq rather than arguments concerning democracy.

The Epilogue

The epilogue reinforces Mr. Bush’s thoughts concerning the identification between the American and British peoples. Further, he again draws upon the memory of the Second World War to justify the Iraqi incursion. It exhorts the British people as being firm, steadfast, generous, and brave. Aristotle suggests that epilogues should summarize, build ethos, and forge good will. The president’s speech does just that.

President Bush’s speech at Whitehall Palace falls into the classical Aristotelian pattern. Each part of the speech contains the lines of argument that are traditional for that segment. He places his detractors on the defensive by portraying them as elitists who believe that only they are ready for democracy; and that he identifies with the “common person” who deserves the same democratic rewards that the elites enjoy. The structure, however, also attempts to hide the administrations early justification for the war as well as the lack of any plan to win the peace.

Enthymemes and the Means of Persuasion

The enthymeme, as explained by Aristotle, is "a kind of syllogism" that is used in rhetoric. According to Aristotle, the speaker is to prove a case to the satisfaction of an audience....and does it by presenting considerations for the audience to think about (enthumema)" (Burnyeat, 93). Further, because most audiences are usually not made up of experts on the subject being discussed, speakers should be wary of arduous of reasoning. Knowing this information, one could say the following about enthymemes: “(1) they must be arguments about things which are capable of being otherwise than they are, (2) they must restrict the number of premises that they use” (Bunyeat 100).

In order to evaluate the methods of persuasion that is at the crux of Aristotelian analysis, two issues must be contemplated. The first is determining major premises upon which enthymemes that form “proofs” are founded. Second, the critic must determine how the audience is moved in the direction of a favorable feeling toward the premises and their subsequent conclusions. In this instance Bush utilized several enthymemes in order persuade the audience of his argument.

The first premise is that Americans and Brits are a religious and moral people. Subsequently, the actions taken by the Anglo-American alliance must be just because it is based upon testament from God. This conclusion ferments from an unusually rich mix of religion and politics within the public sphere that result from a convergence of factors that surround 9/11. Religious passion has been stirred and faith is placed on center stage. Further, Bush’s own faith has been publicly displayed to inform his policies and decisions.

This enthymeme is interesting based on the construct of Bush’s audience. Obviously, the war is popular with the evangelical right wing of his party, but presumably less so with those who portray their devotion in different ways. Pope John Paul II, for example, questioned the moral authority utilized by Bush when invading Iraq. The Pontiff based his objections to the war on the Just War Theory articulated by St Augustine. Augustine’s list of limitations and justifications of force are often used as the guiding tenets of Just War Theory. They are: Just Cause, Right Authority, Right Intention, Good Outcome, Proportionality, Reasonable Hope for Success, and Last Resort. The Pope argues that no part of Just War theory supported the first-strike option adopted by the President. In the weeks and months before the U.S. attacked Iraq, not only the Holy Father, but also one Cardinal and Archbishop after another at the Vatican spoke out against a "preemptive" or "preventive" strike. Further, the Houston Catholic Worker reports that John Paul II sent his personal representative, Cardinal Pio Laghi, a friend of the Bush family, to remonstrate with the U.S. President before the war began. The message: God is not on your side if you invade Iraq (Zwick & Zwick, 2004).

Bush is, however, successful in burying these type questions in his second enthymeme. His presentation of the supporter of the Iraqi policy as ideal moral patriot is offered in such a manner that possible detractors are not encouraged to raise dissent. The conclusion to the enthymeme suggests that supporters of Iraqi policy are idealists in the vein of Woodrow Wilson, are guardians of civil liberties, and act to suppress poverty and oppression. The ideal patriot is actually sacrificing him/herself in order to bring freedom and peace worldwide. It is difficult to attack the premises of these two enthymemes, especially, when Bush utilizes the second enthymeme to protect the first. The target audience lives in the western world and has participated in a western worldview that idolizes sacrificial duty to democratic ideals. To dissent is to question the foundation of one’s lived experience.

Bush also plays upon a pathetic appeal through the premise that the world is a better place for these actions, no matter what the means. He states:

And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he held power? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just society and less dangerous without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world. And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes, instead of committing more. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

Bush gives two premises in the paragraph. First, his actions made the Arab world as well as the western world (by definition the US and Britain) a “safer” place. These premises and the conclusion that the end justified the invasion are obviously more likely to be accepted by audiences that are fearful for their own safety. Furthermore, Bush's words served a second, more defensive purpose. By shifting attention away from only Iraq and towards the foes of both the past and of the near-future, the President could keep the public eye upon "threats" rather than "causes." If Brits and Americans are remembering hijacked airliners, they will not have the time to consider: how did we get here. One way to appreciate the sleight-of-hand behind the creation of the enthymeme is to consider the deft way in which the president included the Clinton administration’s move into Yugoslavia in the war upon terror. Although never treated as such by the GOP before 9-11, Bush emasculates democratic dissent by including their actions as players in the theatres of war.

Perhaps the President’s most overarching argument and enthymeme, however, is indicating that the expansion of western democracy is the ultimate weapon in halting terrorism. The conclusion to this argument is that the lone way to stop terrorist attacks is to form democratic governments in rogue Middle Eastern states. Standing as his third pillar, it is also the most prominent of the three. Several rhetorical devices are utilized to point the audience in the direction of acceptance to the conclusion. First, Mr. Bush defines compulsory democracy, enforced through occupation and outside invasion, in terms that are palatable to the audience. In antithetical rhetorical form the president argues:

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

The definition brackets democracy in western terms, and is developed through a lens of western democratic evolution. Second, Bush presents his view of democracy confidently; disregarding arguments to the contrary that enforcing democracy from the outside is much different than evolving democracy from within.

Finally, Bush portrays a confidence that helps to implant the conclusion. Confidence, according to Aristotle, is the counterpart of fear.

Having now seen the nature of fear, and of the things that cause it, and the various states of mind in which it is felt, we can also see what Confidence is, about what things we feel it, and under what conditions. It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear; it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible: it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm. (Aristotle, Antiquity, 1991)

Presidential abilities to create and sustain confidence have oft been at the core of successful administrations. Houck (2004), in his critique of the rhetoric of the Hoover and Roosevelt presidencies notes that both Hoover and Roosevelt believed public confidence was vital to recovery. They differed markedly, of course, in their ability to restore that confidence. To Hoover, the depression was a foe to be vanquished by Christian and Civic pride. When that failed and government intervention was required he was unable to rhetorically form a message that conveyed confidence. Roosevelt, conversely, used an economic rhetoric that paid particular attention to physical, active, confidence.

Bush understood that a bold confident policy is best presented to an audience that is still fearful of attack. He mollifies an anxious populace with a conclusion that will, according to the president, bring about safety and security through making the “other” just like us. He presents the idea that if the Anglo-American coalition can reduce the anxiety brought about by trepidation toward values held by an unknown culture, the west will be safe. This pathetic appeal holds as its premise that western democratic expansion, implemented in any manner, is an almost unqualified good.

A final enthymeme in the speech is the consequence of doing nothing. Bush argues that for decades the west has done little in the Middle East. He states, “in the past we have been willing to bargain…” The premise is that to negotiate is to appease for the sake of stability. This policy, in turn, will lead to the tyranny of terror in both the Middle East and in the west. The enthymeme tends to interlink all the previous arguments. It rests on the assumption that western democracy can indeed be enforced from the outside. Further, expanding democracy alone can withstand terrorism. The enthymeme, based on this assumption and placed near the end of the speech discourages inquiry by the audience. Although the premise has yet to be proven in nation-state/terrorist situations, its more important function is to provide psychological security for the listener. It reinforces an evident perception in the west that “The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us.”

Following the enthymeme is a series of ethos building statements that credit the president’s policy. This is a particularly effective strategy as it gives the Bush administration rhetorical authority to make the claims concerning democracy. In addition it gives the audience the perception that the Iraqi policy has been radically successful.

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the people, instead of bullying them. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they're ordered. Schools are open, with textbooks free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and are well-supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first battalion of a new army, representative local governments, and a governing council with an aggressive timetable for national sovereignty. This is substantial progress. And much of it has proceeded faster than similar efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II. (Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace)

Appeals such as this attempt to persuade by calling attention to the utility and noble character of the administration’s policy. In this Bush realizes that his public, both American and British, have adopted the postmodern view that politics is not just about appearances -- it is appearances. Assertions concerning Iraq become as important as what is actually Iraq. In addition, Bush once more parallels Iraqi policy to the Marshall Plan. Bush portrays himself and Iraqi policy, as having good moral character and practical wisdom, as well as a concern for the Iraqi’s themselves. The invasion, according to this text, was not based on selfish motives or security concerns; instead it refers to the uplifting of the Iraqi people.

An understanding of Aristotle illustrates that rhetoric is interested with matters that are contingent rather than absolute (i.e., since rhetoric is based on probability rather than on necessity). Further, Aristotle suggests that the persuasive appeal of the speaker's character must be seen as based on the speech itself, not on prior reputation. This particular appeal to ethos, however, is effective because it brackets out the arguments against invasion, i.e. oil interests, pre-emptive strike, American hegemony, etc. In its place is the unselfish motive assertion by Bush – that we went to war to lend a hand to the Iraqi people. This view helps to reinforce the image of America “the savior” that is prevalent in the U.S. After all, the premise boasts, it was the Americans who died at Normandy; it was the Americans who, along with England, saved the rest of Europe and North Africa from the terrors of the Nazi’s. Bush leads his audience along the rhetorical path. After the battles were over, the Americans were so magnanimous that they rebuilt the infrastructure of their enemies. So it is once again, in Iraq. Or at least the President would have his audience believe it was so.

Overall Evaluation

What can be said about President Bush’s speech at Whitehall Palace? The speech was designed for a difficult situation with a friendly local (at least inside the Hall), but less committed national and international audience. The speech functions from premises based upon pathetic as well ethical appeals that are generally accepted by the audience. The less effective premises are not as prominent in the text. The three pillars within the speech are supported by premises and conclusions shared by most of the population of the western world. The strength of the speech lies within its shared vision with the audience, i.e., the desire for safety, democracy, and sharing the responsibility on an international level. The speech allows Brits to identify with Americans and forges the foundation for the Anglo-American coalition. The speech’s arrangement, rhetorical devices, use of ethos and pathetic appeals were largely successful. Neo-Aristotelian criticism provides an appropriate lens in order to better understand Bush’s message. It illuminates the President’s best success – the choice of the correct enthymemes in order to persuade the audience. It helps us to better understand how the use of appeals can be directed in order to move the listener.

References

Aristotle. (1991). Aristotle on rhetoric: A theory of civic discourse. Trans. G. A. Kennedy, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bitzer, L. F. (1968). The Rhetorical Situation. Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions. Boston: Allyn and Bacon: 1995

Burnyeat, M.F. (1996). Enthymeme: Aristotle on the rationality of rhetoric. In Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Amelie O. Rorty (Ed.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Íñigo-Mora, I, (2004). On the use of the personal pronoun we in communities. Journal of Language and Politics 3:1.pp. 27–52.

Houck, D. W. (2001). Rhetoric as currency: Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Great Depression. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

Littlejohn, S. W. (1996). Theories of human communication (5^th ed.). New York: Wadsworth.

Roberts, B. (2003). Bush pulls out of speech to parliament. The Daily Mirror. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/allnews/content.

Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace. (2003). Downloaded, January 3, 2004.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html

Zwick, M. & Zwick, L. (2003). The Pope’s response to the Iraqi war. Houston Catholic Worker, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, July-August 2003.

Terry Robertson (troberts@usd.edu) is at the University of South Dakota.

Reading is Remembering

The Effect of Reading vs. Watching News on Memory and Metamemory

Hesham M. Mesbah

From which news medium can audiences acquire information best? To what extent does the news source affect receivers’ feelings of knowing? Will the effect of a news source on confidence in knowledge, if any, stay over time?

Exposure to either print or electronic news media is a daily habit for an average person in today’s world. Computerized news transmitted via networks and online services led to more diversification in news presentations. Such diversity inspired many scholars to investigate the comparative effectiveness of news media on memory processes. The study reported here examines the effect of exposure to different news media on the variance in subjects’ levels of recall immediately after exposure and two hours later. The three media used in the experiment are television, newspapers, and computer. Special attention to subjects’ metamemory, or their awareness of what they have learned is also given in this paper. Metamemory is tested immediately after exposure, and two hours later.

McLuhan (1964: 22) argued that effectiveness of any source of information is determined by their mechanical nature. He defined radio as a “hot” medium as it extends one single sense in "high definition” and is low in “receivers’ participation,” whereas he identified television as a cool medium that gives out little visual information compared to the movie. Therefore, a hot medium like radio has very different effects on the user from a cool medium.

However, the reason behind this comparative effectiveness of news sources might be more multifaceted than McLuhan puts it. The mechanical nature of a given news medium is one thing; and its contextual features that characterize exposure to it is another thing. A newspaper occupies space and is there whenever needed, whereas broadcast media are volatile. Some experimental studies sought to control this factor. Stauffer et al. (1980) divided their subjects into viewers, listeners, and readers. Each group was exposed once to a variety of news stories. The readers were not allowed to read the story more than once, yet they showed better levels of recall. Applying a similar design, Gunter and his colleagues (1984) came up with consistent findings.

Wicks and Drew (1986), on the other hand, did not find differences between television and newspapers in terms of subsequent recall levels. They attributed this equality between the two media to the experimental conditions that differ from normal exposure at home. Accordingly, contextual factors might not be sufficient in explaining this variance in news recall among news consumers. In a later study, Wicks (1995) found out that subjects exposed to certain televised news stories recorded higher recall scores immediately after exposure and two days later. He suggests that televised images might have this potential of stimulating accelerated recall better than do equivalent newspaper stories .

Another group of studies revealed that “cognitive processing requirements” explain the superiority of printed materials over electronically presented materials. The process of reading requires more cognitive effort, and this results in better levels of knowledge acquisition. Gavriel Solomon (1984) found that learning from printed materials was better than learning from television among children. He based his explanation for this result on the way children perceive both media. Television for them is an easy medium that does not require the same cognitive effort exerted while reading. Kathy Pezdek and her colleagues (1987) showed similar results among adults. This might explain the evidence from the accumulated literature that reflects the superiority of newspaper presentations over televised presentations (M. DeFleur et al., 1992; D. Graber, 1988; McLeod et al., 1982; E. Wilson, 1974). In a more recent experiment comparing television and print news, Gunter and colleagues (2001) found that children learn most from television, whereas adults learn most from print. The superior recall of print news observed with adults was attributed to “the fact that print offers more opportunity to exercise control over the processing of information than television does,” whereas children could show better memory performance with redundant televised news presentations. Comparing children’s recall of news stories in print , photos, and audio formats, Walma and Tom (2000), indicated that the television presentation was recalled better than any of the other media.

According to the concept of “cognitive processing requirements” newspapers are cognitively superior because they are read, not because of the context in which they are consumed. When an electronic medium is apt to be read, rather than watched, newspaper’s superiority is expected to be at stake. DeFleur and his colleagues (1992) found that the levels of recall from newspaper versus computer screen presentations did not differ significantly, whereas the print media were significantly more effective than the broadcast media. However, most studies that experimentally examined the comparative effectiveness of news sources used the “talking head” format in presenting television news to control for the effect of picture (M. DeFleur, 1992; B. Gunter, 1989; W. Dommermuth, 1974; Ogilvie, 1957). When pictures accompanied television presentations, memory performance changed. Furnham and Gunter (1985) found that memory for violent news was better among male subjects who watched it on television compared to those who were exposed to the same content via newspapers or radio. Wicks and Drew (1991), using news stories that offered congruence between audio and video, failed to support research showing that television leads to less information gain than newspapers. The body of findings is inconsistent, however. DeFleur and Cronin (1991), using a visual story versus a printed version, reported that subjects in the newspaper presentation passed on more details more accurately than those in the television group.

This presents study examines the relative effectiveness of print versus electronic news media using a television news story accompanied by redundant video track. Building on the notion of ‘cognitive requirements’, it is expected that subjects who read the news in either newspaper or computer presentations would show better performance than those who watch the same news story. Furthermore, the style of news writing (inverted pyramid vs. narrative reporting) is sought to be controlled by presenting the written version of news story in both styles.

H¹: Verbal recognition scores will be significantly higher for news that is ‘read’ than for news that is ‘watched’.

The comparative effectiveness of different media as sources of news might be explained according to how much individuals are confident in what they learn from each medium. Certain news media might be perceived as prestigious, serious, or deep, whereas other media are considered common or entertaining by definition. This raises two questions here: (1) does confidence in news recall vary according to the type of news source used? (2) Is there a relationship between confidence in answers and levels of memory performance?

Various studies suggest that there is a relationship between people’s confidence in their performance and their accuracy. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) reported improved confidence-accuracy calibration. They concluded that the confidence-accuracy relationship is likely to be best calibrated at about 80% accuracy levels. There is a marked degree of agreement in the cognitive literature that there is a moderate yet robust positive relation between subjects’ confidence evaluations and their performance (Perfect et. Al., 1993:144). Schneider and Laurion (1993), testing memory for radio news, reported strong positive confidence-accuracy relationships.

H²: Levels of verbal recognition scores of news facts will be affected by levels of subjects’ confidence in their answers.

To date, investigators have rarely examined whether levels of confidence in retrieval are affected by the type of news source. Such a psychological factor may add to explaining the comparative effects of news media. New news sources, such as computers, are perceived as a novelty by many receivers in Egypt. Accordingly, acquiring information via computers might lead to higher levels of feeling-of-knowing reflections. Consequently, the third hypothesis is formulated as follows:

H³: There is a significant relationship between the kind of news source and subjects feeling of knowing.

On the other hand, does the variance in confidence levels according to the type of news source used hold over time? Hovland and Weiss (1951) reported that the effect of the message source on opinion change tends to dissolve over time. When subjects were tested four weeks after the experiment, the percentage of those exposed to a high credibility source who had changed their opinions decreased. The percentage of opinion change among those exposed to a low credibility source tended to increase in the second test. The authors termed this the “sleeper effect”. In a later experiment conducted by Kelman and Hovland (1953), similar results were reported. It has been predicted that although the subjects might have not forgotten the source, they apparently had dissociated the content from the source of communication.

The sleeper effect did not receive much attention in memory studies, however. Long-term memory was tested to either assess retrieval of stimuli that were not recalled shortly after exposure (reminiscence), or examine improvement in recall over time (hypermnesia). Effect of type of source on long-term recall still needs to be clarified. By the same token, different levels of confidence in answers caused by exposure to different kinds of news sources are susceptible to change significantly over time. Applying the sleeper effect perspective, information may be stored in and retrieved from long-term memory in isolation from its source.

H⁴: There is a significant difference in the degree of confidence in answers between the first test immediately after exposure and the second test two hours later.

Subject

One hundred and twenty subjects volunteered to participate in the experiment. All subjects were senior students studying mass communication at Cairo University. Subjects were 90 females and 30 males who took the memory test immediately after exposure and two hours later.

Design and Stimulus Material

Using name rosters of students, subjects were randomly assigned to four groups. Each group comprised 30 Ss who were exposed to one news story presented through different media according to the experimental conditions.

The news story used in the experiment consisted of approximately 300 words. It is actually a news report on AIDS in the world, which was broadcast on the Egyptian television in April 1996. Different criteria were used in selecting this particular story material for the experiment. First, previous exposure will be controlled as the story was aired years ago. Second, subjects’ background knowledge will be ruled out as well, because all the facts and figures mentioned in the story are now history or have changed dramatically. Third, the global nature of the topic dealt with in the story is of general interest that is not restricted to the local community.

This televised news story was transcribed and printed in a column format and font characteristic of newspapers. Two versions of the story were presented in the newspaper form. The first one was just a typical recitation of the voice over of the story. This format was termed ‘the broadcast-style printed version’. The other version was edited according to print journalism standards. Two specialized news editors were asked to rewrite the story in the print format using typically the same information and words in the original story. Another version of the story was prepared using the computer. The story was written in its original format and it occupied 36 lines on the screen.

Each subject was told at the beginning of the experiment that she/he would be asked several general questions on the news story presented. Subjects were not allowed to take any notes during reading or viewing the story. They either read or viewed the material just once. Subjects in the newspaper and the computer conditions were closely watched by the experimenters to make sure that the instructions were clear and thoroughly followed. Two hours later, subjects were asked to take the same recognition and confidence test again. During the time lapse between the two tests, the students were seated for a lecture on a totally different topic. This was done to prevent any interpersonal communication among the students concerning the experiment or the story presented.

Measurement

Memory was measured by giving the students a twelve-item multiple choice test on the content of the presented news story. The total number of the correct answers on this test was the measure of aided recall for factual information in the experiment.

As subjects answered each multiple-choice item, they also rated to what extent they were confident that their answer was correct. This was done using a 5-point-Likert type scale, ranging from not at all sure (1), to completely sure (5).

Analysis and Results

Effect of source. The mean recognition score immediately after exposure for the news story was calculated for each group. The findings showed consistency with research literature that reveals superior cognitive effects of written materials. Readers in both computer and newspaper presentations showed better performance on the test.

Table 1: ANOVA of Immediate Memory According to Type of News Source

P Probability	F Ratio	df	Source of Variance
0.01	3.86	3	Between groups
		116	Within groups
		119	Total

Subjects in the computer group remembered the story best (M=8.23). Those who read the story written in broadcast style were able to remember details (M=8.17) more than those who read the story written according to the traditional Inverted Pyramid style (M=7.77). Memory performance was at its lowest among those in the television group (M=6.73).

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the significance of difference between these different levels of immediate memory.

As Table 1 illustrates, the effect of type of news source produced a statistically significant difference (F= 3.86, p< 0.01) supporting the hypothesis that differences between groups in terms of news recall are statistically significant. In order to identify whether each medium differed significantly from each other, Benferroni test with significance level 0.05 was further run (see Table 2).

Table 2: Significant Differences Between Groups (Benferroni Test)

Computer	Broadcast Style	Newspaper	Television	Medium	Mean
				Television	6.73
				Newspaper	7.77
			*	Broadcast Style	8.17
			*	Computer	8.23

*Denotes significance in difference between new media

The data in Table 2 supports the hypothesis that subjects’ recognition scores in the ‘reading condition’ are significantly higher than those in the viewing condition. However, only two groups who read the story (computer (M= 8.23) and broadcast style (M= 8.17) presentations) showed significantly better memory performance than subjects in the television group (M= 6.73). No significant difference was detected between the television group and the newspaper group (M= 7.77). This suggests that “reading” the news is more cognitively effective than “watching” it.

Table 3: ANOVA of Delayed Memory Scores according to News Media

F Probability	F Ratio	df	Source of variance
0.12	1.96	3	Between groups
		116	Within groups
		119	Total

Delayed memory and news source. The influence of the type of news source was not found when subjects’ recognition memory was tested again after two hours. As Table 3 suggests, there is no significant difference between groups in terms of recognition memory performance two hours after exposure to the news story (F= 1.96, p> 0.12). Mean of correct answers in each group in both tests is displayed in Table 4.

Table 4: Mean Recognition Scores for News Facts varied by Source of News and Time of Testing

Mean (time 2)	Mean (time 1)	News source
7.10	6.73	Television
7.79	7.77	Print
8.23	8.17	Broadcast format
8.00	8.23	Computer

Memory performance in both the “TV” and “print” groups improved slightly when retested. Although memory for news facts was better for “read” materials, superiority of written presentation of news was not confirmed statistically when delayed memory was tested. This could be explained according to the familiarity of the test. In the second time, the students were more familiar with the multiple-choice questions. Reading the items again might have triggered long-term memory traces and led to almost equal performance among the four groups.

Memory-confidence relationship. Analysis of subjects’ metamemory suggests that they are primarily aware of what they know. Aggregate score of confidence ratings correlated significantly with total number of correct answers in both immediate test of memory (r= 0.57, p< 0.001) and delayed test (r=0.55, p< 0.001). This result supports the hypothesis that subjects’ feeling of knowing positively correlates with their levels of memory performance.

News source and metamemory. Subjects differed in their degrees of confidence in answers according to the type of news source. Differences were greater in the first test (time 1), whereas in the second test (time 2) the gap tended to be closer (see Table 5).

Table 5: Mean Confidence Scores Varied according to Medium and Time

M time 2)	M (time 1)	News source
41.03	39.87	Television
45.30	43.67	Broadcast format
44.47	45.10	Computer
45.03	45.50	Print

In both tests, television was the least initiator of the feeling of knowing among the four groups. The other written presentations of the same news story contributed to higher levels of confidence, however. Analysis of variance was used to examine the significance of differences in subjects’ metamemory based on medium and time of testing.

The data supports the hypothesis that both style of news presentation and time of testing exert effects on subjects’ metamemory (see Table 6).

Table 6: Analysis of Variance in Confidence Scores According to Medium and Time

Time 2 F Ratio p	Time 1 F Ratio p	df	Source of variance
1.97 0.12	4.19 0.007	3	Between groups
		116	Within
		119	Total

Significant differences in levels of confidence were uncovered immediately after exposure, whereas no such significance was detected when subjects were tested two hours later (F= 4.19, p< 0.007 at time1; F= 1.97, p> 0.12 at time2). In other words, the effect of medium on feeling of knowing tended to diminish over time.

Discussion

The study aimed at examining the effect of the news source on both memory performance and feeling of knowing. The results show consistency with previous research in showing superiority of written news over televised news. Reading news via a computer screen or a newspaper is a cognitively more demanding task that results in better levels of memory recognition. Subjects who read the news story either on a computer screen or via a traditional newspaper clipping showed a significantly higher level of recognition compared to the television groups. On the other hand, memory performance in the “newspaper” group and “computer” group was almost similar. This finding is consistent with the body of literature that shows similar cognitive effects of reading the news via printed materials or the screen. For example, Sundar and colleagues (1998) examined memory from print and online versions of a newspaper article. The found no significant differences in memory for news across different media. The structure of reading the news in both the “newspaper” and “computer” conditions was linear, reading from beginning to end. Adding the structural norm in hypermedia to computerized news text is expected to introduce some variance in memory performance, however. Several studies showed that print conditions have higher memory scores than other nonlinear conditions (Eveland and Dunwoody, 2001b; Tewksbury and Althaus, 2000).

This could be explained according to how highly subjects evaluate computer as a sophisticated source of news that is handled with attention. This might also explain the high levels of confidence in answers among the computer group.

Moreover, the study reveals that the traditional format of IP (Inverted Pyramid) is not necessarily the most relevant for writing print news. Many feature and human interest stories are better formulated in the narrative style common in currently in both print and broadcast journalism.

On the other hand, the delayed test of memory showed equality among the different news sources utilized in the study. Performance among the television group was improved to be almost similar to the other groups. Confidence in answers was not an exception. Repeated testing of the subjects might be responsible for this leveling. When taking the test again, subjects might have performed inner rehearsals that facilitated retrieval of correct answers in time 2.

Finally, the sleeper effect materialized significantly in the study. When subjects were tested immediately after exposure, they showed varying degrees of confidence in their answers. Confidence-accuracy relationship appeared to be positively significant.

When tested two hours later, confidence levels turned out to be almost equal among the four groups. Applying the concept of the sleeper effect, subjects might have associated information with its source in the first test, whereas dissociation was more prevalent in the second test. When dissociation took place, confidence scores were leveled out, and the effect of the type of news source on the feeling of knowing was neutralized.

On the other hand, the results suggest that while broadcast news media are gaining popularity and prominence, they are less effective in initiating stronger memory traces for the news compared to print materials or the news that are presented in a "written" format. Consequently, broadcast news could strive for more effectiveness by using additional techniques such as captions, superimposed statements, figures, and excerpts. Television news stories need to be "verbalized" as much as they have been "visualized." The use of factoids (lists of boiled-down facts) inside the televised news items could be one of the answers. On the other hand, the writing styles for different news media should be developed to meet the requirements of new technologies. Although print and online journalism are organized in space, they do have inherent dissimilarities that dictate the use of different news writing styles for both media. Professionals agree that he Inverted pyramid style is more suitable for print news, whereas the square format is more relevant to broadcast news. Agreement on the most suitable writing style for online news is still lacking, however.

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Hesham M. Mesbah, Dept. of Journalism &Mass Communication, Kuwait University This paper has been presented at the 28th Southeast Colloquium of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication held at Little Rock, Arkansas, March 6-8, 2002. The paper was recognized by the “Newspapers division” with Honorable Mention.

To Answer, or Not to Answer—

That is the Question of the Hour:

Image Restoration Strategies and Media Coverage of Past Drug Use Questions in the Presidential Campaigns of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

Shari Veil

Abstract

This study analyzed the relationship between image restoration strategies and media coverage, specifically, the image restoration strategies utilized by Bill Clinton in 1992 and George W. Bush in 1999 in response to questions of past drug use and the ensuing media coverage during the respective campaigns. A literature review of political apologia and image restoration strategies is presented, followed by potential explanations for the extensive media coverage of the drug issue. Articles published in 7 newspapers during the respective political campaigns were retrieved and textually analyzed to determine the candidates’ image restoration strategies. The reported presidential comments were then critically analyzed to demonstrate the potential influence of image restoration strategies on the media coverage of the drug questions.

Introduction

During their respective campaigns, Bill Clinton in 1992 and George W. Bush in 1999 used multiple image restorations strategies when questioned about past drug use. Their responses to these questions provide interesting examples for political communication research and analysis. Future political candidates and their staffs may find it useful to review notable candidates' strategies and the influence of these strategies on media coverage when developing rhetoric to promote and protect the candidate’s political image.

Trent and Friedenberg (2000) describe one’s political image as how voters perceive a candidate or elected official. This perception is based on “a candidate’s personal traits, job performance, and issue positions” (Denton & Stuckey, 1994, p. 7). Once an image has been established, strategies may be required to protect that image. Brinson and Benoit (1996) recognize that “when a reputation is threatened, individuals and organizations are motivated to present an image defense: explanations, justifications, rationalizations, apologies, or excuses for behavior” (p. 30). Sellnow, Ulmer, and Snider (1998) agree, “[Individuals] must engage in a discourse with their public that provides an adequate justification for whatever actions are under scrutiny” (p. 62).

It is in this discourse that political candidates may utilize apologia or image restoration strategies to defend their image against overzealous questions and accusations. While candidates cannot dictate the media’s coverage of certain issues, by taking into account other potential influencers, one can analyze media coverage and determine if image restoration strategies can also influence the media.

Research Questions

To determine the potential influence of image restoration strategies on media coverage, three relevant research questions were asked.

RQ1) What image restoration strategies were utilized by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in response to questions about past drug use?

RQ2) Was there a difference in the amount of media coverage of the drug issue pertaining to the candidates?

RQ3) Is there a relationship between the image restoration strategies utilized and the media coverage of the candidates’ responses to questions of past drug use?

To investigate these questions, a literature review of political apologia and image restoration strategies is presented, followed by potential explanations for the extensive media coverage of the drug issue. Retrieved articles are then textually analyzed to determine candidates’ image restoration strategies. Finally, the media coverage in correlation to the image restoration strategies used is analyzed to provide implications of the study and offer suggestions for future research.

Literature Review

Apologia and Image Restoration Strategies

A respectable body of research on political apologia has developed over the years, spanning the decades between Sam Houston’s speech of self-defense in the House of Representatives in 1832 (Linkugel & Razak, 1969) and President Clinton’s 1999 self-defense in the Monica Lewinsky scandal (Kramer & Olson, 2002). While the majority of political apologia research has focused on single speeches, as in Nixon’s 1952 “Checkers” speech (Vartabedian, 1985) and Edward Kennedy’s 1969 “Chappaquiddick” address (Ling, 1970), more recent research has concentrated on the progressive apologia of individuals facing a crisis, such as the multiple messages of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal (Kramer & Olsen, 2002). Another body of apologia discourse has focused on corporations going through crisis (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Hearit, 1995; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001). According to Benoit (1997), “The basic options are the same for both individual and corporate image repair efforts” (p. 177).

In apologetic discourse, an individual can use several strategies to respond to image-damaging attacks. Ware and Linkugel (1973) posit these strategies include denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Denial involves the disavowal of “any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the audience” (276). Bolstering requires reinforcement of “the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship that is viewed favorably by the audience” (277). Differentiation changes the meaning of an event by separating the elements of that event from the larger context. Transcendence cognitively joins “some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some larger context within which the audience does not presently view that attitude” (p. 280).

Building on apologia discourse, Benoit (1997) offers five broad categories of image restoration strategies to use when one’s reputation is under attack: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. Within each broad category, Benoit details variants of the “message options” (p. 178). Denial can be classified as simple denial or shifting the blame to another party. Evasion of responsibility includes the variants of provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Provocation is used in claiming the accused was provoked into committing the offensive act. Defeasibility is used when stating there was not enough information available or the accused was unable to avoid the offensive act. The third variation is used in claiming the offensive act was an accident, and the fourth variation of good intentions is used in claiming the accused meant well in the act. Reducing offensiveness of the act includes bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, and compensation. Beniot (1997) describes bolstering as “stressing good traits,” minimization as claiming the act was not serious, differentiation as claiming the act was less offensive than other acts, transcendence as claiming there are more important issues than the offensive act, attacking the accuser as reducing the credibility of the accuser, and compensation as reimbursing the victim of the offensive act. Corrective action—a plan to solve or prevent a problem—and mortification—an apology for the act—do not have subcategories but are often used in conjunction with other image restoration strategies (p. 179). Sellnow, et al. (1998) contends that “individual strategies used to restore an image may interact with other strategies” (p. 69) and “one image restoration strategy can imply or combine with other strategies” (p. 71).

Benoit (1997) also addresses the issue of not responding. In identifying the options of redefining the attack, refocusing attention, and simply ignoring the issue, Benoit contends that an individual does not need to respond to accusations, although he notes that “if a charge is important to the audience,” one “may well be forced to deal with that accusation” (p. 183). I posit that, by doing nothing, an individual is still responding. The individual is attempting to reduce the offensiveness of the act by responding with a message that the issue is not important enough for a response.

While it is true that, if the issue is not important it will likely go away, it is not the individual’s perception of the issue but the public’s that determines if a full-blown crisis will be avoided by ignoring the situation. As Benoit (1997) suggests, “The key question is not if the act was in fact offensive, but whether the act is believed by the relevant audience(s) to be heinous” (p. 178).

In furthering image restoration strategy discourse, I propose an additional option, ambiguity, that does not fall into Benoit’s image restoration strategy. Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) offer advice that initially seems contradictory to standard crisis management practice. They contend that “ambiguity, when viewed in the context of a crisis situation, enables organizations to strategically communicate seemingly contradictory messages to distinct audiences” (p. 146). By tailoring organizational ambiguity to image restoration strategies, an individual may be able to extend the life of certain strategies. Rescinding a denial delivered before all the facts are known may actually damage an individual’s image. Ulmer and Sellnow’s (2000) review of Weick’s (1988) explanation of “appropriate action” contends that organizations and individuals “limit their potential for coping with a crisis when they make a firm commitment to a single strategy” (p. 146).

Allowing the potential for coping with a crisis is not the same as deception, however. It is the intent of the ambiguity that can infringe upon ethics. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) warn, “withholding information as a form of deception may deny individuals the ability to make informed judgments” (p. 235). Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) agree, “There exists an ethical obligation for those in positions of influence to provide the information to their constituencies that is necessary for making well-reasoned decisions” (p. 216). Nilsen (1974) labels this ability to make decisions “significant choice.” Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) contend that stakeholders should have the opportunity to engage in significant choice. The question addressed with the Clinton and Bush drug inquiries is whether there was an ethical obligation to answer the question. While this study does not examine the ethical implications of the image restoration strategies, crisis communication research suggests the quickest way to end a crisis is for the individual or organization to be open and avoid withholding important information from the public (Benoit, 1997; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Sellnow, et al., 1998; Ulmer, 2001). If the public finds out at a later date that information was withheld, the individual’s or organization’s image will be damaged by the discovery and by the perception that the individual or organization was dishonest in withholding the information. Benoit (1997) attends that, “Apart from the fact that this is morally the correct thing to do, attempting to deny true accusations can backfire” (p. 184).

Regardless of the strategies used, Scott and Lyman’s (1968) framework of accounts suggests that the strategies and accounts will be accepted when they (1) outweigh the offense, (2) offer a motive acceptable to the audience, and (3) reflect ordinary social knowledge of reasonable behavior. Blaney and Benoit (2001) describe the theory of image restoration as having two primary assumptions: first that communication is a goal-oriented activity, and second, is that maintenance of a favorable image is one of the primary goals.

While the maintenance of a favorable image is an obvious goal for a political candidate, that image is subject to the scrutiny of the public and the media as the public’s eye. Benoit and Brinson (1999) note, “One’s image is influenced by one’s own words and actions, as well as by the discourse and behavior of others” (p. 145). By analyzing Clinton’s and Bush’s own words, categorizing the image restoration strategies used to address the drug questions, and examining the behavior of the media pertaining to the coverage of the drug issue, this essay demonstrates how image restoration strategies, along with additional factors, influence media coverage.

Media Coverage

The amount of media coverage a certain issue warrants can be attributed to a number of different factors, including bias. Because Clinton and Bush belong to different political parties, any difference found in the coverage of their drug use could be attributed to left or right wing bias. While Lichter (2001) and Lowry and Shidler (1998) found that Democrats have received slightly more favorable coverage than Republicans in the past 50 years, repeated analysis of news coverage of presidential elections has found no evidence of partisan bias in news reporting (Gulati, Just, & Crigler, 2004; D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Hofstetter, 1976; Just, et al., 1996; Patterson, 1980; Patterson & McClure, 1976).

Bias can also be seen in how a story is framed. Theories of framing suggest that news coverage can foster changes in public opinion by promoting particular definitions and interpretations of political issues (Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). Patterson (1980) notes that the news frames campaigns within a competitive game in which there is always a loser. Hofstetter (1976) contends that news is biased against losing candidates, not because of their policies, but because of what reporters deem to be news. Some researchers have found candidates receive negative coverage when they are behind in the polls (Bennett, 2001; Stevenson, Eisinger, Feinberg, & Kotok, 1973) while others have found that it is the front-runner who receives more negative coverage (Robinson & Sheehan, 1983). During their respective campaigns, both Clinton and Bush were already the front-runners for their respective parties in the primaries when the initial stories of the drug questions broke (Boyarsky, 1992; Yardley, 1999).

While framing an election as a game or race can add excitement to a campaign, the juicy details of a politician’s past life have become a part of the sensationalism inherent to today’s news repertoire. “Overall, the network news, the cover stories of news magazines, and the front pages of major newspapers witnessed an increase from 15% to 43% between 1977 and 1997 in celebrity, scandal, gossip, crime, and other human interest stories” (Hickey, 1998, p. 49). Gulati, et al. (2004) contend that campaigns that are not competitive or do not have a scandal erupting are rarely covered. Television is one of the most influential catalysts to increased sensationalism and has “enhanced the discrepancy between the ‘hoopla’ and substance observed in print” (Gulati, et al., 2004, p. 241). Because television also has a greater tendency to dramatize politics (Bennett, 2001; Graber, 2001), the trend of increasing attention on political drama could be attributed to any increase in media coverage between the elections.

Aside from political bias, game-framing, and sensationalism, there could be many other reasons why one candidate receives more media coverage than another, including timing, relevance, or lack of more important news stories. In the analysis of the media coverage of candidates’ past drug use, I do not attempt to claim image restoration strategies have a direct correlation with the amount of media coverage an issue receives since I cannot control any other factors. However, I do posit that image restoration strategies are an additional influence on the media coverage. As future research on image restoration strategies and media coverage develops, additional studies may further prove this hypothesis.

Method

To determine whether image restoration strategies have an influence on media coverage, I analyzed each candidate’s use of image restoration strategies and the media’s coverage over the course of the presidential campaigns before the 1992 and 2000 elections. I completed a textual analysis of the quotations from news articles in various metropolitan area newspapers, including Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Orlando Sentinel, Star Tribune, The Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal (retrieved through ProQuest). I also studied the evening news on three major television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, over the course of the campaigns (retrieved through the Vanderbilt Television News Archives). The articles and television news clips were retrieved using the following key word combinations: Clinton and marijuana, Clinton and drug, Bush and cocaine, Bush and drug. The articles and news clips were then classified and counted as a part of the initial story break or the revival of the story. Articles and news clips retrieved were not used in the study if they did not pertain to past drug use of the candidates. For example, articles regarding Clinton’s stance on medicinal marijuana were not used unless there was a reference to accusations of Clinton’s own past drug use. Likewise, articles regarding Bush’s stance on tougher penalties for cocaine dealers were not used unless there was a reference to accusations of Bush’s own past drug use. I also did not review articles featured in the opinion, editorial, letters to the editor, commentary, or perspective columns of the newspapers. After limiting the scope of my study, I reviewed the 76 articles and 12 news clips and analyzed the image restoration strategies used by the candidates as reported by the newspapers and networks.

Textual Analysis of Image Restoration Discourse

Image Restoration and Clinton’s Awkward Admission

During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton engaged in multiple image restoration strategies when questioned about marijuana use. While he eventually admitted to using the drug, it was only through a series of strategically ambiguous statements and minimization, denial, attacking the accuser, bolstering, and mortification strategies that the awkward admission occurred.

Using ambiguity, Clinton implied he had not used drugs, without admitting whether he had in fact used them. Edsall (1992a) reported that “When asked by the New York Daily News editorial board if he had ever engaged in drug use, Clinton replied: ‘I have never broken the laws of my country’” (p. A1). Clinton also stated, “I’ve never broken any state laws” (Edsall, 1992a, p. A1), thus avoiding admitting past drug use by withholding that he had broken the law of another country.

In his now famous admission, “When I was in England, I experimented with marijuana a time or two. And I didn’t like it, and I didn’t inhale and I didn’t try it again” (Edsall, 1992a, p. A1), Clinton employed a compound of minimizing statements. Noting he was in England at the time, Clinton attempted to minimize the offense by claiming he did not technically break United States law. His comment that he “experimented a time or two” implied that the use was out of curiosity and was not a regular habit. Blaney and Beniot (2001) contend that “By saying that he did not like the experience and never repeated it, he minimized the offense, implying that he never became an active part of the drug culture that so many people found offensive” (p. 60). Finally, Clinton’s claim that he did not inhale implied that “the action was not as bad as if he had actually imbibed the substance” (Blaney & Benoit, 2001, p. 60).

When asked to assess the political impact of his admission, Clinton used minimization in conjunction with denial and bolstering: “I don’t think it hurt Senator Gore four years ago, or Governor Babbitt. It certainly didn’t keep Clarence Thomas off the Supreme Court” (Edsall, 1992a, p. A1). Invoking the names of famous political figures who admitted past marijuana use allowed Clinton to minimize his own use. In this instance, his use of denial allowed him to imply that since the other politicians’ careers were not damaged by their admissions, neither would his.

Clinton used minimization with bolstering when recalling past experiments with other vices. “This is not a big issue with me. I never even had a drink of whiskey until I was 22” (Edsall, 1992a, p. A1). Claiming it is not a big issue to him, Clinton minimized the offense by determining that it was unimportant. In his comment that he “never even had a drink of whiskey” Clinton employed minimization and bolstering by implying that someone who did not even have a “drink of whiskey” until age 22 could not have been involved in a major drug offense.

Clinton also used denial in response to the accusation that he had misled the American public into believing he had not used drugs. Edsall (1992a) reported that during an impromptu sidewalk news conference after the March 29, 1992 debate, Clinton defended his answers: “I said I’ve never broken the drug laws of my country, and that is the absolute truth. . . . If they [the Daily News editors] had asked me the same question . . . I would have given the same answer” (p. A1).

As questions about Clinton’s past drug use progressed into the weeks following the admission, Clinton began to attack his accusers. Rosenstiel (1992) reported that “The Clinton campaign responded by blaming the New York media for not being interested in issues” (p. 24). Maraniss (1992) reported that Clinton “raised his hoarse voice several decibels as he tried to turn the burden of responsibility around to the press. He said, ‘I think a lot of this stuff is calculated media grandstanding and positioning’” (p. A1). Turning his attacks to his political opponents, “Clinton, appearing exasperated, said the focus on personal issues was what Bush and the Republicans wanted to obscure a debate on the nation’s problems. ‘It’s a trap,’ he said. ‘It’s just another trap’” (Maraniss, 1992, p. A1).

After taking hit after hit from the media, Clinton used bolstering and mortification to try to put an end to the questions. “I think I’ve done a pretty good job, being an imperfect person, in trying to follow the real moral obligation in life - which is trying to do better tomorrow than you did today. . . . What you’re seeing is what you get. If you don’t want it, vote for Bush. . . . I’ve got a great life but it’s going to be a bad, cold four years for America” (Maraniss, 1992, p. A1). Clinton used bolstering by implying that he is a good man because he is “trying to follow the real moral obligation in life.” He implied mortification by admitting that he is “an imperfect person.” Clinton used bolstering again by implying that he is a better candidate than Bush by claiming that, if you vote for Bush, “it’s going to be a bad, cold four years for America.”

Despite the instances of ambiguity and image restoration strategies, Clinton claims he was not trying to restore his image with his answers. Richter (1992) reported that Clinton said he found it “amazing” that “anybody would be so obsessed with [the drug use issue] and should actually have decided that I gave a calculated answer to try to diminish the impact of the fact that I’d tried” marijuana (p. 31). Clinton also stressed that he was not trying to avoid blame by saying he did not inhale. “What you interpret me as saying was, ‘It really wasn’t so bad because I didn’t inhale it.’ I wasn’t trying to exonerate myself” (Richter, 1992, p. 31).

Bill Clinton engaged in multiple image restoration strategies in the progressive apologia surrounding the question of marijuana use. While he eventually admitted to using the drug, it was only through a series of strategically ambiguous statements and the utilization of the image restoration strategies of ambiguity, minimization, denial, attacking the accuser, bolstering, and mortification.

Image Restoration and Bush’s Refusal to Reply

George W. Bush had seen the media’s fascination with presidential candidates’ past drug use when Clinton ran against his father in 1992. Despite this front-row view, Bush also had to employ image restoration strategies when faced with accusations of past cocaine use. As reported in the media in 1999, Bush engaged in ambiguity and employed the strategies of mortification, minimization, attacking the accuser, and transcendence.

Simon and Walsh (1999) accounted that “Bush asks voters to dismiss his past sins, real or imagined, as the result of an occasionally ‘irresponsible’ youth” (p. 31). By acknowledging his “past sins,” Bush used mortification to imply that what he did (or did not do) in the past was wrong. He used ambiguity by saying that his sins were “real or imagined” but did not admit whether he had actually “sinned,” or used cocaine. Bush sought to minimize the offense by saying any sins are the result of an occasionally “irresponsible” youth. By focusing on “occasional” and “youth,” Bush attempted to distinguish claims that he was an avid partier and that it was not a recent activity.

Bush often used his youth as a minimization strategy. In response to the questions: “Have you ever used drugs? Marijuana? Cocaine?” Bush replied: “I’m not going to talk about what I did as a child” (Kurtz, 1999a, p. C1), and “I’m not going to talk about what I did years ago” (Kurtz, 1999b, p. A2). In one account Bush stated that he would have been able to pass security clearance in Clinton’s administration, which required reporting drug use in the past seven years, and in Bush’s father’s administration, which would have required reporting drug use 15 years prior to 1989 (Barringer, 1999b, p. 1.28). When pushed to answer the question beyond 1974, Bush refused. Barringer (1999b) reported that Bush rebuffed the question of past drug use with the words: “What I did as a kid? I don’t think it’s relevant” (p. 1.28). Bush used minimization by concentrating on the “relevance” of youthful indiscretions and by implying that anything prior to 1974 was not important enough for a response.

Bush attacked his accusers when stating that rumors were being planted and the media was taking the bait. Barringer (1999b) reported that Bush said he was convinced that rumors about his personal life were being planted, but he didn’t identify who he believed was planting the rumors. “They’re ridiculous and they’re absurd, and the people of America are sick and tired of this kind of politics. And I’m not participating” (p. 1.28). “Somebody floats a rumor and causes you to ask a question, and that’s the game in American politics . . . I refuse to play it” (Balz & Duggan, 1999, p. A13). Bush was not alone in attacking the accuser. Woodward (1999) noted, “Supporters of George W. Bush launched an assault on the news media for its coverage of rumors” (p. A5).

Bush used transcendence in his reasoning for not answering the question. Benoit (1995) suggests that a transcendent appeal “directs our attention to other, allegedly higher values, to justify the behavior in question” (pp. 77-78). Apple (1999) reported that Bush said, “I have told the American people all I’m going to tell them . . . I hope the people appreciate a candidate who comes along and says, enough is enough. Enough is enough digging into people’s background years ago” (p. A14) In a later interview, he said he was determined to end what he called “the politics of personal vilification,” and he was going to give his “best shot at cleansing and reinvigorating the system” (Apple, 1999, p. A14). According to Walsh (1999), Bush said, “I’ve learned that sometimes politics can be unnecessarily ugly and I’m trying to purge the system of ugly politics” (p. A5). Bush used transcendence when he said his reason for refusing to answer the question was to draw the line on invasive questions and “cleanse” and “purge” the system. Bush contended that he was taking the high road and would sacrifice the election in order to take a stand against invasive questions: “If the American people don’t like my position they can go out and find someone else to vote for” (Apple, 1999, p. A14).

While both Clinton and Bush utilized image restoration strategies, they varied in their use of the different strategies. I propose that the image restoration strategies used demonstrate, not a direct correlation, but a potential influence on the media coverage of the issue.

Media Coverage of the Drug Questions

To determine if candidates’ image restoration strategies influenced media coverage, the study included an analysis of news articles from Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Orlando Sentinel, Star Tribune, The Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, and news clips from the evening news on ABC, NBC, and CBS over the course of the campaigns. There were differences in the newspaper and television coverage of the candidates.

Twenty-seven news articles and nine evening news stories covered Clinton’s responses to drug questions from March 29 to October 4, 1992, with news coverage on 16 days. Forty-nine news articles and three evening news stories covered Bush’s response to drug questions from August 5 to October 27, 1999, with news coverage on 20 days. Clinton’s answers to the drug question received much less coverage in the newspapers; however, they received more television news coverage. For Clinton, the topic remained in the news for a much longer period of time; however, he had fewer actual days of news coverage.

The Media of Marijuana

The initial newspaper coverage of questions about Clinton’s drug use included 21 articles in the 7 publications (Table 1). The coverage ran 26 days from March 30 to April 24, 1992. Television coverage during the evening news included 9 stories on 3 stations (Table 2). The coverage ran March 29 to April 29, 1992, spanning 31 days. During the conventions and the final stages of the campaign, Clinton’s opponents revived the drug question, bringing up Clinton’s sketchy admission to smoking marijuana. Six articles in 3 of the 7 publications (Table 3) covered the stories for 82 days, from July 14 to October 4, 1999.

Table 1: Newspaper articles in the initial story break of Clinton’s

marijuana questions

Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run

Chicago Tribune 1 March 30, 1992

Los Angeles Times 6 March 30 – April 24, 1992

New York Times 2 March 30 – April 24, 1992

Orlando Sentinel 2 March 30 – April 24, 1992

Star Tribune 1 March 30, 1992

Wall Street Journal 1 March 30, 1992

The Washington Post 8 March 30 – April 12, 1992

Table 2: Television news stories in the initial story break of Clinton’

marijuana questions

Network # of Stories Dates Run

ABC 2 March 29 – March 31, 1992

CBS 3 March 29 – April 17, 1992

NBC 4 March 29 – April 7, 1992

Table 3: Newspaper articles in the revival of the story of Clinton’s

marijuana question

Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run

Los Angeles Times 3 August 19 – October 4, 1992

New York Times 1 October 4, 1992

Star Tribune 2 July 14 – August 18, 1992

The Coverage of Cocaine

The initial newspaper coverage of Bush’s responses to drug questions included 38 articles in seven publications (Table 4). The coverage ran August 5 to September 20, 1999. Television coverage during the evening news included three stories on two stations (Table 5). The coverage ran three days, from August 19 to August 21, 1999. Bush also saw a revival of the drug question when an unauthorized biography alleging drug use was pulled from the shelves. Nine articles in 6 of the 7 publications (Table 6) covered the story, running 6 days from October 22 to October 27, 1999.

Table 4: Newspaper articles in the initial story break of Bush’s

cocaine questions

Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run

Chicago Tribune 8 August 5 – August 27, 1999

Los Angeles Times 3 August 19– August 23, 1999

New York Times 7 August 19 – August 26, 1999

Orlando Sentinel 7 August 19 – August 23, 1999

Star Tribune 1 August 22, 1999

Wall Street Journal 2 August 20 – August 30, 1999

The Washington Post 10 August 11 – September 20, 1999

Table 5: Television news stories in the initial story break of Bush’s

cocaine questions

Network # of Stories Dates Run

ABC 1 August 19, 1999

CBS 2 August 19 – August 21, 1999

Table 6: Newspaper articles in revival of the story of Bush’s

cocaine questions

Newspaper # of Articles Dates Run

Chicago Tribune 1 October 24, 1999

Los Angeles Times 3 October 22 – October 27, 1999

New York Times 2 October 22 – October 23, 1999

Star Tribune 1 October 22, 1999

Wall Street Journal 1 October 22, 1999

The Washington Post 1 October 27, 1999

Implications

Print Media Coverage

In reviewing the image restoration strategies and the potential influence on media coverage, I found that Clinton employed minimization the most often in his interaction with the media. Because minimization is a more passive strategy, the media may have decided to simply let the marijuana issue go, since Clinton did not think it was a big issue. Also, while there are other reasons that may explain the difference in the number of articles in the newspaper coverage of the drug use questions, including media issues such as bias and timing aforementioned or policy issues such as the hardness of the drug and past stances on drug issues, based empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of open, honest communication (Benoit, 1997; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer, 2001; Sellnow, et al., 1998) I believe the strongest factor in Clinton’s marijuana story fading from the news was in his admission. While the “I didn’t inhale” line is still used as a political inside joke, once the question was answered to the reporters’ satisfaction, there was no reason to revisit it.

Bush, however, in refusing to fully answer the question, left reporters still looking for answers. By using transcendence in his image restoration strategy, Bush may have also offended reporters by saying the system needed to be purged of “ugly politics” (Walsh, 1999, p. A5). Transcendence is an aggressive strategy and implies that the user of the strategy has “higher values.” Bush’s strategy of transcendence may have been seen as a challenge to some reporters, causing an increase in questioning rather than a decrease in coverage. Clymer (1999) contends that Bush’s answers made the issue linger rather than go away (p. A8). Based on the difference between the amount of media coverage of the drug question in the two campaigns and the empirical research described in this study, I maintain image restoration strategies do influence the amount of media coverage an issue receives.

Television Media Coverage

While a continuing trend in covering scandals can help explain the increase in newspaper coverage of Bush’s cocaine query, it does not explain the decrease in television coverage from 1992 to 1999. However, the availability of video can explain the difference. Clinton’s admission was delivered during a television debate. There were cameras rolling, and there was “exciting” video to feed to television stations. Kurtz (1992d) states that Clinton spent much of his time in New York “explaining, denying, justifying and shouting down hecklers. The television image is of a man constantly backpedaling, struggling to shift the debate from personal ethics and pot-puffing to economic issues” (p. A1). Not long after Clinton’s admission, Billy Chrystal took the opportunity to mock Clinton on the televised Academy Awards, which led to more interesting video (Maraniss, 1992, A1). Yardley (1999) found there was only a tape recording and a transcript of the news conference where Bush lashed out at the media. There was no “hoopla” to show on television, which diminished the television coverage of Bush and the cocaine accusations. Comparing the television news coverage of the responses to question of drug use in light of the research on sensationalism in television news (Gulati, et al., 2004; Bennett, 2001; Graber, 2001), I found no correlation between the image restoration strategies and the evening news coverage.

Length of Media Coverage

Based on the timing of the story breaks, it is also difficult to draw conclusions from the length of the time the stories were in the media. The amount of time the issue was in the news is relevant to when the story broke. Because Clinton’s admission occurred in March during the primary, the revival of the story in October occurred because of the upcoming general election. Meanwhile, since Bush’s story broke in August—a year before the election—the story was not timely enough to bring back into the news at the end of the campaign. Therefore, even though Clinton’s connection to marijuana was in the news longer, it does not necessarily mean his drug use received more coverage. I found no correlation between the image restoration strategies and the length of time the stories were in the news.

After analyzing the image restoration strategies and the media coverage of the campaigns, I determined that image restoration strategies do influence media coverage; however, other factors also influence media coverage, including the availability of video and timing of the story. While some implications can be drawn from this study, others require future research.

Limitations and Future Research

This study was limited to news articles in seven national newspapers and news stories on three television news programs. Future research could take into account the coverage of the drug issue in newspaper opinion columns. While I did not analyze whether the content of the opinion columns was positive or negative, an initial count of opinion, editorial, letters to the editor, commentary, and perspective columns in the 7 publications revealed 21 articles on Clinton and 50 articles on Bush. Analysis of editorials could suggest a possible slant in the news coverage due to the opinions of the editors. A qualitative analysis of letters to the editor could be compared with a quantitative analysis of the polls to determine if the public really is disinterested in the past drug use of presidential candidates. The study could also be expanded to other newspapers and other mediums, including cable and satellite television as well as newsmagazines. While it was not used in 1992, the Internet could be added as a medium in future studies comparing other campaigns. An interesting twist considering the gossip value of the drug issue would be to analyze the content and coverage of entertainment programs like The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Late night with David Letterman, and Saturday Night Live. Smith and Voth (2002) note that shortly before the 2000 Presidential election, the Pew Research Center for People and the Press reported that 47% of people between the ages of 18 and 29 obtained most of their political information from late-night entertainment outlets.

Conclusion

This study analyzed the image restoration strategies utilized by Bill Clinton in 1992 and George W. Bush in 1999 and the ensuing media coverage of their alleged past drug use. Despite polling evidence that the public is not interested in presidential candidates’ past drug use (Balz, 1999), reporters continue to broach the subject when questioning politicians, forcing candidates to employ various strategies to protect their images. While the glaring headline in The Washington Post embodies the predicament of politicians faced with the nagging questions of past drug use: “To Answer, or Not to Answer: That is the Question of the Hour” (Woodward, 1999, p.A.05), continued coverage of this issue could lead to interesting longevity studies of image restoration strategies and improved strategic campaign rhetoric.

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Shari Veil (Shari.Veil@ndsu.edu) is a Ph.D. Student at North Dakota State University

To Answer, or Not to Answer—That is the Question of the Hour:

Image Restoration Strategies and Media Coverage of Past Drug Use

Questions in the Presidential Campaigns of Bill Clinton and

George W. Bush

Shari Veil

Image Restoration Strategies and Media Coverage

of Past Drug Use Questions in the Presidential Campaigns

of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

Abstract

Literature Review

Paradigmatic Conflict

Paradigmatic Resolution Through Fiat

Destination Vehicle

What How

Value Kritiking

Kritiking qua Praxis

Conclusion

Notes

References

Abstract

Introduction

Ethical Violations in Extemporaneous Speaking

When Conventional Norms Contradict Scholarly Research

Challenging Cultural Norms And Unwritten Expectations

References

Abstract

Synopsis

The Narrative

The Epilogue

Enthymemes and the Means of Persuasion

References

To Answer, or Not to Answer—

That is the Question of the Hour:

Image Restoration Strategies and Media Coverage of Past Drug Use Questions in the Presidential Campaigns of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

Shari Veil

Abstract

Apologia and Image Restoration Strategies

Image Restoration and Clinton’s Awkward Admission

Media Coverage of the Drug Questions

The Coverage of Cocaine

Print Media Coverage

Television Media Coverage

Length of Media Coverage